

JORDAN'S DIPLOMACY
REGIONALLY AND INTERNATIONALLY
(1990-2004)

By

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This thesis (Jordanian Diplomacy: Regionally and internationally 1990-2004) was successfully defended and approved on the 31st of August, 2005.

Examination Committee

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
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

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Dedication

I dedicate the work and the efforts I made on this thesis to the most precious people to
my heart:

My beloved Parents,

My wonderful husband,

My dearest brothers and sisters

And to every Jordanian and human being who loves this country, our beloved Jordan,
as much as I do.

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No matter what I say or do, I cannot express my thankfulness for my precious parents who constantly supported me and provided the perfect atmosphere and encouragement for me to excel. My deep appreciation goes to my beloved husband, without his patience, continuous encouragement, and “I’m so proud of you reminders” I would have not been able to finish this thesis. More thanks go to my wonderful brothers and sisters who each helped in his/her own way.

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I would also like to thank the former Dean of the Faculty of Higher Education Dr. Suleiman Al Khalil for his complete understanding and cooperation to provide the best learning environment for the students. My deep appreciation goes to the current Dean of the Faculty of Higher Education Dr.Hani Al Dmour. In addition to my respected teacher Dr. Abdul Hakim Shibly. Last but not least, I would also like to thank all the domain of my study population who answered the questionnaire, and my friends who supported and encouraged me.

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-Researcher's Personal interview with Dr. Mohammad Abu Hdeib is a deputy the lower House of Parliament and Head of the Lower House's committee for regional and International affairs. The researcher met with Dr. Abu Hdeib in his office in July of 2005 .

-Researcher's personal interview with former minister of foreign affairs Abdul Ilah Al Khatib on Sunday August 21st, 2005 in Amman.

-Researcher's personal interview with Dr. Fayez Al-Tarawneh- Former Prime Minister of Jordan -Head of the Jordanian delegation to the Washington negotiations- and former Jordanian ambassador in Washington D.C.. The interview took place on the 28th of July 2005.

-Researcher's personal interview with Dr. Saleh Al Ma'aytah, retired general of the Arab Army. He is also a strategic researcher and lecturer at the University of Mu'ta. The researcher met with him on the 28th of June, 2005 in Amman-Jrdan.

-Tables and figures of the outcome of the questionnaire analysis by SPSS.

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ABSTRACT

This thesis talks about the Jordanian Diplomacy in two periods of time and under the reign of two monarchs. It discusses the main events and aspects of Jordanian diplomacy, which has been headed by the monarch from its very beginning, in the last nine years of King Hussein's reign and in the first five years of King Abdullah's. This thesis described the Jordanian stances in the main events that took place during these periods of time. It described the Jordanian stands and positions in inter-Arab conflicts such as the Yemeni conflict and the Gulf wars, the Arab-Israeli conflicts, international relations mainly with the United States of America, in addition to the issue of reform.

The study utilized the historical description and analysis method to find out how effective the Jordanian diplomacy is had been and what role had it been playing in regards of the above mentioned issues and most importantly its main goal in the protection and achievement of its national interests.

Aim of the thesis:

In this thesis the researcher is going to discuss the Jordanian diplomacy, see how Jordan had dealt with the various events and the constantly changing regional and international environment. The researcher will display the main changes and events and find out whether the Jordanian diplomacy has succeeded or failed in making the right foreign policy and diplomatic decisions during the last nine years of King Hussein's reign and the first five years of King Abdullah II's reign.

Importance of the thesis:

Despite the fact that Jordan is a small country with very limited resources, its geographic location in the heart of the Arab world gives the kingdom its true importance, far beyond its scarce resources and small population might have suggested. Being physically closest of all Arab countries to the epicenter of the conflict in Palestine and the conflict in Iraq, Jordan has the role of regional stabilizer, or shock absorber, that other countries near and far could not afford to dismiss.

Thus the researcher wanted to find out how Jordan could have such a role, and in the light of the unstable regional circumstances felt the need to look into how the Jordanian diplomacy headed by its monarchs dealt with the different emerging events in the region. The researcher wanted to go through these major events and analyze the Jordanian diplomatic position in each event. In this thesis the researcher also carried out a questionnaire to ask the people's opinion of how Jordanian diplomacy dealt with things and if they think that it failed or succeeded in taking the right actions and positions. The researcher also interviewed experts in Jordanian diplomacy to add more first hand information to her thesis.

Thesis Hypothesis:

- 1- A country's diplomacy plays a major role in preserving its survival and stability, and achievement of its national interests.
- 2- Even small countries with limited resources can play the role of the regional stabilizer.
- 3- The personality and the charisma of a country's leader play a big in defending and communicating its policies.
- 4- The wisdom of a small country's leader along with his own long and direct contacts with other leaders can make him and his country far more important than his country's small size and weak status would have otherwise indicated.
- 5- Small countries are able to achieve internal development and reform.

Methodology:

In order to prove or dis- prove the thesis Hypothesis the researcher used the Historical description and analysis method and strived to obtain accurate and updated primary and secondary data.

Primary data was obtained through:

- Interviews with Foreign Ministry officials, Parliament members, and leading political figures in Jordan.
- Interviews with leading journalists and Jordanian intellectuals.
- A survey and a questionnaire.

While secondary data was obtained through:

- Reference books and publications.
- Publications of International institutions such as the Washington Institute for Near East studies.
- Ministries' Archives.
- Reports of International Organizations
- Newspapers (local and international).
- Magazines.
- Periodicals.
- Internet articles.

Limitations of the study:

Jordanian diplomacy has been involved in most regional and international affairs; however it is impossible to discuss all these affairs in this thesis. Thus, the researcher is going to talk about the following issues precisely in the period between 1990 and 2004. A period which covers the last nine years of King Hussein's reign and the first five years of King Abdullah II's reign. The major issues that concerned Jordanian diplomacy which will be discussed in this thesis are:

1. Inter- Arab relations and regional affairs.
2. The regional disputes and precisely the first and second Gulf conflicts.
3. The Arab- Israeli peace talks and the implications of the peace treaty for Jordan.
4. International relation, particularly relations with the United States and the European Union.
5. Economic development.

Previous Studies:

1. “From Hussein to Abdullah: Jordan in Transition” Satloff, Robert- Number Thirty Eight, April 1999.

This study was published a few months after King Abdullah II’s accession to the throne. Its aim was to put down the main challenges that the new King had to face and a brief description of his expected behavior towards them.

2. “Jordan: Case study of a pivotal state” Susser, Asher- the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington, 2000.

This book reviews the evolution of Jordan’s regional role and identifies the areas of continuity and change over the years. It recognizes Jordan’s key role in all major Middle East policy questions- from the peace process to Iraq. The book also assesses Jordan’s geostrategic centrality as essential to sound planning on each of these critical issues. It also discusses the fundamentals of Jordanian security strategy particularly after the death of King Hussein and the accession of King Abdullah II.

3. “The Jordanian-Israeli treaty: a study and analysis” Saqer, Mohammad, and others- The Middle East Studies Center, Amman 1999:

This study explains the details of the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty that was signed between the two countries on the 26th of October 1994. It was carried out by the The Middle East Studies Center to explain to the parties opposing this treaty and those who are pro this treaty the circumstances in which this treaty was signed and reads into the text of the treaty and its annexes to help them understand the causes, consequences, and

reflections of it so they can make use of the positive and prevent the negative aspects of it.

5. “King Hussein’s policy of survival” Dann,Uriel- the Washington Institute for Near East policy, Washington DC, 1992:

This is a policy paper written by a big admirer of King Hussein. He presents the different challenges King Hussein had faced and explains how the King dealt with each of them. This study reaffirms the fact that it was not easy for Jordan or the Jordanian monarchy to survive the challenges and threats it had faced and expresses admiration of King Hussein’s diplomacy.

6. Jordanian foreign policy: a study of the influencing changes and decision making.

By sai’eed ,Fou’ad , 1988. In this study the researcher talks about the Jordanian foreign policy in the period that preceded my time frame of my research which is up to 1988. It explains the different variables that have affected Jordanian foreign policy in that time frame.

7.Jordanian- Egyptian political relations: 1981-1999.By Bakr Mikhled

This study dealt with the Jordanian-Egyptian political relations from 1981 until 1999. It studied the style of political relations between Jordan and Egypt during that period, based on the assumption that these relations were unsettled because of regional crisis.

8. “Jordanian foreign policy and Arab conflicts: A study of the influence of regional factors on the Jordanian foreign policy behavior towards Arab conflicts.”, Tleilan, Osama,Mafraq-Jordan, February 2000.

As can be understood from the title of this study, it goes through the different Arab conflicts that took place in the region from the Iraqi-Kuwaiti conflict of 1961 until the Yemeni conflict of 1994. It provides an analysis of the Jordanian positions in regards of these conflicts and Jordan’s foreign policy behavior.

9.“(Political development in Jordan: 1974-1999, By Amayra, Isaldeen- Aligarh Muslim University, India, 2003).

This study represented a PHD thesis that analyzed different aspects of political development in Jordan within the time frame specified above. It discussed the political reforms which took place during that time, economic growth and development and the two biggest events in Jordanian politics at that time: The first Gulf war and the Jordan-Israel peace treaty.

10. “ Jordan’s diplomacy: Balancing National Survival with Nation’s revival”, Braizat, Musa- the Center for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan, Amman, Jordan, 1995.

This study talked about the several aspects of Jordan’s diplomacy. It gave a historical back ground of Jordan, discussed Jordan’s position within the Arab system, the peace process, the Gulf war. It also discussed Jordan’s economic policies, and its work to achieve democracy.

11. “Jordan’s position in the Gulf war”. Gur’an, Saleh- supervised by Dr. Mohammad Msalha, University of Jordan, Amman, June 1993.

This study was made in order to analyze and justify the Jordanian position towards the Gulf Crisis in the period between August of 1990 and March of 1991. It goes through Jordan’s attempts to avert war, the factors affecting its position, Jordan’s position during the war itself, and the consequences of such a position on Jordan and its economy.

Literature Review:

1. “Jordanian peace diplomacy 1967-1995”, by Al Aas, Tareq- The National Library, 1996:

This book describes Jordan as being one of the most committed countries in finding peaceful political solutions for the Arab-Israeli conflict, and in particular the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Thus it talks about the Jordanian pivotal role in this regards starting with the issuance of the UN Security Council resolution number 242 until signing the Palestinian-Israeli peace treaty.

2. “Secrets, positions, and decisions of King Hussein: between supporters and opposition”, by Hamza, Abd Al Min'em, the scientific book center, Egypt, 1999:

This book talks about various aspects of the last fifty years of King Hussein's life in which he went through numerous problems and conflicts. The author of this book explains how King Hussein dealt with these conflicts with extraordinary wisdom and smart politics that had to be studied and interpreted. This Egyptian author, of a military background, explains the geo-strategic importance of Jordan and how its stability is essential for the stability of the whole region. This book talks about King Hussein's decisions in the major events, particularly the Gulf wars and the Arab-Israeli conflict and peace process.

3. “The Jordanian peace treaty with Israel: between the Arab strategic choice and the constitutional path of Jordan”, by Al Badareen, Faleh-Al Hamed publication and distribution, first edition 2002:

This book discusses the Arab- Israeli negotiations since the Arab-Israeli war in 1948 until Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty was signed in October of 1994. It goes through the settlement projects and the international changes that took place in that period of time focusing at the treaty itself and the details of it.

4. “The regime of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan” by Dr. Haddad, Amjad- Dar Wael for printing and publishing, first edition 2003:

This book is rich with the details of the regime or system of Jordan. It talks about the history of Jordan then moves on to talk about the political system and life in the kingdom including its democracy, its national charter and foreign policy, In addition to the details of the “Jordan First “campaign

5. “Democracy and tools of political contribution”, by Al Adayleh, Nidal- Yazeed center, first edition 2004:

This book discusses most issues related to democracy. It explains issues such as the basics of a democratic regime, democracy and human rights, the different forms of democracy, and most importantly for this thesis the concept, limitations, and theory of political development.

6. “The Jordanian Foreign policy and the Gulf Cooperation Council” the papers of the third conference 3-4 April 2001, Edited by Dr. Mashakba- Ameen, Al Hamed for publication and printing, Amman, 2001:

This book in particular had been very useful to the researcher. It discussed at the beginning the details of the Jordanian Foreign policy, its variables, its variables, and the external and internal influences. Then the book displayed the Jordanian relations with each member of the Gulf Cooperation Council in papers presented by different political experts. And was concluded by a discussion of the future of Jordanian relations with the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council.

7. “The Jordanian Scene: from the Inherited culture to the concept of a state”, Batayneh, Fouad- the Arab establishment for studies and publications, first edition, 2005:

This publication talks about various issues on the Jordanian scene. It talks about the concept of “Jordan first” as an Arab phenomenon and a Jordanian logo, it talks about the Jordanian position in the second Gulf war, the concept of a state, tribal issues, the Royal Court, the General Intelligence department, corruption, Jordanian representation in the UN, the peace process, and most importantly for this thesis the Jordanian foreign policy.

8. “Democracy and tools of political contribution”, by Adayleh, Nidal- Yazeed center, first edition 2004:

This book discusses most issues related to democracy. It explains issues such as the basics of a democratic regime, democracy and human rights, the different forms of democracy, and most importantly for this thesis the concept, limitations, and theory of political development.

9. “The Jordanian Foreign policy : Reality and ambitions- documents of the first conference Amman April 1998” Edited by Dr. Mashakbeh, Ameen in cooperation with Dr. Tayyem, Fawzi- Dr. Khalaf, Mahmoud Dr. Mahmoud Ali, Dr. Hazaymeh, Mohammad- Al Hamed publication and distribution, Amman, 1999:

This book was the fruit of the first Jordanian Foreign Policy conference which was held in Amman in the summer of 1998 in cooperation of the following four national institutions: The Jordanian Society of political science, The Jordanian Institute of diplomacy, the political science and diplomatic studies department of the Applied Science University, and the international affairs society.

This book includes all the papers submitted by a group of Jordanian experts including politicians, academics, and intellectuals. These papers discussed most issues related to

the Jordanian Foreign policy, methods of developing it and improving its performance, in addition to the important subject of the achievement of the higher national interest for the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

10) “Abdullah II: The King of altruism and dedication”, By Jalabneh, Mostafa and Ghraibeh, Hussein The National library,2000)

This is a unique book that talks about the details of King Abdullah’s different stages of life; his education, military career, hobbies and activities. Not only that but it focuses on King Abdullah’s first year of rule and highlights his main decisions, first governments, speeches and different concerns and initiatives.

11) “The Negotiation diplomacy in the Jordanian experience: From Washington to Wadi Araba”, Dr. Masalha, Mohammad- Dr. Tarawneh, Fayez Center of Parliamentary studies, Amman, 2005).

This book enriches the reader with the finest details of the negotiation process that led to the signing of the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty in 1994 in Wadi Araba.

Dr. Mohammad Masalha, the researcher and supervisor of this book put down the facts and incidents that took place during the negotiations and quoted Dr. Fayez Tarawneh who was a direct participant in the negotiations, for first hand information.

12) “Al Kitab Al Abyad” or “The white book” Jordan and the Gulf crisis: August 1990-March 1991, published by the government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in Amman 1991.

After the first Gulf war the government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan felt that it had to explain its position from the Iraq-Kuwait conflict and the war on Iraq. It was harshly misunderstood and punished for this position, therefore it felt the need to justify

its actions and put down all the facts in this book that represents the official Jordanian position in this crisis.

The following books also discussed issues related to this thesis:

-“The Jordanian-Israeli treaty: a study and an analysis”, second edition, Amman 2000, by Saqer, Mohammad and others.

-“The process of decision making in the Jordanian Foreign policy”, Dr, Abu Deyyeh, Saad first edition, Beirut, January 1990.

-“The pursuit of Peace”, Prince Al Hassan bin Talal, Amman.

-“Rihlat Al Omr” – The Journey of life- from the tent to the Premier Power., Dr. Al Majali, Abdul Salam- First edition, Beirut –Lebanon 2003.

Section one

Concept and General overview of Diplomacy

There are numerous definitions of the term Diplomacy. However all of them can be summarized by saying that Diplomacy is the management of international relations by negotiation; the method by which these relations are adjusted and managed by ambassadors and envoys; who represent groups or nations with regards to issues of trade and war etc...

So, according to the definition the main task of diplomacy is negotiating and the exchange of ideas rather than using force or violence.

Diplomacy is a word derived from "diploma" in Latin which means (protecting and closing). In the Roman era, diploma was known as a metallic sheet that was carefully closed and protected. This metallic sheet gives to its carriers the permission to represent their kings and rulers in other countries.

In the 15th century, the meaning of diplomacy changed and advanced to be the word that is given to the documents that are related to international relations.

The expression “diplomacy” was for many years associated in men’s minds with the preservation of archives, the analysis of past treaties and the study of the history of international negotiations. This scientific, scholarly, element is still vital to the functioning of any efficient Foreign Service.

By time, Diplomacy was used a lot when related to foreign relations, and it became known as the art of negotiation and the art of administrating foreign relations.

The exact date when the human began using diplomacy is unknown, but most researchers agreed with the British diplomat 'Harold Nicholson' theory that says "the first time diplomacy was used was when the human being decided to put his weapon aside to make peace with his neighbors. As a result of this, his neighbors welcomed the idea of peace since they will be able to solve their conflicts and achieve common benefits.

The first embassy founded was in 1445 and the embassy represented Milan (Italy) in Genoa. It was in Italy that many of the traditions of modern diplomacy began, such as the presentation of ambassador credentials to the head of state. And since then, the idea of establishing embassies began in other countries.

Development of Diplomacy;

The development of diplomacy can be summarized through the following periods:

First Period: From ancient ages until the 15th century:

Diplomacy and foreign relations were unstable and unorganized. Tribes and nations during this period were only sending representatives to align, agree on peace, make truce, declare wars and sign trade agreements.

Second Period: From the 15th century until the Congress of Vienna in 1815:

The Vinita Republic had the big role in changing the diplomat from a traveling representative to a settling representative. In the other hand, France began to adopt the idea of the diplomatic system that was devised by King Louis XIV.

Third Period: From the Congress of Vienna in 1815 until World War I:

During this period, foreign relations rules and laws, which were agreed by the nations and countries at the Congress of Vienna and the time at which the 'League of Nations' was established, were applied by all countries.

Fourth Period: From World War I until present time:

In this period, the use of traditional diplomacy declined, and was replaced by modern diplomacy especially after World War II and the establishment of the UN in 1945.

Embassies and Ambassadors:

Definitions:

Diplomat: A diplomat is someone involved in diplomacy.

Diplomatic Mission: A collective term for a group of diplomats from a single country.

Ambassador: The most senior diplomatic rank.

Embassy: It is a diplomatic mission headed by an ambassador.

Diplomatic Corps: The collective body of all diplomats resident in a particular country is called diplomatic corp.

Countries establish embassies mainly for the following reasons:

- 1) To keep up to date with the latest developments in that region.
- 2) To strengthen the relations between the two countries, and allow a fast contact with the host country head of state.
- 3) To offer services to the foreign residents in the host country and to grant visas to travelers.

There are many different types of diplomacy; the following types are the main ones related to the topic of this thesis:

- Type 1: The Traditional Diplomacy (old diplomacy):

The use of this diplomacy became nowadays very limited. In this diplomacy, the big countries make their important decisions secretly and isolated from the smaller less power countries. These decisions are not accepted by the less power countries.

However, this traditional diplomacy is no longer used because of the international law and other factors like media that changed this diplomacy to the modern diplomacy.

- Type 2: The Modern Diplomacy:

In modern diplomacy International treaties, decisions and agreements are no longer secret between the nations and no longer expensive as they were in traditional diplomacy. This is all because of the advanced technology in communications. Nowadays, a country

leader may simply solve a conflict that could trigger war by a phone call, if there was full trust between him and the mediator.

The Modern diplomacy divides into many different types such as Electronic Communication Diplomacy, Parliamentary Diplomacy, Summit diplomacy, Public Diplomacy, Bilateral and Multilateral Diplomacy, and Earthquakes Diplomacy. Of course, it is not possible to talk about all these different types of diplomacy, but following is a summary of the types that are related to this thesis:

-Public Diplomacy

Public diplomacy presents efforts to inform and influence public opinion in other countries. Public diplomacy is different from other types of diplomacies because other diplomacies are government-to-government exercise conducted between officials.

In Parliamentary diplomacy the people control and decide the foreign policy for their country. But, for example, if the government has an investment plan to open in another country or a war to declare, how will the government convince the people to accept it? By using the media, international publications and cultural exchange the government will be able to convince the people on how necessary the thing the governments want to do. This is public diplomacy, it aims to win the hearts and minds of people and engage them in international relations and diplomacy.

-Bilateral and Multilateral Diplomacy

This diplomacy has been used from a long time in history, until now. Of course, bilateral and multilateral diplomacy were considered to be a type of traditional diplomacy but as time passed they changed to become a part of modern diplomacy and removed the secrecy they were based on.

An example for these types of diplomacy are the different types of conferences that aim to end up with a list of agreements, like the conference which resulted in the establishment of the United Nations in 1945.

However, since this thesis is concerned with the diplomacy of a small country such as Jordan, which is headed by the monarch, the following two types of diplomacy are the most important for this thesis:

-Summit Diplomacy

Summit diplomacy is the highest level of diplomacy and it is arranged by experts from an early time. In the summit diplomacy the head of state in the country meets with other head of states. This type is clear and frank, and usually concludes with many agreements.

-Small state diplomacy

The small state with which this thesis is concerned is a state lacking the military power to carry out a policy by force against a large state for any protracted period. Such a definition excludes a number of countries which are not traditionally regarded as great powers but which for one reason or another have escaped most of the consequences of smallness. Close association with other states acting collectively, for example, Canada's and Australia's membership in the British Commonwealth of Nations, may remove such

states from the category of “small” because they are unlikely to have to stand alone. Other states excluded are those difficult to subdue because they are inaccessibly distant from the centers of power or because of the vast area they cover. India and China may thus be eliminated.

In a conflict these states could not long stand up to a great power if they had to depend only upon the use of violence. But there are other sources of influence and other instruments of power than armed might. The tools of statecraft include the economic: compliance can sometimes be bought. They include also the ideological: propaganda can occasionally affect the decisions in another state. They include the legal: where international law has been broadened to protect particular rights of all states it does to regardless of their size. They include the organizational: combinations of states may cooperate successfully to further their common interests. For the small state the art of diplomacy is the government’s strong arm. Far more than states with large military potential, the small states must be able to protect themselves by adroit diplomatic use of favorable opportunities for advancing their interest.⁽¹⁾

The small state has one important advantage over the great power: its interests are local and limited. Thus all attention can be focused upon a single objective, whereas the large state, with varied and extensive interests, must balance these and give only a relatively fleeting glance towards a particular small power. With favorable conditions smart governments of various small states have successfully utilized negotiating techniques in order to resist the pressures of the great powers. Their performance helps to

⁽¹⁾ Kertesz, Stephen , (1959), **diplomacy in a changing world** , second edition , Indiana ,U.S., university of Notre dame press

explain the paradox that while power in world politics has become increasingly concentrated in a very few great states, not only has the number of small states multiplied but they have also shown remarkable vitality.

There are small states and small states. There are also periods of time during which, and particular circumstances under which, a small state can enjoy a greater scope in its diplomacy than otherwise.

The creation and functioning of an almost universal international organization, the United Nations, has offered to the small states unprecedented scope and opportunity for exercising their diplomacy. As a consequence of the assumption of state equality which is implicit in the general international organization, the small states as a category have a relatively large representation in United Nations activities. Since the great powers, which possess the special veto privilege in the Security Council, have been unable to agree on many issues, these have been aired in the General Assembly.

It is essential for the small state that the people maintain political unity in the face of subversive efforts, loyally support the government, and preserve their self-control and their single-minded devotion to the state even when under terrible strain.⁽¹⁾

⁽¹⁾ Pearson, Lester ,(1959), **diplomacy in the nuclear age** ,first edition , Norway, university aula .p 62

Section Two

Jordan's Diplomacy

As discussed earlier, Diplomacy in the general sense is the art and practice of conducting negotiations between accredited persons or diplomats representing groups or nations. It usually refers to international diplomacy, the conduct of international relations through the intercession of professional diplomats with regards to issues such as trade and war. International treaties are usually negotiated by diplomats prior to endorsement by national politicians.

In Jordan, however, the foremost policy maker and diplomat has always been the monarch, from the country's first Emir, Abdullah I, through Kings Hussein and now King Abdullah II.

The major issues that concerned Jordanian diplomacy which were discussed in the thesis were:

1. The domestic and external challenges facing the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.
2. Inter-Arab relations and regional affairs.
3. Regional disputes, precisely the Gulf conflicts.
4. The Arab-Israeli peace talks and the implications of the peace treaty on Jordan.
5. Reform and economic development.

The main goal of Jordanian diplomacy is to secure and protect Jordan's national interests and advance its goals under the circumstances that prevail in every stage. It is based on the full adherence of International law, U.N. Charter, International Conventions and Human rights acts.⁽¹⁾

In addition to its main goal of preserving its national interests, Jordanian Diplomacy has been based on a number of pivotal principles in executing its foreign policy. The first and the most important is its support for the Palestinian issue in all international arenas and considering this issue Arab's number one pivotal concern. Therefore, Jordanian diplomacy never stopped supporting this issue and defending the rights of the refugees to return or be compensated. Jordan continued this policy during the Arab-Israeli negotiations after the Arabs announced that peace is the strategic choice with Israel, and cannot be given up.

Jordanian diplomacy is also based on the principle of respect for national sovereignty for other countries, and not interfering in their internal affairs. It is also built on solving conflicts in peaceful means⁽²⁾

Jordan has always been viewed as not being strong enough to direct regional politics on its own. Susceptible to the wishes of its more powerful neighbors, Jordan has usually followed a conservative foreign policy, including the reliance on international allies, to maintain its independence and avoid involvement in destructive wars and outright invasion. Clearly in the period of time that precedes our discussion Jordan has not been completely successful—it was involved in two Arab-Israeli wars and did suffer one brief

⁽¹⁾. Al Tarawneh, Fayez, in an interview with the researcher, 28th of July, 2005, Amman, Jordan.

⁽²⁾. Abu Hdeib, Mohammad in an interview with the researcher, July 2005, Amman-Jordan

Syrian assault. But relatively speaking, it has avoided costly foreign entanglements that many of its neighbors have not. In fact, its vulnerability has often been cited as the key to understanding its foreign policies. These vulnerabilities can be found in both internal and external resources.

It is true that the internal environment and circumstances are not usually considered closely related to a country's foreign policy and diplomacy, but it is also true that when internal changes are affected by external ones they would automatically affect the capabilities of a country and its behavior. It is known that a country's tendency to be affected or influenced by external events and changes are determined in the light of its internal environment and the extent of its dependence on the regional one. Thus the internal environment of a country is linked to the country's foreign policy in two ways: First in Quantity and the second is Quality. This is because countries deal with each other on the bases of their resources, capabilities, and their abilities to make use of these resources to achieve their goals, which are also elements affecting the leadership's evaluation of using and directing these resources

When we look at the more than six decades of the political history of Jordan, we see a unique relationship between the geographic location of Jordan and its foreign policy. Since the presence of Jordan as an independent political unit, its geographical location has been imposing itself as one of the strongest determinants of its foreign policy. This influence does not come from the smallness of the size of Jordan in comparison with the countries around it, but comes from the influence of the geographical elements on the internal environment of these countries, and also comes from the fact that this geographical centrality is always subjected to external threats and

possible attempts of development. In addition to the issues and responsibilities this location has forced Jordan to deal with in the context of the reactions and political changes in the region.⁽¹⁾

Pivotal to regional stability, because of its location between Israel and Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Syria Jordan is a small country with a total area of about 89,213 sq. km (34, 445 sq. miles); ⁽²⁾ it has very limited resources, and is geographically trapped between stronger and more aggressive neighbors. These factors are coupled with its internal demographic circumstance of having a large segment of the population of Palestinian origin that does not see itself as completely Jordanian. Together these concerns – both domestic and external – and their political and economic corollaries have occupied the bulk of the attention of Jordanian policy makers. No one can argue the fact that in Jordan the foremost policy maker and diplomat has always been the monarch, from the country's first emir, Abdullah, through Kings Hussein and now Abdullah II. Because of this personal involvement in politics, and despite the aforementioned geo-strategic factors, Jordan has traditionally felt it has an important role to play in regional politics, particularly as they relate to the Arab-Israeli relationships and the Muslim holy places. (Since the capture of the Hijaz, which contains Islam's two holiest sites in Islam Mecca and Madina, by Ibn Saud and its incorporation into Saudi Arabia, Jordan's focus shifted to Jerusalem and its Islamic sites. Between 1948 and 1967, Jordan was responsible for these sites; and since Israel's 1967 seizure of the West Bank and Jerusalem, Jordan kept its link and maintenance of them). Because of this, Jordan's interests and ambitions have

⁽¹⁾ Tleilan, Osama, **Jordanian foreign policy and Arab conflicts**, second edition, 2001, p.33.

⁽²⁾ Efraim, Inbar and Shmuel Sandler, 1997 "The Risks of Palestinian Statehood," *Survival*, Vol. 39, No. 2 (summer). P.33

exceeded its resources, and this has contributed significantly to Jordanian diplomacy and foreign policy.

Traditional Domestic Concerns

Next to the achievement and protection of its national interests, Jordan's main goal has always been the survival of the monarchical political system. In recent years, strengthening the economy – a challenge clearly linked to that main directive- has become increasingly more important as well. These two points both show how Jordan's external security concerns emerge from a need to rely on other states for Jordan's domestic stability and economic well-being.

The lack of a cohesive ethnic or communal base in Jordan creates its political and to some extent, economic problems. Although this is the norm rather than the exception in the Middle East, Jordan is particularly vulnerable to having a segmented population, divided between those who identify themselves principally as Jordanians and those who identify themselves as Palestinians (primarily those who fled to Jordan following the 1948 and 1967 Arab-Israeli wars.”), and more recently Iraqis. This division is manifested in all social, economic, and political arenas, and creates an underlying tension between these groups. The Jordanians of Palestinian origin have tended to dominate the economy; the ‘East Bank’ Jordanians control the government and the army⁽¹⁾. The political system fears political instability. The civil war of 1970 was one example. Another case was the 1990-1991 Kuwait crises during which the Palestinian portion of the populace expressed overtly pro-Iraqi sentiments and demanded action in support of Iraq. King Hussein would have gambled on the kingdom's political stability had he joined the anti-Iraq coalition.

⁽¹⁾ Moshe, Shemesh,(1998) “**Bilateral and Trilateral Political Cooperation” in the Jordanian – Palestinian- Israeli Triangle: Soothing the path to peace**, (Great Britain: Sussex Academic Press,), 33.

In addition, after the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the political government feared that Islamist politics would influence its own subjects. This had not been a problem earlier since the main Islamist group in Jordan, the Muslim Brotherhood, had been a legal political party since 1945 and enjoyed a generally warm relationship with the monarchy for most of that time. However, the government in the 1990s grew increasingly concerned with the Brotherhood's policies and tried to limit its effectiveness through repression. Aside from these identity issues, Jordan's economic problems have been a factor for concern. Particularly since the 1991 Gulf War, the economy has faced severe problems. Largely empty of natural resources, Jordan has been forced to rely on outside assistance for sustenance. The oil price increases of the 1970s might have been a good thing for Jordan. They brought about a sudden, massive increase in oil-exporting countries' wealth, which for Jordan translated into much larger foreign aid. The same boom attracted hundreds of thousands of Jordanian workers to the Gulf region whose remittances also proved of great help. Yet by the early 1980s, when oil prices fell after profits peaked in 1981, foreign aid declined, and demand for foreign workers in the Gulf was reduced or workers faced wage cuts. Government spending did not match the cutback in aid. Unemployment and a deepening recession hit hard in Jordan, and by 1989 Amman began to default on its international debts ⁽¹⁾

Then came the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent war there. Due to the domestic political considerations mentioned above, King Hussein felt he had to support

⁽¹⁾ Eliyahu, Kanovsky (Winter 1991), (The Middle East Economies: The Impact of domestic and International politics," by Security and Policy studies No.31 (Israel: The BESA Center for strategic Studies, February 1997). Amatzia Baram," **Baathi Iraq and Hashemite Jordan: From Hostility to Alignment**," The Middle East Journal, vol.45, no.1 p.55.)

Saddam Hussein's people. This brought him the gratitude of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians within Jordan, but earned him the wrath of Kuwait, which cut off all aid. Thousands of Jordanian and Palestinian workers were expelled from Kuwait settling in Jordan, and the United States suspended its aid program. Virtually all of Jordan's revenue sources were lost or reduced.

Although this situation has eased somewhat with King Hussein's shift to the West and peace with Israel, the economy still faced many problems. Unemployment, corruption, and lack of foreign investments are among the most serious. As well, a population's unhappiness with its socio-economic situation can easily be turned into hostility toward governments that have not alleviated such conditions. This, in turn, affects the political system's core interest of survival. As Laurie Brand (a Professor in the School of International Relations-USA) argues, alliance decisions are made at least partly to help "balance the budget or insulate against future potential economic challenges from abroad," as those suffered as a result of Jordan's stance during the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and subsequent 1991 Gulf War.

The link between internal and external interests can thus be found in the political economy of Jordan: as a result of its lack of natural resources, small population, and small size, Jordan relies heavily on the external sources of revenue to fund its government and maintain living standards. First Britain, then the United States, and then the Arab States of the Gulf were the primary aid providers. Trade with Iraq, which had certain aspects of an aid arrangement, had been an additional factor with political overtones.

Traditional External Security Interests:

Shifting global power structures, regional security threats, and strategic balances of power are usually considered the prime motivators behind Jordan's regional policy. King Hussein, ruler of Jordan from 1952 to 1999, had been responsible for virtually all of Jordan's foreign policy during this period. And from 1999 until now, King Abdullah II has been responsible for it. Therefore, the following sections assumes that when speaking of Jordanian foreign policy, the King's hand, though not explicitly mentioned, was always in place, guiding it.

Traditionally considered a conservative Arab state, Jordan is usually aligned on the "moderate" side—which refers to its monarchical nature and pro-western leanings. Yet geopolitical necessities have forced Jordan to try to maintain good relations with at least one of the radical states on its borders, namely Syria or Iraq. Moreover, this is not to say that all moderate states share the same interests or policies; in fact they diverge from each other almost as often as they do from the radical states.

The problems King Hussein had to handle were mainly the Arab-Israeli dispute; the Palestinian factor; Syria- Iraq friction; Syrian and Iraqi ambitions regarding Jordan; the Iran-Iraq conflict; and Iraq's international isolation following the Kuwait war. In each case, Amman has had to balance its policies as much as possible. Yet this has often not worked; hostility between its various neighbors has always forced King Hussein to choose, at least temporarily, one side or another.

At first, Jordan and Syria did experience a short period of good relations, primarily in the mid 1970s. This was based on Jordan's disillusionment with the Arab world's

recognition, at the 1974 Rabat Summit, of the PLO as the “sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people,” at the expense of Jordan⁽¹⁾ But these relations soon soured, and Iraq was soon seen as a far more effective ally.

Some of the reasons for this shift include the following points: Egypt’s isolation in the Arab World following its peace deals with Israel left Iraq and Syria as the strongest Arab powers in the region; fear of a direct Israeli assault on Jordan; and fear of being dragged into Syrian-Israeli military hostilities. Iraq was assumed to be a protector against Israel and Syria, while this alignment would be less provocative to Jerusalem or Damascus than alliance with either of them, By fighting Iran, Iraq was also protecting Jordan from the spread of radical Islamism.

By the late 1970s, and throughout the 1980s, King Hussein brought Jordan increasingly closer to Iraq. This was a result of Syria’s continued hostility (exemplified by the abortive 1970 Syrian invasion of Jordan.) It was reinforced by Baghdad’s supply of cheap oil and guaranteed economic links such as export markets. By 1989 and 1990, the King was increasingly concerned that Israel would make a push against the Palestinians that would produce a massive influx into Jordan, thus destabilizing the Kingdom, endangering the political system, and turning Jordan into Palestine. This was also at the time when political liberalization was being undertaken; in turn the result of declining socio-economic conditions and growing domestic unrest and anger⁽²⁾. There was also a genuine fear of Iranian expansionism if Tehran was to win the Iran-Iraq war. By the beginning of the 1990s, Iraq was Jordan’s most valuable and important ally.

⁽¹⁾ Ann, Mosely Lesch, (Winter 1991), “**Contrasting Reactions to the Gulf Crisis: Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and the Palestinians,**” *The Middle East Journal*, vol.45, no. 1 p33.)

⁽²⁾ (Baram, “Baathi Iraq and Hashemite Jordan,” p.55)

At the same time, relations between Iraq and Syria declined rapidly in the 1970s and by 1976 Damascus had cut all land and air routes crossing its territory into Iraq. Therefore, Baghdad needed Jordan as an outlet to the Red Sea. In the end, Jordan became economically dependant on Iraq—as a source of cheap oil and imports, a market for exports, and because of the transit trade that passed overland and through the Jordanian port of Aqaba.

As one of the founders of the Arab Cooperation Council (ACC) in 1990, King Hussein believed this grouping could help balance Jordan's security interests against the myriad directions in which it might be pulled. The inclusion of both Egypt and Iraq, two of the stronger and more influential powers in the region, gave Jordan the opportunity to have supporters in case peace with Israel was achieved, or use them as protectors if it was not. At the same time, the ACC also helped Jordan more effectively against long time antagonist Syria⁽¹⁾ Unfortunately for Jordan; Iraq invaded Kuwait shortly thereafter, forcing realignment in the region's politics and pushing Jordan in the end, toward the West (However, officially the ACC has not ended yet. The 1990 Kuwait crisis united Jordanians, but not necessarily in the direction safest for Jordan's survival. King Hussein followed the tide of public opinion to support Iraq. Public rallies chanting the heroics of Saddam Hussein were common across the country. But when Iraq lost the war, this policy proved disastrous. Jordan suffered severe economic repercussions. After Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990, King Hussein unsuccessfully sought to play a mediating role. Meanwhile, the large influx of refugees from the Gulf region, combined with the worldwide embargo on trade with Iraq, took a toll on the Jordanian economy. An influx

⁽¹⁾ Curtin, Ryan (summer 1998) "Jordan and the Rise and fall of the Arab Cooperation Council," The Middle East Journal, vol. 52, no 3, p.390).

of Jordanians who had fled the Gulf War from Kuwait and Iraq increased the country's unemployment rate. The falling worth of the Jordanian dinar also added to the country's economic problems. Jordan's apparent tilt toward Iraq during the Gulf War strained relations with the United States, Saudi Arabia, and other Arab states. Some political analysts say that if Iraq had won the war, though, the effects on Jordan might have been worse.

The 1990s witnessed a Jordanian shift away from Iraq, toward the United States and to a lesser extent Israel and Turkey.

In the aftermath of the second Gulf war, the U.S administration of George Bush gained a position of diplomatic dominance and agreed to seek a negotiated settlement for the Arab- Israeli conflict. A joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation took part in the comprehensive Middle East peace talks that began in October 1991. King Hussein joined the Madrid peace talks, and signed a formal peace treaty with Israel in 1994.

Jordan reaped benefits because of its change in policy: In 1994, major creditor states including the United States wrote off \$833 million of Jordan's debt. Other official creditors rescheduled Jordan's debts four times between 1989 and 1997. In 1997, Jordan signed a partnership agreement with the European Union as a first step toward achieving a Jordanian-EU free trade area by 2010. In addition, Jordan was admitted to the World Trade Organization. This new policy also helped Jordan's own security apparatus. It used peace treaty with Israel to improve access to American weapons and embark on a military modernization program.⁽¹⁾

⁽¹⁾ (Inbar and Sandler, "The Risks of Palestinian statehood," pp.25-26).

In King Hussein's politics whosoever poses in his judgment the danger of the moment determines his reaction. His one guiding principle is survival. Other goals, such as economic development, expansion, or dynastic ambition are subordinate to this. The essentials of his survival strategy had been.⁽¹⁾

* Today's perils must be looked at today, while tomorrow's may be looked after tomorrow.

* It is important to be popular and bad to be hated. * Powerful allies are a necessity, but one must keep all options open.

* Syria is a perennial object of suspicion and fear, while Israel must be made to feel secure along its Jordanian frontier. No breakthroughs with Israel should be made to seem imminent.

* Direct and efficient control of the army is the ultimate fundament of survival.

Any discussion of King Hussein's and King Abdullah's foreign diplomacy should note their personal desire to have played and continue to play a major role in the Arab World and in the Arena of Arab-Israeli relations.⁽²⁾

The personalities and effectiveness of both Kings in defending and communicating moderate policies, along with their own long and direct contacts with Western and Arab leaders, made them far more important than Jordan's small size and weak status would have otherwise indicated ⁽¹⁾

⁽¹⁾ Asron, Wildavsky, "Jordan and the Arab- Israeli Conflict: The Hashemite Predicament," Orbis, vol.29, no.4 , p.796

⁽²⁾ Dann, Uriel," King Hussein's Strategy of survival",The Washington Institute for Near Easr Policy, Wasington D.C., P.54

Section three

Jordanian diplomacy (1990-1999):

This period of time represents the last nine years of the reign of King Hussein bin Talal. And as mentioned earlier, the foremost diplomat and foreign policy decision maker in Jordan has always been the monarch.

The problems King Hussein had to handle were mainly the Arab-Israeli dispute; the Palestinian factor; Syria- Iraq friction; Syrian and Iraqi ambitions regarding Jordan; the Iran-Iraq conflict; and Iraq's international isolation following the Kuwait war. In each case, Amman has had to balance its policies as much as possible.

The Arab-Israeli conflict:

Late King Hussein had struggled throughout his 45-year reign to promote peace in the Middle East. Reaching a settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in particular was the predominant pre-occupation of King Hussein and therefore the pre-dominant occupation of Jordanian diplomacy and foreign policy at the highest levels since the Kingdom's independence, particularly following the 1967 War. King Hussein stressed this fact by saying: "The Palestinian issue is the corner stone of Jordan's internal, Arab, and foreign policies, if this was a holy issue for the nation it is a matter of life or death for Jordan"⁽¹⁾.

From the very beginning Jordan never fell short to initiate or respond positively to most peace initiatives that offered hope for a just and lasting peace settlement. Head of

⁽¹⁾ King Hussein's Designation letter to prime minister Bahjat Al Talhouni on the 7th of October 1967)

the regional and international affairs committee in the Lower House of Parliament Dr. Mohammad Abu Hdeib confirmed: “Jordanian Diplomacy has been based on a number of pivotal principles in executing its foreign policy, the first and most important of which is its support for the Palestinian issue in all international arenas and considering this issue Arab’s number one pivotal issue. Therefore, Jordanian diplomacy never stopped supporting this cause and defending the rights of the Palestinian refugees to return or be compensated.”⁽¹⁾

After the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, King Hussein was instrumental in drafting UN Security Council Resolution 242 which calls on Israel to withdraw from Arab lands it occupied in the 1967 war in exchange for peace. Former minister of Foreign Affairs Abdul Ilah Al Khatib said that from the very beginning of the adoption of resolution 242 in 1967 Jordan insisted and tried to promote the idea that the only solution was a political one based on resolution 242. He explained how Arabs resisted that for fifteen years. “Actually between 1967 and 1982 Arabs have reprimanded Jordan in many many ways for advocating that position and in 1982 when the Arab summit convened in Morocco Arabs decided that they would accept resolution 242 as the base for negotiations and the political solution for the Arab-Israeli conflict. From that date on there has been an evolution of the Arab position. More Arabs were convinced that resolution 242 should be the base.” Khatib added.⁽²⁾ This resolution has served as the benchmark for all subsequent peace negotiations.

The early 1990s marked a watershed period in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Gulf Crisis redefined the balance of power in the Middle East, reshuffled

⁽¹⁾ Abu Hdeib, Mohammad, Interview with the researcher, July 2005, Amman,-Jordan)

⁽²⁾ Ilah Al Khatib , Abdul, Interview with the researcher, 21st of August 2005, Amman,-Jordan)

inter-Arab relations and demonstrated once again the need to work toward a just and comprehensive regional peace. Moreover, several other factors converged during this time to produce a situation propitious for pursuing peace. The termination of the Cold War allowed the Arab-Israeli conflict to be treated as a regional problem. This, combined with the international realization that Arab-Israeli peace is necessary for regional stability, provided the spark to re-ignite a hitherto dormant peace process.

Sensing a “window of opportunity” following the liberation of Kuwait, and after the United States gained a position of diplomatic dominance. The US and the Russian Federation agreed to seek a negotiated settlement for the Arab- Israeli settlement and co-sponsored the Madrid Peace Conference in October 1991.

King Hussein played a pivotal role in convening the Madrid Peace Conference, and in providing an "umbrella" for Palestinians to negotiate their future with the Israelis directly for the first time as part of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation.

On the 20th and 21st of July 1991, U.S Secretary of State James Baker visited Jordan after he had made several visits to the region and left out Jordan.

Before that the U.S Secretary of State would not visit Jordan. In this regards Former Foreign Minister Abdul Ilah Al Khatib said: “if you look at the pattern of conduct of Jordanian diplomacy starting in 1992 onwards you will see that Jordan managed to rebuild its relations with the west and with the Arab world. After the war the Americans started to prepare for the Middle East peace conference and they could not ignore Jordan from their preparations. At the beginning, the U.S. Secretary of State would not even visit Jordan when he visited other Arab countries, I remember we went to see him in Geneva

in the first meeting.”⁽¹⁾ His first visit came on October 14, 1991 when King Hussein announced his intention to accept the invitation of the U.S.A. and Russia to attend a Middle East peace conference. This conference was to include delegations from Israel, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. A conference that would bring together Israel, Palestinians, and Arab nations to participate for the first time in direct negotiations in the city of Madrid.

James Baker visited Amman again for more rounds of pre-conference diplomacy. In a press conference that followed his deliberations in Amman, Baker announced:” I do not think that there is any one more courageous, more flexible, or even more supportive of peace than King Hussein” ⁽²⁾ On the 18th of October 1991, the United States and the former Soviet Union sent out an invitation to Arabs and Israel to attend the peace conference that took place on the 30th of October 1991 in Madrid. After the invitations were sent out and everybody agreed to attend it several problems came to the surface. The first problem was how the Palestinians can be invited to participate in an international conference with sovereign states when their country is not acknowledged to be a sovereign one. The other question was how the Palestinians can be invited to participate in this conference as observers when their issue is the focus of the negotiations. As always, King Hussein came up with a smart solution for these issues ⁽³⁾He proposed a third alternative on the expense of Jordanian sovereignty. He proposed that the Jordanian delegation be constituted of Jordanians and a delegation of Palestinians

⁽¹⁾ Ilah Al Khatib, Abdul, Interview with the researcher, 21st of August 2005, Amman,-Jordan)

⁽²⁾ Masalha, Mohammad and Al Tarawneh, Fayez , 2005 (**The negotiation diplomacy in the Jordanian experience: From Washington to Wadi Araba,**, Center of Parliamentary studies, Amman page 98)

⁽³⁾ Al Majaly, Abdul Salam, **the Journey of life (Rihlat Al Omr)**, 2003, first edition, Amman-Jordan, pp 206.

under the “umbrella” of a joint delegation. The purpose of this “umbrella” which Jordan has provided in the form of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation was to enable the Palestinians to participate in the peace talks and represent them selves. Former Prime minister Fayeze Al Tarawneh and head of the Jordanian peace talks delegation said in this regards: “The idea of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation emerged, because it was impossible for any of the three Arab countries (Syria, Egypt, and Lebanon) to play the role Jordan was willing to play, and thus was James Baker’s visit to Amman in 1991”.⁽¹⁾

Then another complication came up when Israel put two new conditions for its participation in the peace talks. The first new condition was that the Palestinian part of the joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation should not include any Palestinian personality from the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). The second condition was that the Palestinian delegation should not include anyone from Jerusalem or a resident of Jerusalem. These conditions made the Jordanian House of representatives oppose the conference and demanded Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories and East Jerusalem as a precondition for Jordan’s attendance; and rejected Israel’s insistence that neither Palestinians from East Jerusalem nor members or supporters of the PLO should be allowed to attend⁽²⁾ King Hussein once again used his diplomacy to overcome the Israeli conditions and appointed two additional members in the Jordanian part of the delegation. These two new members were Anwar Al Khatib (a former mayor of Jerusalem) and Dr. Walid Al Khaldi (Whose father and grandfather are originally from Jerusalem). Israel was not able to reject these two people because they belonged to the

⁽¹⁾ Masalha, Mohammad, and Tarawneh, Fayeze, (2005) **(The negotiation diplomacy in the Jordanian experience: From Washington to Wadi Araba**, Center of Parliamentary studies, Amman, page 101)

⁽²⁾ Abu Odeh , Adnan, September 1999, Jordanians, Palestinians of the Hashemite Kingdom in the Middle East process, United States Institute of peace, ,p.20)

Jordanian part of the delegation and they carried the nationality of a sovereign state which is Jordan. Despite the fact that the eleventh parliament issued a statement urging the government not to attend the proposed conference in Madrid, Spain, King Hussein utilized the political and moral weight of the monarchy to buttress enough popular support for Jordan's participation in the conference. Thus in late October 1991, A national congress was convened, which King Hussein employed as a forum to address the nation and explain the circumstances that necessitated Jordan's participation. He invited about two thousand people representing the different Jordanian institutions (e.g. the parliament, municipalities, representatives of political parties, villages, towns, and cities, etc...) to the National Jordanian congress.

He met with them and told them of the proposed international conference in Madrid and of the Jordanian perspective of the way the negotiations should go. He explained to them that the Madrid peace conference is not only a conference between Arabs and Israelis, but is also a conference between Israel and the international law and international legitimacy in which all issues will be discussed. King Hussein told the congress that Jordan wants to take part in this conference out of its sincere interest in achieving stability and security in the region, within the Jordanian commitment to support the Palestinian issue to help them regain their land and legitimate rights. He explained that Jordan's absence from the talks would be very costly in both political and economic terms and that Jordan's higher national interests, as well as the requirements of national security, dictated its involvement. The King declared that both Jordan and the Palestinians were besieged- the King here was referring to the attempts by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to strangulate Jordan and the Palestinians both politically

and economically, in the wake of the second Gulf war, as well as to the semi-quarantine imposed by the U.S. led multinational marine forces against the port of Aqaba, Jordan's only outlet to the sea.⁽¹⁾ King Hussein stated that he had received assurances from the USA that it would do its utmost to ensure that a transitional period of Palestinian autonomy in the occupied territories would be negotiated within one year of the opening of the conference. He added that he believed that attending the conference would increase international pressure on

Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories and to implement U.N. Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) and the formula of land for peace. He then said that he hopes that this participation receives the acceptance and blessings of the Jordanian people and that he is open to hearing any other alternatives or opinions any Jordanian might have. Everybody at the national conference applauded in support of the King without any reservations. Therefore, and in spite of the opposition of the Muslim brotherhood and leftist political groupings, the King announced that a Jordanian delegation would attend the conference. This announcement pleased the U.S. administration and thus the disagreement between Jordan and the U.S. over the Gulf war was quickly overcome. The U.S. Secretary of State then James Baker recognized Jordan's contribution and King Hussein's role in this context.

The Central Council of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) met in Tunis on the 16th and 17th of October and approved the formation of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. This decision was strongly criticized by the leader of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) George Habash.

⁽¹⁾ Braizat, Musa,(1995) Jordan's diplomacy: **Balancing National Survival with Nation's revival**, Center for Strategic studies,University of Jordan, Amman-Jordan)

Jordanians had realized the gains both Jordanians and Palestinians can achieve through the peace process. With negotiating with Israel Jordan could solve the issues of land and water that were used by Israel. Since the late 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s Israel had been illegally trespassing in Jordanian lands from the South of the Dead Sea reaching the city of Aqaba. This trespassing offended Jordanian sovereignty. That was not the beginning of such Israeli acts because it was preceded by the first serious trespassing of Jordanian lands in 1952. Jordan at the time complained to the United Nations because Israel was justifying its occupation of Jordanian lands one bit at a time with the excuse of protecting its security and its only land path that connects it to the Israeli port of Elat. The area of land that had been occupied by Israel in the area between the South of the Dead Sea and Aqaba was 380,084 squared Kilometers. In the North of Jordan, Israel had occupied 830 squared meters. From here came Jordan's keenness to get back its lands and have the borders officially drawn as one of the main priorities on the path of a just peace.

In regards to the issue of water, Israel had continued its attempts to control Arab water until it finally was able to take over most of the riverheads of the Jordan River North of Tabariya Lake and used the river on its own. Israel also had occupied the land on the sides of Al Yarmouk River to the East reaching Al Raggad valley and used unlimited quantities of the winter water of this river breaking all the international laws of sharing collective water.⁽¹⁾

King Hussein completed picking out the members of the Jordanian delegation that included diplomats, civil servants and academics. At the very beginning minister of

⁽¹⁾ Al Aas, Tareq Jamil , 1996 "Jordanian peace diplomacy 1967-1995", by, The National Library,"

Foreign Affairs Dr. Kamel Abu Jaber had to be the head of the Jordanian delegation attending the conference according to the conference's protocol but he only had to give the Jordanian speech at the inauguration of the conference. In his opening speech Dr. Abu Jaber said that King Hussein would have preferred to have a separate Palestinian delegation but "we have no objection to providing an umbrella for our Palestinian brethren, the Palestinian people must be allowed to exercise their right of self determination in their ancestral homeland". He added: "Jordan has never been Palestine and will never be so". Dr. Abdul Salam Al Majaly was then chosen by King Hussein to be the head of the Jordanian delegation for the rest of the conference. A complete team under the supervision of Prince Hassan bin Talal carried out a series of preparations and studies before they headed for the conference. The Palestinian delegation headed by Dr. Haydar Abd Al Shafi and the Jordanian delegation left to Madrid according to Royal directives on the same plane. ⁽²⁾

The peace process started since the inauguration of the Madrid conference on October 30, 1991. The main issues in this conference were in determining the framework of the following:

1. The basics and techniques on which the negotiations were to be held.
2. The references on which the negotiations were to be built.

The Madrid Peace Conference was a historic event in which all parties to the conflict in addition to Russia, European countries, International Organizations and establishments concerned with the Arab-Israeli conflict were joined by a common desire to negotiate peacefully and directly to arrive to a settlement to this conflict. However, the

⁽²⁾ Al Majaly, Abdul Salam, **the Journey of life (Rihlat Al Omr)**, 2003, first edition, Amman-Jordan, pp 206.

Israeli team kept having problems with the technical issues of the conference to delay negotiating the real issues, the Likud- led right wing government in Israel refused to negotiate with an independent Palestinian delegation. Jordan acted on the expense of its sovereignty to enable the Palestinians to take part in the process and it was not easy. Formally, there was a joint Jordanian- Palestinian delegation, but in reality there were two independent teams, each discussing its own agenda separately. The Israeli delegation headed by the Prime minister Yitzhak Shamir attempted to suppress the Palestinian identity, and tried to emphasize the concept of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. Despite the delay and the problems of the conference, one can say that the conference was some how fruitful. Dr. Abdul Salam Al Majaly said: “If I can comment on what happened in Madrid since its inauguration until now I would focus on the following points:

- The Madrid conference had been the first international event with this size of international interest in the Palestinian people and the Palestinian issue. The international community recognized that the Palestinian people have their own existence, separate from the Jordanian existence.

- Our Palestinian colleagues left the Madrid conference at ease with what happened and feeling a bit of happiness because the whole world received them, welcomed them, and dealt with them on the bases that they are active and present.

- The Israelis left the conference with a different mentality than the one they came with. This became clear through the absence of their foreign minister, and was replaced by the Israeli Prime Minister Shamir as a head of their delegation. It also was clear from the historical claims and allegations, harsh and boastful words that Shamir chose in his

speeches. Al Majali continues to say: It seems to me that what really bothered the Israelis was the fact that they were put face to face and on equal foot with a delegation, they did not even acknowledge before and did not want to even meet (The Palestinian delegation). Perhaps one of the most important things the Israelis had to face was the fact that they discovered- before they were fully prepared- that the Palestinians constituted a full team present on the table of war and peace in the Middle East.”⁽¹⁾

Jordan has confirmed the fact that it welcomes and supports any agreement the Palestinians reach by themselves because the coming generations are the ones who are going to live with the agreement.

Despite the fact that the Israelis wanted the following meetings to take place some where in the Middle East, the venue of the next meeting was decided to be in Washington. On the 3rd of December 1991, the Jordanian and Palestinian delegations left to Washington to resume the talks, as agreed in Madrid. However, because of the venue issue the Israeli delegation did not show up on time, which was the 4th of December 1991. This caused some conflicts at the beginning especially because the Jordanian delegation was keen to be there and was present on time. Another issue of conflict was that the Israelis refused at the beginning to negotiate with the Palestinians as a separate delegation but wanted to negotiate with a Joint Jordanian –Palestinian delegation; however, the Jordanian position was clear from the very beginning and the Jordanian delegation refused to speak on behalf of the Palestinians.

In the Washington meeting Jordan confirmed that it will not negotiate on behalf of the Palestinian people, it also clarified its position in the peace process that included

⁽¹⁾ Al Majaly Abdul Salam, **the Journey of life (Rihlat Al Omr)**, 2003, first edition, the publication company, Amman-Jordan, pp 206.

the following:

1. Jordan will not accept any thing less than a comprehensive peace based on justice and the implementation of international law and international legitimacy, particularly U.N. resolution number 242 with all its aspects and international understanding of it.
2. Signing a peace treaty is not in its self the ultimate goal but one of the several ways of achieving the more comprehensive goal of peace.
3. Urging Israel to take practical steps to express its good will and readiness to work for peace.
4. Putting an end to building Israeli settlements is a necessary thing for the continuity and success of the peace process.
5. The Israeli acknowledgment of the self-determination right of the Palestinian people.
6. Solving the issue of the refugees on the bases of return or compensation.
7. Jordan's concept of a comprehensive peace is based on having three basic elements: Land (complete pull out), security, and justice.
8. U.N. resolution number 242 means the complete pull out, perhaps with minor modification on the borders in a mutual manner.
9. The implementation of the Fourth Geneva convention on the Arab occupied territories particularly the West Bank and Gaza.

On the 15th of January 1992, the U.S Secretary of State James Baker confirmed to the Arab delegations the U.S commitment to the peace process. He said that the U.S administration would always be there when substantial issues are being negotiated but it will not interfere in the minor issues. The U.S Secretary of State advised the delegations

not to get into the difficult issues at the beginning and start with the easy ones. He promised that the next multilateral negotiations would be based on the form of the Madrid conference (30th Oct-3rd Nov 1991).

In Washington, the Arab-Israeli negotiations lasted for 11 continuous rounds; the first seven of which were not very fruitful. The eighth round lasted for six days and was interrupted twice. On the Jordanian-Israeli level, both sides were able to achieve some development on the Agenda issue, which meant specifying the priorities and categorizing them into groups, which will be, negotiated one group at a time.

In 1992, the change of government in Israel and the new Labor Government's position regarding recognition of the PLO lead to the signing of the PLO-Israel Declaration of Principles. This declaration had big significance, for it released Jordan from the major Israeli constraint that had been focused on it for years - the Jordanian option as an alternative to recognizing the PLO.

The acceptance by Israel, under the Labor government of the late Prime Minister Rabin, of the Palestinian political identity and the recognition of the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people opened the way for a new and groundbreaking relationship between Palestinians and Israelis.

Negotiations between the Jordanian and Israeli delegations continued, sometimes with the assistance of technical experts to prepare for the upcoming phase. Dr. Fayez Al Tarawneh said:” up until that time there were no signs of any substantial development in the Syrian, Lebanese, and Palestinian negotiations, until the end of September of that year 1993, when we woke up on a Sunday morning, looked at the American newspapers to

find the complete details of the Oslo agreement published in New York times".⁽¹⁾ It turned out that after the Washington meetings, the PLO had held secret talks with the Israeli government in Oslo-Norway early in 1993. These talks led to declaration of principles on the 19th of August 1993 that involved a degree of Palestinian self-government in the occupied territories. Almost two years after the Madrid conference, the declaration of principles (**Oslo I**), outlining a negotiating framework to be followed leading to a final status treaty between the Palestinian and Israeli peoples, was signed in Washington on the 13th of September 1993. This agreement came as a surprise to King Hussein who had not been informed that negotiations were taking place in Oslo, and the agreement is reported to have caused grave embarrassment to the Palestinian negotiators in Washington. Despite the King's initial irritation at the Israeli-PLO accord, which presented a socio-economic challenge for Jordan, the King quickly accepted the declaration of principles.

Ayman Al Safadi, former director of King Abdullah's press office said in this regards: "When the peace process started it started as a comprehensive solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. When Jordan entered the negotiations it entered as part of Arab countries which have collectively decided to negotiate a peace settlement with Israel then they decided to have separate talks but the over all decision, the global decision that allowed these talks to take place was a collective decision. That was a very sensitive period for the Jordanian foreign policy because supposedly you have all these countries coordinating. If you follow closely you would realize that there

⁽¹⁾ Masalha , Mohammad, and Al Tarawneh, Fayez, 2005 (**The negotiation diplomacy in the Jordanian experience: From Washington to Wadi Araba**, , Center of Parliamentary studies, Amman)

was not enough trust and confidence among the Arab parties themselves therefore Jordan was very scared of what Syria is doing, even though they had a Jordanian-Palestinian negotiating team under the “umbrella” it turned out that the Palestinians were negotiating separately with the Israelis and hence came Oslo, that lack of trust and lack of coordination some how pushed each country to try and serve its interest while maintaining that link with the overall.”⁽¹⁾

The signing of the declaration of principles (**Oslo I**) opened the road for Jordan to proceed on its own negotiating track with Israel.

Once the Palestinians had gone their independent path with the Israelis at Oslo and signed the PLO-Israeli Declaration of Principles on September 13th, 1993 in Washington, Jordan initialed the Common Agenda with Israel on September 14th, one day after the PLO-Israel Declaration of Principles was signed.

The agenda aimed to achieve a just lasting and comprehensive peace between Arab States, the Palestinians and Israel. Jordan and Israel agreed to respect each other’s security and to discuss future cooperation on territorial and economic issues. The signing of the agenda was publicized as being the first agreement between an Arab state and Israel since the peace agreement between Egypt and Israel in 1979. King Hussein addressed the nation on October 12th 1993 and announced that Jordan "signed the Jordanian-Israeli agenda twenty-four hours after the Palestinian Israeli meeting in Washington, because we had refused to sign it before we saw clear and tangible progress on the Palestinian-Israeli level.” The King declared. King Hussein, however, stressed that the agenda was not a peace agreement but an

⁽¹⁾ (Ayman , Al Safadi, Interview with researcher , Thursday, August 11, 2005, Amman-Jordan)

outline of topics to be discussed at future talks. Much of the agenda had already been agreed in 1992 but an official signing was delayed because of objections by the Palestinians. After the signing of this agenda, there was optimism in Israeli government circles that Jordan would soon sign a formal peace agreement with Israel. These hopes were dashed in late January 1994 when King Hussein insisted that the key issues that lay behind the Arab-Israeli conflict must be discussed before any accord could be signed and that it was unacceptable to leave negotiations until after the signing. Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon withdrew temporarily from the rounds of bilateral talks with Israel in Washington immediately after the Hebron massacre in February 1994, although the gesture appeared to be largely symbolic and aimed at appeasing public anger at the incident. The King firmly rejected calls made by Islamist deputies for Jordan to withdraw permanently from the peace talks. At the end of March 1994, King Hussein announced that Jordan would not resume peace negotiations with Israel unless the naval blockade of Aqaba was lifted. However, it was not until the end of April that the U.S accepted a Jordanian proposal for a new land-based system of inspection for the goods passing through the port of Aqaba.⁽¹⁾

On the 25th of April Prime Minister Abdul Salam Al Majali told the press that his government was now willing to sign agreements on all individual items on the Jordan-Israel agenda and to participate in all multilateral talks in the hope that the negotiations would eventually lead to a peace treaty.

In May-June of 1994 the peace process received a new impetus, after King Hussein decided to proceed unilaterally with the talks with Israel. In the end of May, King Hussein held talks with the Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in

⁽¹⁾ (Middle East and North Africa year book (London: 2000), p.692

London. Negotiations between the two parties resumed at the meeting of the Jordanian-Israeli-US Trilateral Commission in Washington DC on the 6th and 7th of June 1994. In this meeting both Jordan and Israel agreed to hold future bilateral talks in Jordan and Israel. They also agreed on the establishment of joint sub-commissions on boundary demarcation, security, water, and environmental issues. These sub-commissions began their work on the 18th and 19th of July on the Jordanian-Israeli border.

On July 25th 1994 The Washington declaration was signed at a White House ceremony by King Hussein and the Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. With the signing of this declaration the war and hostility between the two countries that existed since 1948 ended. The declaration did not represent a full peace treaty, but US secretary of State, Warren Christopher, said that he expected it to speed the process for an official peace treaty “within a matter of months”.⁽¹⁾ The Jordanian delegation negotiated with the Americans the possibility of achieving the following demands:

1. Erasing Jordan’s debts, which were 750 million dollars at the time.
2. Receiving military support for the Jordan Armed Forces that was suffering from severe weakness in the period between 1990 until 1994.

Jordanian opposition to this declaration was very limited. There were no large-scale protests. However; Islamists declared “a day of sadness and mourning”. In a modest protest meeting at the central mosque in Amman, Bahjat Abu Gharbiah, head of the Arab-Jordanian popular committee against Normalization told the

⁽¹⁾ Al Madfai ,Madiha, 1993 “**Jordan, the United States and the Middle East peace process, 1974-1991**, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, , p.40).

demonstrators that the declaration was “an attempt to consolidate the hegemony of the Zionist entity through normalization that allows its cancer to spread until it covers all the shores of the Arabian Gulf”.

Chairman of the PLO Yasser Arafat congratulated Jordan and Israel on the declaration and expressed his hope that both Syria and Lebanon would also make peace with Israel. However, some Palestinian leaders were angered by a statement in the declaration endorsing the special role of King Hussein as guardian of the Muslim Holy places in Jerusalem. They argued that this statement undermined the Palestinian claim to sovereignty over Jerusalem, and that it contradicted the Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles, which stated that the final status of Jerusalem would be determined by negotiations between the PLO and Israel.

Negotiations between the Jordanian and Israeli delegations continued through August and September of 1994. In mid-October, the Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin visited Amman, and an agreement was reached on the final peace treaty between Jordan and Israel.

Since the Jordanian government received all its Jordanian demands from Israel, it was about time for it to issue the treaty law according to King Hussein's letter to the nation in which he confirmed the fact that Jordan will not look behind, and in accordance to the will of Arab brothers to choose peace, will sign a peace treaty with Israel with out making any concessions.

The law of the peace treaty was presented to the government and approved by 55 votes. There was not much of an objection to the law neither in the parliament nor on the streets of Jordan, except for some demonstrations organized by

opposition parties, but they were normal, legitimate, and expressive of the democracy Jordan has been working to achieve.

Dr. Abdul Salam Al Majali: “In my point of view, the law of the treaty and the treaty itself were very well accepted by the people for the following reasons:

-King Hussein’s speech to the nation, and people’s unlimited faith in him, his ambitions, and his vision of the future of Jordan.

-The fact that the treaty with Israel achieved all Jordanian principles and invariables, and Jordan did not have to make any concessions.

-The fact that through the negotiations Jordan was able to make U.N. resolution 242 applicable to Jordan because the Jordanian lands, East of the Jordan river were occupied after the year 1967 so resolution 242 did not include Jordanian territories before this peace treaty.

-Jordan was able to convince Israel that U.N. resolutions 242 and 338 also apply on Palestinians, at the time when the legal point of view did not see that because the (Palestinian) territories occupied in 1967 were Jordanian territories under the authority of Jordan since 1951 when they were occupied.

-Jordan received its full share of water.

-With this treaty Israel withdrew from all Jordanian territories occupied before 1967 in Wadi Araba and Bakoura.

-This treaty put an end to the concept of the alternative homeland because the new borders were drawn and registered between Jordan and Israel.

-Jordan put a condition before signing the treaty. This condition was the implementation of international law on the issue of the refugees since 1948 until

today. Israel agreed on this condition which meant that it has to implement the resolutions of the U.N. and Security Council related to the: right of either return or compensation for who ever wants it.

On the 18th of October 1994 the council of ministers presided by Prime Minister Abdul Salam Al Majaly held a meeting to discuss the details of the peace treaty with Israel. The council approved the treaty and Majaly signed it since it went in accordance with the Jordanian principles and invariables.

On the 26th of October 1994 under the patronage of King Hussein and the presence of the U.S President Bill Clinton, the Israeli President Aizer Weitzman, the U.S Secretary of state Warren Christopher, the Foreign minister of Russia (Former Soviet Union) Andreh Kozeref, Prince Hassan bin Talal, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, his Jordanian counterpart Dr. Abd Al Salam Al Majaly, in additions to a big number of invited delegations representing other countries. King Hussein attended this ceremony in Wadi Araba in which the peace treaty between Jordan and Israel was officially signed by the Israeli Prime Minister Itzhaq Rabin and the Jordanian Prime Minister Dr. Abd Al Salam Al Majaly.

By signing this treaty Jordan and Israel had put an end to 46 years of war and strained relations between the two countries. This treaty which came as a direct consequence of the Oslo accord was approved by the lower and upper houses of Parliament and ratified by King Hussein on the 9th of November and according to the constitutional steps this treaty became approved.

This treaty included an introduction, thirty articles, and five annexes that deal with the issues of land, boundaries, water, environment, police cooperation, joint border

crossings, crime, and temporary procedures.⁽¹⁾

Jordan stood to gain immediate and long-term advantages of the treaty in terms of defining Jordan's borders with Israel conclusively for the first time, putting an end to regional political designs such as the suggestion that Jordan is Palestine, restoring Jordan's share of its waters, stimulating economic growth and reiterating its commitment to refugee rights. The treaty resolved the long-standing and deeply disputed issue of land and water rights: Israel agreed to return about 350 sq km (about 135 sq mi) of disputed territory just north of the Gulf of Aqaba to Jordan in exchange for a much smaller portion of land then under Jordanian control. Israel also agreed to make 50 million cu m (13.2 billion gallons) of water available to Jordan each year, mostly by diverting flows from the Jordan River. In addition, the two governments agreed to a full normalization of diplomatic relations, and cooperation in areas of mutual concern such as tourism, transportation, environmental protection, trade, and economic development. After this agreement Jordan sent an ambassador to Israel and Israel sent one to Jordan and the two countries started sharing the cross points and bridges.

The Jordanian diplomatic stand confirmed that the treaty drew the boundaries and internationally declared the boundaries of the Jordanian state and its land is the end of the "Great Israel" idea at least in the international public opinion and according to regional and International organizations and this is considered one of the triumphs of the Jordanian diplomacy on the local, regional, and international levels. The treaty helped to burry the Israeli plans to settle the Palestinian issue by having Jordan as the alternative homeland for Palestinians and it also saved what can be

⁽¹⁾ Badareen, Faleh, The Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty, 2001, Al Hamed Publication, Amman-Jordan.

saved from the Palestinian land to confirm the Palestinian right of self-determination.

Israel and Jordan also agreed to a number of regional concepts in the treaty. These included a commitment to the creation of a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Middle East (CSCME), culminating in a regional zone of security and stability, the idea of a partnership in peace, and a commitment to human resource development at the regional level.

The treaty also obliged Israel to respect the Jordanian special role towards the preservation of the Islamic Holy shrines in Jerusalem so the Israeli religion ministry does not take control of them before the Palestinians achieve their authority. The Jordan-Israel treaty strengthened the Palestinian stand in its Declaration of Principles with Israel that took place in Washington and stressed the need to solve the refugees' issue according to the International Law.

The 1994 Peace Treaty between Jordan and Israel was a major step towards achieving a just, comprehensive and lasting peace in the Middle East. It also meant peace for Jordan after suffering from the war in addition to the economic suffering, destruction, and receiving the refugees during the 1948, 1967, and 1973, wars and even after the Gulf wars. This meant that Jordan entered a new phase after the treaty, like Late King Hussein said "I hope that this treaty will be a gift from me to express my gratitude to the Jordanian people; old and young, Women and men and to all the members of this beloved family which I'm very proud of belonging to".

In regards to the peace treaty Former Director of King Abdullah II's press office Ayman Al Safadi said: "What mattered to Jordan at the time was: number one: the

retrieval of those lands wherever those were for symbolic political reasons because you can not go to your people and say we signed a peace treaty retrieving our land no matter how insignificant that land is but it is still a matter of sovereignty. Number two is water which was a key issue for Jordan and still is, number three: borders to have clear demarcation of borders which was something that was not done in the past, number four is the relation with Palestinians in as far as the refugees issues which was at the time a significant issue for Jordan now it is less important at least in the Jordanian perspective and the relations with the West bank. I think Jordan got a very good deal in the peace process considering that it is one of the weakest countries in the region”⁽¹⁾

Jordan has not been a party to the final status negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, except on the issue of refugees. This is because of the fact that Jordan houses more than 41% of the Palestinian refugees in the world, most of who hold Jordanian citizenship. The Peace Treaty with Israel affirms Jordan’s role in safeguarding the rights of its citizens of Palestinian origin. The Jordan-Israel treaty of peace offers a potentially ideal example to emulate. But it should always be understood that no peace can be achieved without an agreement with the Palestinians. Therefore, Jordan views progress on the Palestinian-Israeli track in particular as a source of strength and support for its own model of and vision for peace.

The Jordan-Israel treaty of peace constitutes an important core of comprehensive peace in the region; the ultimate objective for the realization of comprehensive

⁽¹⁾ Al Safadi , Ayman, Interview with researcher , Thursday, August 11, 2005, Amman-Jordan

peace that could ensure security and prosperity for all parties is based on securing peace treaties between Israel and all other Arab parties.

Additionally, a just and comprehensive peace in the region has also to include peace agreements with Syria and Lebanon, including the withdrawal of Israel from the Golan Heights to the June 4th 1967 borders.

Yet paradoxically it was Jordan that managed to employ its peace treaty with Israel to serve the Palestinians. The Hebron Protocol, the release of Ahmed Yassin, and the Wye River Agreement would not have been secured were it not for Jordan's intervention.

Furthermore, Jordan managed to neutralize the Israeli factor in its relations with the United States.⁽¹⁾

Following a demonstration against the treaty in Amman by about 5,000 people, organized by Islamic groups, the government banned all public meetings. The Islamic Action Front (IAF) and its allies continued to oppose the treaty and began a campaign in the National Assembly against the normalization of relations with Israel. They attempted to prevent the repeal of legislation limiting relations with Israel, including a law adopted in 1973 prohibiting land sales to Israelis, a 1958 law imposing a total economic boycott to Israel, legislation from 1953 outlawing trade between the two states.

The reaffirmation of King Hussein's special role as guardian of the Muslim holy places in East Jerusalem was criticized by the leadership of the PLO. In September

⁽¹⁾ Hamarneh, Mustafa, (A Jordanian perspective by is director of the Center for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan.)

1994 the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) had claimed responsibility for all Islamic institutions in East Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza. In response, Jordan had agreed to relinquish its rights over sites in the West Bank and Gaza, but it refused to renounce its guardianship over the holy shrines of East Jerusalem. At the end of January 1995, both sides reached a compromise on the issue and signed a mutual agreement. The Palestinians agreed to recognize the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty, thus implying de facto recognition of Jordanian rights over the Jerusalem shrines, at least until the city came under Palestinian sovereignty. In return, Jordan confirmed its support for Palestinian autonomy and for the future existence of an independent Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital. The agreement also covered economic, cultural, and administrative affairs, and included an agreement to use the Jordanian currency in Palestinian territories.⁽¹⁾ The Jordan-Israel peace treaty, signed in October 1994, was accompanied on both sides by high hopes of warm relations between the peoples of the two countries. For a period of about two years from the signing of the Wadi Araba treaty until the year following the opening of the Western Wall tunnel in September, 1996, Jordanian popular attitudes were somewhat up in the air, and perhaps susceptible to change. For example, during the spate of bus bombings in Israel in the spring of 1996, considerable sympathy for Israelis was expressed on a personal level. A wide range of factors, however, led to the deterioration in any public support for the peace agreement on the Jordanian side. These included: the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations; Israel's

(1) Isaldeen, Amayra, 2003 (Political development in Jordan: 1974-1999, By Aligarh Muslim University, India,)

1996 "Grapes of Wrath" operation in Lebanon; the strength of traditional anti-Israel feeling especially among Palestinians; and the vigorous "anti-normalization" movement, led by the Islamic Action Front and the country's professional associations who steadfastly opposed any opening to Israel under current conditions or, indeed, under virtually any circumstances other than the dismantling of the Jewish state. Their views represented what had formerly been the loose consensus, basically since before 1948, in common with the entire Arab world.

The relations also deteriorated by the attempted assassination of Hamas leader Khalid Mishal in September 1997. The attempt which angered King Hussein who not only expressed his sympathy with Mishal calling him 'brother but also 'threatened' to cut off diplomatic relations with Israel unless Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu delivered the 'antidote' for the poison that nearly killed Mishal. Then Netanyahu had rushed defense minister Yitzhak Mordechai and infrastructure minister Ariel Sharon accompanied by his personal advisor to pacify the King. From Amman, the king sent his brother, Prince Hassan, to deliver a 'stiff message' to the Israeli prime minister. Another triumph for King Hussein's diplomacy was the release of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, the leader of Hamas who King Hussein used to call 'my Palestinian brother.' from an Israeli prison on October 1 after he had been incarcerated by Israel in 1989. Sheikh Yassin was released only days after the assassination attempt took place (Ibrahim Ghoshe, a Hamas spokesman, was arrested in Amman on September 7.)

Jordan's brief peace with Israel was also disrupted when Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu sparked the violence by the opening of the Western Wall

Tunnel in Jerusalem and ensuing incidents, Jordanian public opinion turned against Israel, intensifying over the next few years. Events since then, such as commercial fairs to which Israelis were invited but boycotted, the Jordanian reaction to the King's sharing the grief of bereaved Israeli parents, the attempted assassination of Hamas leader Khalid Mishal, and various other incidents all showed that the vast majority of Jordanians could not have an acceptance of Israel.

The word for contacts with Israel quickly became "normalization." During the two-year period after the treaty, the concept was discussed fairly openly in the press, and some Jordanians, though always a minority, actually advocated, even publicly, closer ties with Israel. However, by late 1996, such discussions disappeared from the press. Instead, "normalization" in Arabic ⁽¹⁾. The spearhead of the anti-normalization process was the Jordanian professional associations, which had, three months before the signing of the treaty, already threatened disciplinary action against members who dealt with Israelis.⁽¹⁾

Not long after, the professional associations were the driving force behind the formation of an "anti-normalization committee," which was active in researching contacts with Israel with the aim of "exposing" them.

It was made clear by the Jordanian political government that no matter how much the Jordanian-Israeli relations may deteriorate the commitment for peace within the two countries would always be respected. "However relations did not improve or

⁽¹⁾ Majdoubeh, Ahmad, Jordan Times, 7 December 1995. Majdoubeh discusses the etymology of the word, but also points out that (already) that it had acquired connotations and assumptions of Israel politically, culturally, and economically overwhelming Jordan. and "normalizer" became solely words of opprobrium.)

⁽¹⁾ Lori, Plotkin, (May 1997) "Jordanian - Israeli Peace: Taking Stock, 1994-1997," Washington Institute Policy Focus, Research Memorandum 32), p. 27.)

deteriorate but there was always a line of commitment that the relations would not deteriorate beyond. And Jordan always argued that it needed to maintain that back channel with Israelis as a pressure tool.”

King Hussein had always confirmed Jordan’s commitment. And rejected the opposition’s calls to expel the ambassador of Israel from Amman.

In an Address to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe-Strasbourg, France on September 25, 1995, King Hussein said: “On October 26, 1994, when Jordan and Israel signed their peace treaty, we did not make peace only with Israel: We also made it with ourselves, confident in our belief that this was the only way we could break out of the cycle of violence which has devastated our lands and our peoples.

Wye River peace accord:

The Oct. 1998 summit at Wye Mills, Md., generated the first real progress in the stymied Middle East peace talks in 19 months. With President Bill Clinton mediating and the great help of King Hussein who left his hospital bed to help mediate the Wye River peace accord between Israel, represented by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and the Palestinians, represented by the Palestinian President Yasser Arafat, settled several important interim issues called for by the 1993 Oslo Peace Accords. . State Department spokesman James Rubin said to reporters, "we think the King will help bring home to the two delegations the importance of taking the tough choices for peace." The Palestinians agreed to remove language from their founding charter that called for the dismantling of the

Jewish state; Israelis agreed to cede an additional 13% percent of the West Bank.

But several highly sensitive issues—Palestinian statehood, the drawing of borders, and the status of Jerusalem—went unbroached, although only six months were left before the Oslo Accord deadline of May 4, 1999. If significant progress were not made by then, Arafat threatened to unilaterally declare a Palestinian state, which would inevitably lead to retaliation by Israel.

Although Israel did complete the first of three withdrawals from the West Bank on Nov. 20, released 250 Palestinian prisoners, and authorized the opening of the Gaza airport, the peace accord began unraveling almost immediately. Disagreement over the Israeli release of Palestinian prisoners led to violence in the West Bank and Gaza, for which each side blamed the other.

King Hussein's great initiative to leave his hospital bed in which he was receiving chemotherapy for non-Hodgkin's lymphoma at Mayo Clinic to mediate and participate in this accord made him win accolades from all sides for his deft diplomacy.

The First Gulf War:

Jordan lead by Late King Hussein had spared no effort to prevent any deterioration of Arab-Arab relations. Thus before the First Gulf war King Hussein made tremendous efforts to stop the deterioration of relations between Iraq and Kuwait. He encouraged both countries to reach a peaceful settlement for their problems. King Hussein saw his role as that of an active mediator between Saddam

Hussein and both the other Arab states and the West. Between August 1990 and late January 1991, the King held countless meetings with Western and Arab world leaders, including President Bush in mid-August. Initially, King Hussein sought to promote an "Arab solution" to the Gulf crisis. Disappointed at the failure of this effort, he pursued an "Islamic solution" involving Islamic states outside the Arab world, and after the war began on January 16, he strove to end the conflict.

When Iraq invaded Kuwait, King Hussein and the Jordanian government tried to do whatever they can to contain the crisis, put an end to the occupation of Kuwait, and peacefully remove all the reasons that lead to this crisis through Arab mediation.

When these efforts failed, Jordan moved on towards making initiatives to persuade the United Nations to continue focusing on the diplomatic means to solve this issue and to leave aside any decisions that would lead to a military confrontation. Despite of the failure of its attempts, Jordan continued its efforts to prevent any military aggression, because it truly believed that any aggression is going to cause huge damages and human, social, and political destruction from which the region could never recover.

In all its efforts Jordan kept a neutral position between all the sides of the conflict so it can have the role of the mediator because such a neutral position is necessary for any successful attempt to solve the claims and the counter claims.

There were two main sources for these claims and counter claims that were the main sources of the conflict between Iraq and Kuwait. The first source was the struggle on the issue of the borders between the two countries and the right of

extracting oil from Al Rmeileh oil field. The other source was Iraq's old interest in having an outlet to the Gulf waters. An interest that Iraq believes it was deprived from because of the way that the borders between the two countries were drawn by the British government's representative in 1922.

Jordan believed that it was not only possible but it was also an urgent necessity to overcome these sources of difference through the mediation of Arab governments because of their belonging to the Arab League.⁽¹⁾

It also believed that Arab countries had to make serious efforts to find a suitable Arab solution for these differences in accordance with the UN charter (Chapters 6) that stresses that regional disputes should be solved peacefully. That was Jordan's goal, ever since it realized at the Baghdad summit of May 1990 that a serious situation has emerged as a result of Iraq's inability to receive its demands from Kuwait. Those demands related to Iraq's alleged rights to extract oil from Al Rmeileh oil field and the negative consequences of the international drop in oil prices on the economy of Iraq, for which the Iraqis blamed Kuwait. Iraq said that this drop in oil prices was caused by Kuwait's and the United Arab Emirates' overproduction of oil than the shares specified by the OPEC.

Iraq complained against the over-production of oil by Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which hurt Iraq due to a sharp fall in oil revenues. On the 19th of July 1990 Kuwait sent an official letter to the Secretary General of the Arab League expressing "astonishment and surprise" at the Iraqi accusations. For some

⁽¹⁾ Al Gur'an, Saleh, **Jordan's position in the Gulf war**, University of Jordan, Amman, June 1993.)

reason the Arab League did not take any initiative to defuse the Iraq-Kuwait war of words. Two days later, the OPEC ministerial meeting held in Geneva between the 26th and the 27th of July 1990 supported in principle the Iraqi contention on crude oil prices and production quotas.

The minimum demands made by Iraq were reported to be that Kuwait should promise to abide by the OPEC rules: 1) ceding the southern part of Rmeileh oil fields 2) pay \$2.4 billion as compensation for oil extracted from Rmeileh fields, 3) make some sort of debt write off and additional financial compensation for oil market losses and for war efforts. Kuwait confirmed that the loans will be written off and financial compensation will be paid, provided Iraq agrees to sign a favorable border treaty. Iraq did not agree and could not repay around \$80 billion that had been borrowed to finance the Iran-Iraq war. It argued that the war was in Kuwait's and Saudi Arabia's interest since the enemy was Iranian messianic Shiite fundamentalism, which potentially threatened them.

One cannot ignore the fact that the issue of Rmeileh oil fields was a major cause for the conflict between Iraq and Kuwait. Since this oil field lies in a disputed area between Iraq and Kuwait, and Kuwait was extracting oil from it Iraq claimed that Kuwait's extraction of oil from this field was illegal.

Jordan had a very effective role in the beginning of the crisis. It depended on the diplomacy of direct communication; when its political leadership, which reserved the pivotal role in administering foreign diplomacy, persisted direct "personal" communication through bilateral meetings, phone calls, or letters to the political leaders and officials of Arab and Foreign countries, in an attempt to

convince them of the peaceful solution for the crisis⁽¹⁾. King Hussein made serious mediation efforts between Iraq and Kuwait in the last week of July 1990. Through this mediation he was able to get assurances from Saddam Hussein that Iraq will not use force to solve its dispute with Kuwait as long as negotiation were still taking place. However, while similar efforts were beginning to achieve some good results, external pressures were applied that lead to the escalation of the conflict between Iraq and Kuwait. Such pressures were the naval maneuvers that the United States carried out in the Gulf waters, and the US house of Senates' decision made on the 27th of July 1990 to stop all its aid of food products and prohibited sending any military equipment or technology to Iraq.

On the 29th of July King Hussein made a trip to Baghdad then to Kuwait on the next day to urge the governments of both countries to have more flexibility. These visits represented a final second attempt to avoid the big explosion.

“Unfortunately it was apparent that the Kuwaiti authorities had a misconception of its security, and did not realize the seriousness of the situation and the great anger that the Iraqi government had for Kuwait at a time when the armed forces of both countries had been gathering at the borders. Perhaps this came as a result of the Kuwaiti belief that they could count on immediate foreign back up in the case Kuwait was subjected to a foreign invasion” King Hussein said.

Iraq realized the danger of foreign interference and the stubbornness of Kuwait. As a result representatives of both sides attended a meeting in Jeddah on the 31st of July, which was bound to fail. In spite of all this, the Iraqi invasion of

(1) Masalha , Mohammad , **A word on Jordanian diplomacy**, Addustour April 7, 1991

Kuwait in the early hours of the 2nd of August 1990 was a surprise for the Jordanian government.

King Hussein was told about this invasion on five thirty in the morning of that day (2nd of August 1990) when King Fahed bin Abed Al Aziz of Saudi Arabia called him and asked him to urge Saddam Hussein to stop the invasion at the border of the area which was being fought by both countries until a peaceful solution is found.

When King Hussein asked King Fahd where the Iraqi forces had reached, he was shocked to know that the Iraqi forces at the time were already only six kilometers away from the city of Kuwait and were still going forward.

At 0200 hours of the 2nd of August, three Iraqi Republican Guard armored divisions with nearly 300 tanks rolled over the Kuwaiti frontier, in a move coordinated with heliborne air assault with nearly three commando battalions of the Special Forces. The main force of commandos were landed on Kuwait international airport to make it secure for troops flown in by transport aircraft immediately afterwards. The second element of the heliborne commandos quickly captured most of the key points in the city including the command and control centers of the Kuwaiti army. There was hardly any resistance except by the guards at the royal palace. The whole thing was a complete surprise to everybody except the Iraqi political system.⁽¹⁾

The borders and air space of Iraq were closed, and King Hussein's attempts to

⁽¹⁾ Al Gur'an, Saleh,(1993) **Jordan's position in the Gulf war**", University of Jordan, Amman .

contact Saddam Hussein failed. King Hussein could not get hold of him until the afternoon. Saddam Hussein then told King Hussein: “The Iraqi army, in compliance with a balanced demand from the Arab countries and not under threats, provocation, or condemnation, will be ready to withdraw from Kuwait”. Kuwait was already fully occupied, but Saddam promised King Hussein that under these conditions he will start withdrawing his army from Kuwait within days and end the occupation within weeks.

A little after this phone call and on the same day of the 2nd of August, King Hussein went to Alexandria and met with the Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak who asked the King to visit Baghdad as soon as possible which was the same thing King Fahd of Saudi Arabia had asked from King Hussein. Then King Hussein and President Mubarak called the US President George Bush who considered the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait inadmissible and expressed his concern for the foreigners present in Kuwait. King Hussein told President Bush that he needed forty-eight hours to travel to Iraq and get some definite assurances from Saddam Hussein in regards of a complete Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, which would only come as a result of the Arab solution that was discussed between King Hussein and the Iraqi President. King Hussein and President Mubarak decided that the Arab League should postpone making any decisions or condemnation regarding the invasion before King Hussein ended his mission in Baghdad. They also agreed that King Hussein was going to demand Iraqi clarification of its stands in regards of two proposals: The first proposal being an Iraqi commitment of a complete pull out from Kuwait as soon as possible, and the second being the approval of Iraqi

attendance in a small summit to be held in Jeddah to discuss ways of solving any conflicting issues between Iraq and Kuwait. President Mubarak strongly supported these two proposals and gave an order of placing his own private (G4) jet under the disposal of the Jordanian Foreign Minister so he can go to Cairo for deliberations with his Egyptian counterpart during the meeting of the Arab foreign ministers held in Cairo. The aim of this meeting was to calm the foreign ministers of the Gulf States who were pushing the Arab League towards issuing a condemnation of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

On the next morning, the 3rd of August, King Hussein headed to Baghdad, after he had stopped in Amman for a few hours. In Baghdad he met with the Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and got his approval of solving this crisis within Arab context, and attending the Arab summit to be held in Jeddah on the 5th of August 1990. This small summit would also include the leaders of Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. They also agreed on the general guidelines of the conflict's solution that King Hussein had previously discussed with President Mubarak and King Fahd bin Abd Al Aziz. These General Guidelines stressed the urgency of a quick Iraqi pull out from Kuwait by a date that is going to be decided in the summit. They also agreed that President Saddam was to inform King Hussein of the details of the Iraqi stance and position before his Majesty arrives to Amman coming from Baghdad. All this was agreed upon, but the Iraqi President stressed that the Iraqi response to Arab demands will be positive as long as the Arab League does not condemn Iraq because he knew that any condemnation of Iraq was going to open the way for foreign intervention. After a comprehensive merger between Iraq and

Kuwait, the Iraqi government declared for JIHAD or Holy War against the Americans and the Israelis. On the same day it ordered closing down all the embassies in Kuwait. On the 12th of August the Iraqi President Saddam Hussein declared that Iraq would pull out from Kuwait, if Israel withdraws from the West Bank, the Gaza strip and the Golan Heights. The Iraqi government announced that it was going to start pulling out from Kuwait starting seven p.m. of that same day of August 3rd 1990. This announcement came as a result of King Hussein's visit and deft diplomacy. However; at the time when Jordanian diplomacy headed by King Hussein was starting to get very positive results and while His Majesty was making more efforts towards achieving the proposals agreed upon with the Egyptian President, the Egyptian government issued a statement condemning the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. When King Hussein arrived in Amman he called President Mubarak to tell him about the agreement reached with Saddam Hussein, and expressed his disappointment in the Egyptian condemnation statement.

President Mubarak explained to King Hussein the Egyptian stance and said that Egypt was put under tremendous pressures and that he had spoken with King Fahd of Saudi Arabia who was very upset by the situation. President Mubarak told King Hussein that now he does not accept the agreement between King Hussein and Saddam, and that the Iraqi pullout from Kuwait and the return of the rule to the ruling Kuwaiti family should be unconditional. Therefore, the Egyptian President adopted the same stance that the Arab League Foreign ministers had adopted which is a stance that condemns the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and demands an immediate

pull out.⁽¹⁾ Jordan's representative in the Arab League, Jordanian foreign minister at the time Marwan Al Qasem warned the Arab ministers of the dangerous consequences of such condemnation, especially because King Hussein and some other Arab leaders were still making big efforts to hold a small Arab summit to contain the crisis. In spite of all this, in the late hours of August 3rd 1990, the condemnation resolution was issued with 14 votes for the condemnation. Jordan's representative did not vote and justified his decision.⁽²⁾

This policy resulted from a number of factors. The King shared the view of the majority Palestinian element of Jordan's population that the West, led by the United States, was using a double standard in denouncing Iraq's invasion of Kuwait to the point that it was willing to go to war, while ignoring Palestinian grievances over Israel's occupation policies in the West Bank. This stance made the King popular with Palestinians, as did permission for the September holding of a pro-Iraqi conference by Jordanians and representatives of several major PLO groups, sponsored by the AJNDB. As Prince Hassan bin Talal acknowledged, Saddam Hussein's popularity in the Kingdom was a "limiting factor on Jordan's maneuverability"

The condemnation resolution aborted Jordan's attempts to hold a summit, made the Iraqi government more stubborn, blocked the way in front of any Arab solution and paved the way for foreign intervention that made the international

⁽¹⁾ (Arab League resolution number 3036 made on the 3rd of August 1990).

⁽²⁾ Al Qasem's, Marwan , 1990, (Jordanian foreign minister speech to the Arab League – Cairo 3rd August 1990)

community demand an unconditional, nonnegotiable Iraqi pull out.

On the other hand, the speed at which Arab Foreign ministers issued the condemnation resolution, and the sudden change of President Mubarak's position, which had previously supported the Jordanian initiative, represented signs to the Jordanian government that the governments of Egypt, Saudi Arabia and other Arab states were under heavy pressures. These pressures also altered Saudi Arabia's position who kept, until the last moments before the condemning resolution was issued, encouraging Jordan and participating with genuine efforts their pursue of a diplomatic solution for the issue.

Jordan became more worried when Jordanian foreign minister Marwan Al Qasem returned to Amman carrying the text of the condemnation statement to the Islamic Conference Organization meeting in Cairo that condemns the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. King Hussein's direct reaction was foreseeing that this condemnation is going to internationalize the crisis instead of solving it within Arab context. Not long afterwards, it became clear that his majesty's expectations were very accurate.

At this point the crisis began to escalate at a very dangerous pace when all Jordanian efforts to break the rush into war have failed. Then there was the last hit, when the Arab League gave up its role as the safety valve for Arab security at the extraordinary Arab summit which President Mubarak had called for on the 8th of August 1990 and that was held on the 10th of August 1990. King Hussein attended this summit; however' once again his efforts to mediate between his fellow Arabs did not succeed. The Arabs found them themselves in front of a ready made resolution that perhaps was made even before the summit took place: a resolution

that was approved very quickly and came to repeat once again Arab condemnation of Iraq and to announce the approval of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states request for gathering Arab forces “to protect their territories and insure regional security against any foreign assault, Article number six of the Arab League charter states that if a country is assaulted by another, decisions are made unanimously.⁽¹⁾ Jordan believed that the decisions made on the ministers’ level on the 3rd of August 1990 and the other made on the 10th of August 1990, were not made in accordance with Article number six of the Arab League charter. Jordan believed that the latter decision was made to allow foreign intervention before giving enough of a chance to find an Arab solution for this crisis, Therefore, Jordan did not vote.

1. Jordan did not, however, support the use of force to solve the oil-pricing problem or the invasion and annexation of Kuwait.

Many in the region realized, that the sending of land, naval, and air force by the international coalition to Saudi Arabia represented a big threat towards the achievement of a plan to destroy Iraqi military and industrial capabilities. The features of these threats began to be more and more apparent, through what was found to be a campaign coordinated by Western media that lasted for more than two years before the beginning of this crisis. The aim of the campaign was to create the illusion that the Iraqi government is planning to become the super power of the Middle East in preparation to attack particularly Israel. As a reaction to what Iraq has considered a malicious conspiracy against it, it announced the capture and

(1) Resolution number 195 The Arab extraordinary summit / Cairo 9-10 August 1990.

detention of a number of foreigners, adding to the crisis another dimension, breaching, once again, international law, and spreading fear in the hearts of the big number of foreigners in Iraq and the countries of the Gulf. Consequently, hundreds of thousands of refugees went into Jordan adding new burdens to the old ones Jordan had.

On the 6th of August 1990 the Security Council issued resolution number 661 that imposes sanctions on Iraq. On the 25th of August this was followed by resolution number 665 that imposed complete naval, land, and air blockade on Iraq. These two resolutions had destructive economic and financial consequences on Jordan. Jordan's port of Aqaba, the only Jordanian outlet to the sea was besieged in an arbitrary and abusive manner by the coalition's navy forces at the time when the ports of other countries, which are connected to Iraq, did not receive any similar treatment. The trade movement with Iraq - which had been Jordan's main market, source of oil products which were given to Jordan to pay up Iraq's debt to Jordan - was completely stopped. In such manner, Jordan was subjected to a very harsh economic punishment as a result of actions it was not even part of. In addition to the hundreds of thousands of new refugees who streamed into Jordan. With all that happened one can imagine the extreme tension that this caused that might have exploded if the government did not adopt a neutral position and if it did not resist foreign pressures since the beginning of the crisis. The Jordanian armed forces were in a condition of full preparedness, readiness, and alertness. They were instructed to confront any trespass of its land or airfields, something that became known to everybody. King Hussein described that period of time as being very critical for

Jordan, who continued to receive threats and was subjected to a lot of pressure. However, the Jordanian people survived this crisis, kept their high morale and stood by each other.

Since the explosion of the crisis, the Jordanian government explained its stance with full Clarity and explicitness. It announced its rejection of the principle of taking over any land by force.⁽¹⁾ Through out the crisis, Jordan tried its best to keep a balance between the respect for the Security Council resolutions and the need for a diplomatic solution. Resolution 660 dated the 2nd of August 1990 guarantees the bases for a peaceful solution, for article three of this resolution call on “ *Iraq and Kuwait to start immediately intensive negotiations to solve their dispute, and supports all similar efforts, specially those made by the Arab League*”. Jordan explained the term “*Unconditional pull out*” stated in the resolution as a statement that does not exclude, in the language of diplomacy, pre agreement on later arrangements. Unfortunately, members of The Security Council who belonged to the international coalition against Iraq ignored the third article of the Security Council resolution. Despite the emergency summit’s decision to send Arab forces to join the coalition forces against Iraq on the 10th of August 1990 which Jordan was disappointed for, Jordan continued to do whatever it can to reach an Arab solution for the conflict in coordination with some other members of the Arab League who shared the same interest in finding a peaceful solution. Jordan directed its efforts in two ways:

First: Jordan used its diplomacy to contact the main members of the

⁽¹⁾ Speech of the Jordanian foreign minister delivered to the UN’s General Assembly on the 24th of September 1990

international coalition to stress the need of dialogue and giving up confrontation with Iraq.

Second: Jordan intensified its communication with the Arab governments which have the same position as Jordan. It also intensified its communication with the Iraqi government in an attempt to reach a settlement that would convince the Iraqi government of removing any reasons that would justify the presence of foreign forces in the region, and thus its pull out from Kuwait.

Following the Arab summit which took place on the 10th of August 1990, King Hussein went to Baghdad on the 13th of August 1990, and then he flew to the United States where he met with President George Bush on the 16th of August. During this visit, King Hussein got the impression that the U.S military presence in Saudi Arabia and the region was to protect Saudi Arabia, and that these forces along with the other military forces present there were merely in a defensive position. The American stance towards the necessity of Iraqi pull out from Kuwait was very clear and in accordance with the Jordanian stance. Because there were no evidence of any Iraqi bad will towards Saudi Arabia King Hussein felt that there is a chance that he should make use of, to increase his efforts to reach a peaceful solution for the whole situation. This aim rose to the position of a holy duty for King Hussein, to save peace and the interests of all parties concerned. On that same day, Prince Hassan bin Talal met with a delegation of “The Europe Council” and explained to its members Jordan’s clear position.⁽¹⁾

In the period between the 23rd and the 29th of August 1990, King Hussein

⁽¹⁾ Prince Hassan Bin Talal’s speech to at the meeting of the European Council’s ministers- 16th of August 1990.

visited Yemen, Sudan, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Mauritania, and Morocco. The King also visited Spain, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Italy during the period between the 30th of August and the 5th of September 1990. In each European country, King Hussein met with their leaders, and explained to them the Jordanian perspective in regards of the origins and the causes of this crisis, and the current situation. He also explained the various means by which a peaceful and just solution can be found for this crisis. In all these countries, except the United Kingdom, King Hussein was encouraged to pursue his mediating mission (King Hussein's letter to Saddam Hussein- on the 22nd of September 1990

When King Hussein saw some encouraging signs from president Saddam Hussein regarding Iraq's readiness to look for a compromising solution, and accept a negotiated settlement, and that this was not rejected on Iraq's part, in addition to the European support he was given to double his efforts to achieve Arab mediation: he decided to make a new initiative in cooperation with the Algerian President Al Shathely bin Jadeed and the King of Morocco. On the 19th of September 1990, King Al Hassan of Morocco held a meeting in Rabat. This meeting was attended by the Algerian President Al Shathely bin Jadeed and King Hussein. On the 22nd of September King Hussein sent a letter to Saddam Hussein. ⁽²⁾ Out of all the efforts that Jordan had made to achieve an Arab solution King Hussein's letter to Saddam Hussein was very distinct. In this letter King Hussein expressed his fears and the fears of Arabs that the conflict between Iraq and Kuwait might bring up plans that target Arab wealth and Arab lands that this crisis might be a trap for Iraq. He also

⁽²⁾ King Hussein's letter to Saddam Hussein- on the 22nd of September 1990

explained in this letter the dangerous consequences of a military confrontation not only for Iraq, but also for all the Arab Nation. This letter confirmed for Saddam Hussein the fact that Jordan and all Arab countries do not accept the occupation of land by force, not only because this is a firm principle, but also because ignoring this principle, would be considered a dangerous precedent Israel could very well use. The Iraqi invasion, and the annexation of Kuwait are two things that cannot be accepted and Iraq's retreat would not represent a defeat for Iraq. On the contrary, this would be a gain for Iraq and the whole Arab world. In the case of an Iraqi pull out from Kuwait, Iraq would be saving two decades of achievements, and the world would start to focus on the need to fill the gap between the rich and the poor Arab countries, which will remain a legitimate national goal. In addition, Jordanian diplomacy clarified that the Iraqi pull out from Kuwait might help Iraq achieve its claims that caused the conflict in a legitimate way. It also pointed out that this pullout might force the international community to face its responsibilities towards the Palestinian issue, and would not give the chance to the enemies of Arabs to make use of their conflicts.

The Royal letter confirmed that these goals could be achieved if a peaceful solution to this conflict is found within Arab framework. Such a solution would have to give Kuwait the right of self-determination and would stress what Iraq had always been saying that it is never acceptable for an Arab force to be used against Arabs. This solution could have shown that Iraq invaded Kuwait for self-defense to confront a stubborn position and not as an expression of the love of expansion or domination.

King Hussein's letter to Saddam Hussein asked the Iraqi President to answer a number of questions to help the three leaders carry out their mediation role between parties of the conflict. These questions were:

What are the exact and executable demands that Iraq wanted from Kuwait in regards of the joint borders? What does Iraq need an access to the Gulf waters for? What does Iraq want in compensation for the oil extracted from Al Rmeileh field? In addition to other questions regarding other demands.

King Hussein's letter was concluded by urging Saddam Hussein to give a positive response to the efforts of the leaders of the three countries so they can carry out their mediation role between Iraq and Kuwait, and to resume the relations with the other countries of the Gulf, which had begun to fear the consequences of its collapse along with Iraq in the midst of the huge foreign military presence.

On the 29th of September, Iraqi Foreign minister Tareq Aziz arrived in Amman carrying Saddam Hussein's response to King Hussein's letter. Despite the fact that the response came in agreement with the Jordanian analysis of the conflict, it expressed the Iraqi government's surprise of some of the ideas present in King Hussein's letter. For example, the Iraqi government did not accept the proposal regarding the options Iraq had. The Iraqi response said: "The questions that were directed to President Saddam Hussein should have been directed to the other party" of the conflict and it should have asked: "what do they want from Iraq?" The Iraqi letter said that if war was the alternative to answering the Jordanian questions, then Iraq accepts the challenge and the consequences will not be as catastrophic as King Hussein said in his letter and that it is the U.S and its allies whose end is going to be

catastrophic. The letter added that Saddam Hussein is ready to accept one of two solutions to this conflict: The first being the Arab solution where the two parties of the conflict would sit together to solve their differences exactly like King Hussein suggested on his visit to Baghdad on the 3rd of August 1990. The second is the solution announced by Iraq on the 12th of August 1990 which calls for holding an international conference that not only discusses the Kuwaiti issue but also the Palestinian and the Lebanese ones on the condition that the solution is built on international legitimacy. This second option was immediately rejected by the United States and the United Kingdom. In the context of this option President Saddam Hussein expressed his willingness to attend a small summit, which was then aborted by some the parties, which were supposed to attend according to the Iraqi letter in which Saddam Hussein expressed his willingness to reach an Arab settlement. The Iraqi President accepted King Hussein's principle of not accepting the occupation of any land by force but demanded that this principle should be implemented on all cases not only Kuwait's case. For, when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait he wanted to place the international community face to face with its responsibilities in regards to the Palestinian issue and he succeeded to reveal the true intentions of the U.S and its ally Israel. The Iraqi President saw that both the U.S and Israel had all ready made plans for the Arab countries and were preparing for these plans before even the invasion of Kuwait took place, and were going to carry out their plans in the Middle East even if the invasion of Kuwait did not take place.

Iraq did not link the invasion of Kuwait to the Palestinian issue with the aim

of attracting Palestinian or any other Arab support for the Iraqi position. This is because the Palestinian issue is a central one, and had always main the main subject of Saddam Hussein's public and private speeches at Arab summits.

The Jordanian-Moroccan- Algerian mediation did not succeed. And the Jordanian government feared the escalation of the crisis; therefore it focused its efforts on preventing the coalition forces from using military power.

In September 1990, King Hussein directed a letter to the American people clarifying the Jordanian position. In this letter King Hussein said that Jordan believes in the principle of not accepting occupation of land by war. King Hussein also said that Jordan still recognizes the country and government of Kuwait. It also recognized Saudi Arabia's right to ask for the assistance of its friendly countries, and the right of the American administration to respond to the Saudi call. King Hussein's letter to the American people called for putting an end to the US and the coalition forces' presence on Saudi land as soon as possible. The letter explained that the crisis did not emerge from thin air and has very complicated roots and causes, and have three linked dimensions:

The first dimension is the dispute over the borders between Iraq and Kuwait, which is an old one. The Iraqi political system had begun to look for a negotiated settlement for this dispute, if it had been found Iraq would have guaranteed an independent outlet on the Gulf waters, and the disputed borders would have been drawn in a final manner.

The second dimension is a regional one. The absence of any development in finding a solution for the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the failure in implementing UN

resolution 242, which is very similar to UN resolution 660 dated the 2nd of August 1990, and the resolutions which followed in regards of the Gulf crisis. The United States had always pushed Arabs towards the acceptance of negotiated solutions and settlements, and Arabs have always complied with its wishes. However, in the case of Iraq and Kuwait it had been clear that the U.S did want Arabs to reach a negotiated settlement between Iraqis and Kuwaitis, and it rejected any solution except the unconditional Iraqi pull out from Kuwait.

The third dimension emerges from the nature of relations between the countries of the Middle East and the rest of the world. What is wanted from the era of the new world system which came into existence after the end of the cold war is not to marginalize the region. It is very essential to unite Arab efforts and Arab existence to find a diplomatic solution for the conflict. Otherwise the world would demand a solution imposed on the region by outside the region, and the legitimacy of the solution would be questioned.

Despite the fact that this position of King Hussein was a position of a peacemaker not a defender of Iraq, his advices were not very well accepted. Therefore, a media campaign and propoganda was organized to distort Jordan's position to make it look like an ally of Iraq and a defender of Iraq's actions. The propoganda also provoked the US administration to replace the sanctions on Iraq with military action. In addition, this campaign succeeded in polluting the relationship between Jordan and the United States. Consequently, the US military forces, which were sent to the region on a distinct mission, which is to defend Saudi Arabia in case it was subjected to an attack, started receiving military

reinforcements to evacuate the Iraqis from Kuwait. In addition to receiving more US military forces in the region, the US carried out another campaign in the beginning of October 1990 to pressure the members of the international coalition to send military forces. The campaign also pressured the UN Security Council to adopt a new resolution (resolution 678) on the 29th of November to allow the use of all means necessary to insure the respect and implementation of all the resolutions issued by this council before the deadline of the 15th of January 1991.

The Jordanian government saw that this tremendous change lead by the United States is the introduction that will definitely lead to a military confrontation, which will have tragic consequences not only on Iraq but also on the region as a whole. After the failure of Jordanian diplomacy to find an Arab solution to the conflict, Jordanian diplomacy shifted its efforts towards seeking the help of the European countries and the Soviet Union ton help prevent any military action.

From this point, Jordanian diplomacy went in two directions. In one direction was that the Jordanian leadership tried to make use of its influence on Iraq to insure the release of the foreign hostages detained in Iraq and Kuwait since the midst of August 1990. On King Hussein's visit to Baghdad on the 4th of December 1990 Iraq announced its will to release all the foreign hostages. In the other direction, Jordanian diplomacy began working on encouraging the European countries that belong to the international coalition and the Soviet Union to come out with initiatives to persuade the Iraqi government to take the necessary steps that would prevent the use of military force that was allowed – according to some interpretations- by the Security Council Resolution number 678 on the 29th of

November 1990. The French and the Soviets supported this Jordanian attempt. In the meeting between the French President Francois Mitterrand and King Hussein in Paris on the 25th of November 1990, the French President confirmed his interest in finding a diplomatic solution for the conflict and expressed his hope that Saddam Hussein would help both France and the Soviet Union adopt a peaceful initiative. He said that this initiative can not take place unless Saddam Hussein announces his will to pull out from Kuwait and reiterated that France has no bad will for Iraq but cannot back out on the decisions it had made with its allies.

With the upcoming of the U.N.'s deadline on the 15th of January 1991, Jordanian diplomacy increased its efforts to convince the European countries in the international coalition to avoid any military confrontation with Iraq and warned of the war's political, human, and environmental damages.

In the speech that King Hussein gave at the "World Climate Summit" held in Geneva on the 6th of November 1990, he explained the environmentally disastrous consequences of burning the oil fields of the Gulf and the dangers, which threaten the climate of the Middle East. King Hussein pointed out the wide effects the war might have on humans and animals, and the production of foods. Later researches have proved these facts.⁽¹⁾ In another speech King Hussein had directed to the Military staff college on the 9th of December 1990, King Hussein warned: " Our Arab region is now standing on the edge of a disastrous war, that will lead to- if it takes place God forbid- to a huge tragedy, that will not only affect our present, but will also affect our future, in addition to the international economic shake it is going

⁽¹⁾ King Hussein's speech at the "Second World Climate Conference – Geneva 6th of November 1990.

to cause, a disastrous environmental catastrophe, and the opening of deep wounds which will bleed blood and disorder on a huge area of our world and for a long period of time”.

In the same speech, King Hussein gave a set of proposals for solving the conflicts that the nation is suffering from.⁽¹⁾ Between the end of December 1990 and January 1991, the Jordanian governments intensified its communication with the leaders and representatives of all major powers and other members of the international coalition. The Jordanian government encouraged members of the European Union to meet with the Iraqi foreign minister Tareq Aziz despite the fact that this meeting never took place. The Jordanian government also welcomed the announcement of the U.S President George Bush after the U.N. resolution number 678 was issued on the 29th of November 1990 that he was going to send the U.S Secretary of State to Baghdad. This announcement brought a glimpse of hope back to the Jordanian government which never gave up. The meeting finally took place in Geneva on the 9th of January 1991 when U.S Secretary of state James Baker met with the Iraqi minister of foreign affairs Tareq Aziz. Nevertheless, and after five months of no communications between Iraq and the U.S, and the restrictions that the U.N. resolutions put on the negotiations, no body expected this meeting to succeed, particularly because each of the two parties started this meeting with different goals.

⁽¹⁾ King Hussein's speech at the Command and staff college- Amman 9th of December 1990.

In the period between the 2nd and the 10th of January 1991, King Hussein visited London, Bonn, Luxembourg and Roma. In his trip to London he met with the British Prime Minister. In Germany he held talks with the President, the Chancellor and the foreign minister of Germany. In Luxembourg he deliberated with the Duke of Luxembourg, its Prime minister, and foreign minister. And finally in Rome King Hussein held talks with the Italian President and Foreign minister.

In all these meetings, King Hussein continued to warn about the consequences of the war. He asked everyone to make a final effort to protect the region from these consequences and to give Iraq the chance to exit the difficult corner in which it was stuck in by the uncompromising position of the coalition countries on one hand, and Iraq's miscalculation of the dangers that it is surrounded by.

This exact warning was passed to the U.N. Secretary General when he went through Amman on his way to Baghdad on the 11th of January 1991 to convince the Iraqi authorities to accept an unconditional pull out from Kuwait to prevent the use of power against it after the end of the deadline on the 15th of January 1991. This attempt failed, just like the attempt of the French government failed to make the Security Council issue a statement that would spare the region from a close war on the 14th of January 1991. This attempt failed when the American and the British governments rejected the French proposal because they were determined to implement U.N. resolutions number (678) of the 29th of November 1990 because they believed that this resolution gives them the right to resort to the use of power without the need for any U.N. military leadership.

When King Hussein realized that his efforts to prevent a war from taking place had failed, he made a speech to the Jordanian people on the 15th of January 1991.⁽¹⁾ In his speech King Hussein warned that the whole region is standing on the edge of a chasm.” After all doors were closed in face of wisdom and reasonability, and all windows were closed in the face of friendly dialogue”. King Hussein spared no effort in trying to achieve a peaceful settlement therefore he had a clear conscious. King Hussein explained:” From the very first hours of the crisis, I acted in accordance with our convictions derived from our Arab identity and based on loyalty to our nation. We have never wavered from the path we have followed all along, making every effort to build friendship and harmony among the Arab peoples. I have never left a stone unturned in order to enable the single Arab family to stand united on the Gulf crisis in trying to resolve it within the Arab context. We have remained on this path without despairing or isolating ourselves, because the alternative to such an Arab solution was to complicate the crisis by internationalizing it or war. We are now hearing the drums of war which are threatening us all with the most dangerous consequences.” King Hussein said.⁽²⁾

In his speech King Hussein also talked about the dangers that Jordan might be facing and expressed his faith and trust in the Jordanian Armed Forces- the Arab army- which protects the air and land of Jordan” and defies anyone who would ever think of entering it (Jordan) in any direction”.

The failure of all the attempts to persuade the Iraqi government to take the

⁽¹⁾ King Hussein’s speech to the nation-Amman 15th of January 1991.

⁽²⁾ The government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, **Al Kitab Al Abyad (The White Book)**

steps necessary to avoid the implementation of U.N. resolution number (678), and the failure to convince the coalition leaders to take a more flexible position, both resulted in the beginning of military attacks against Iraq with destructive air strikes that aimed at military and civilian sites in all parts of Iraq. With the increase of the destruction level in Iraq, the reaction of the Jordanian people and their solidarity with their Iraqi brothers increased. The scenes of destruction in the Iraqi towns and villages, and the enormous pains that was imposed on the Iraqi people as a result of the merciless air strikes increased the sympathy of Jordanians with their Iraqi brothers and increased their anger towards the coalition countries whose plans turned out to be not to liberate Kuwait but to destroy Iraq. What increased the anger of Jordanians is the fact that coalition forces kept on bombing the trucks that were transferring Iraqi oil to Jordan which was very essential, in addition to the fact that many Jordanian were killed in these bombings. King Hussein expressed these feelings when he directed a letter to the nation on the 6th of February 1991 in which he confirmed the fact that the efforts made by Jordan and other Arab countries to solve the conflict peacefully had been aborted deliberately with premeditation; “Because the true goal behind this war, as the amount of destruction proves, is to destroy Iraq, and to rearrange the region in a way that has much more dangers for the present and future of our nation than Saix Pico treaty did” King Hussein said.⁽¹⁾ When Jordan was unable to prevent the war from taking place it directed its efforts to putting an end to it as soon as possible and to preventing any land aggression. Once again, Jordanian diplomacy began a series of communication with the leaders

⁽¹⁾ (The national speech of King Hussein to the nation –Amman- on the 6th of February 1991)

of the world with the aim of convincing the Iraqi government of pulling out from Kuwait in accordance with the Security Council resolutions and to prevent any land aggression. King Hussein welcomed the Iraqi proposal on the 15th of February 1991 to pull out from Kuwait as part of a comprehensive solution to the conflict. However, this proposal was immediately rejected by the U.S President and the British Prime Minister who considered this trick a “malignant deception”. The proposals of the Soviet Union to stop the war and accept the peaceful settlement was also received by the exact rejection. The U.S President described these proposals as being not enough and unsatisfying to the demands of the United States. On the 22nd of February King Hussein made a desperate attempt to prevent the beginning of a land attack. He sent a letter to the French leader Francois Mitterrand urging him to use the influence of his country to support the Soviet proposals. However, it seemed that it had become too late to stop the coalition forces from carrying out their plans. ⁽¹⁾

The war ended, not only with putting an end to the occupation of Kuwait, but also with the occupation of the Southern parts of Iraq. This cost the Iraqi forces an expensive price, and caused severe damages to the civilians in both Iraq and Kuwait, and the region as a whole. However, the end of the war did not achieve the beginning of peace for the region.

On the 1st of March 1991, King Hussein directed the speech of the last glimpse of hope to the nation. His speech carried his calls on them for reconciliation. The speech summarized the different phases of the conflict from its

⁽¹⁾ (King Hussein's letter to the French President Francois Mitterrand- on the 22nd of February 1991

beginning until its end. He also explained the Jordanian stance. King Hussein said: “Our vision, since the beginning of the first chapter of the tragedy, was very clear. We had realized the consequences of things if Iraq continued its occupation of Kuwait and if we did not succeed in solving the conflict peacefully and within Arab context. We tried our best to contain the conflict since its very beginning, and within all the phases that preceded the war in an attempt to solve the conflict and prevent the catastrophe out of our concern for the higher national interest and our commitment to our sublime principles, but we did not succeed”.

“Jordan was the biggest victim of this conflict after Iraq and Kuwait” He added.”

“Nevertheless, we will never carry a grudge towards any one. And we will not blame any one. Because we knew that we have to pay an expensive price towards holding onto our national stance and the freedom of our decision, and because of our geographical location.”

In an analytical look at the future, king Hussein expressed his faith” that we in Jordan are confident that the Arab people are closer to cohesiveness and harmony than they appeared to be in this conflict and they are able to overcome the elements of dividedness that we have been and still are warning of its consequences and reflections. The people’s contributions in the context of democratic establishments are guaranteed to keep the relationship between the people. Just like the responsible freedom and the respect for human rights and his dignity are the guarantees that prevent decision makers from slipping into mistakes. We see in adopting democracy in our Arab world the path to protecting our nation from falling into

conflicts and disputes”⁽¹⁾. During the Gulf crisis, Jordan had been subjected to harsh pressures on its economic and financial stability. However, its political and social stability was not moved. The exactness of the people’s concerns and those of the government’s policies enabled the country to face the dangers that it had been subjected to in peace.

Jordanian Diplomacy and the Yemeni Conflict:

The bases of the Arab regional system changed after the second Gulf war. Arab countries tended to isolate them selves morally from the Arab system and refrained from showing any interest in renewing mutual Arab cooperation. Arab relations at that period of time were still affected by the consequences of the second Gulf War, and some countries had to face a cold war as a result of their positions towards the conflict. The Yemeni internal conflict emerged in 1994, and the Arab countries behaved differently towards it.

After it’s Southern and Northern parts were united in 1990, and holding elections based on competition and pluralism in 1993. The Unity of Yemen went towards the breakup and clash between its Southern and Northern parts because of both internal and external reasons. The internal reasons included the weakness of the unity procedures, where an acceptable form of the unity of both their armies and security services was not reached and the problem of administrative divisions was not solved, in addition to the economic difficulties and the harmonization of two

⁽¹⁾ (King Hussein’s speech to the nation- Amman- on 1st of March 1991.)

different economic systems, and how the Southerners felt that their role in the united country was marginalized.⁽¹⁾ On the other hand, some of the external reason for the breakup were the following: The continued communication with the communist party that represents the former government of the South of Yemen with some Arab countries, which was bothered by the unity and felt threatened by it, and the birth of a new competition on the level of the Arab Island, particularly after Yemen's position in the second Gulf War. Consequently, the conflict began with more details that cannot be mentioned in this thesis. The conflict was viewed in two different ways: The first current lead by the Yemeni government focused on the fact that the conflict is an internal one, between a legitimate government that came from legitimate elections on one hand and insurgent rebellious groups made up of members on the Yemeni communist party lead by Ali Salem Al Beed. The Yemeni government said that the essence of this conflict is the unity in the face of separation. The second one was expressed by the Yemeni communist party, which considered the conflict as not being a conflict of separation against unity, but a conflict of two separate structures. Thus the positions of Arab countries were divided between these two opinions according to the different elements affecting Arab positions towards this conflict. One group of Arab countries supported the Yemeni Communist party in Aden and rejected the behavior of Sanaa's government because this group believed that the Yemeni government was afraid that the military settlement would lead to the complete change of the Yemeni internal and external system. This group included Egypt and the countries of the Gulf headed by

(1) Al Riase, Suleiman, (Al Yaman: Al Wehdah), Al Mostakbal Al Arabi, pages 11 to 13

(2) The Arab strategic report, 1994, page 138

Saudi Arabia. The second group supported the government of central unity because of historical and ideological elements and considerations and similarity of concepts and interests⁽²⁾, this group included Iraq, Sudan, and Qatar.

Speaking of the Jordanian position towards the Yemeni conflict, one can say that its position was created as a result of several elements; the first of which is the desire of both of the conflicting parties to have Jordan as a mediator between them. Perhaps Jordan facts of this conflict and its internal was the only country accepted by both parties to carry out the mediating role. This acceptance came as a result of several elements like Jordan's moderateness in all regional issues and the nature of its stance in this conflict which seemed to be neutral and did not condemn any of the conflicting sides. Another reason for the acceptance of Jordan as a mediator is the mutual ambitions of both Yemen and Jordan in democracy, political pluralism, and the creation of a law and establishments states. The third reason would be the admiration both conflicting parties have for the humanity of Jordanian diplomacy in dealing with the facts of this conflict and its internal consequences⁽¹⁾.

The fourth reason was that Jordan kept its relations with both parties of the conflict and can carry out communications with both of them easily. In addition to the political relationship between the two countries which had been growing to the extent that Yemen had become one of the most important politically and economically cooperative countries with Jordan. This strong relationship between

⁽¹⁾ (Addustour newspaper, Addustour's letter from Berlin, copied from the Tsaynong Times news paper, Amman, issue 9524, on the 24th of February 1996, page 26.)

the two countries was strengthened by the campaign that was held against them after the second Gulf war Jordan adopted the mediation role in the Yemeni conflict out of its belief in its own ability to find a solution for this conflict and preserve the unity of Yemen. Jordan was keen to do that because it saw that the preservation of Yemen's unity as a step towards the revival of Arab integration instead of separation and disintegration, and as a tool for bringing back the confidence for the Arab world in its ability to solve Arab issues within Arab context without the need of foreign help. Jordan also believed that solving this conflict within Arab context would strengthen the role of Arab dialogue, democracy, and pluralism as tools for putting an end to many issues of conflict. In addition to all of the above containing the conflict successfully would confirm Jordan's active role in resolving Arab conflicts, and would increase the size and power of its political and regional role in the region.

Just like the neutrality of Jordanian foreign policy and the moderateness of its diplomacy succeeded in the gaining the acceptance of both parties of the conflict, the conduct Jordanian foreign policy dealt with the causes and facts of this conflict guaranteed the success of Jordan in containing it.

The conduct of Jordanian foreign policy towards the conflict came in two phases: The first phase was the phase before the signing of the document of pledge and accord. (Al Ahd Wal Ittifaq). Jordan started this phase with a conduct of mediation

that stressed the need to preserve the unity, and use dialogue and democracy to settle the conflict⁽¹⁾.

Jordanian diplomats headed by King Hussein communicated with the different sides of the conflict to fill the gaps between them and draw them closer to each other. These diplomatic efforts were then crowned with the signing the document of pledge and accord in Amman,⁽²⁾ Jordan on February 20, 1994. Between the conflicting parties and the different political powers of Yemen in Amman on the 21st of February 1994. At the time, King Hussein pointed out the principles and origins of the Jordanian position towards this conflict.

The second phase, however, was the phase after signing the accord and the beginning of fighting between the two sides. In this phase Jordan resumed its diplomacy on two levels: The first is dealing with the conflict on the bases of preserving legitimacy and unity and the second is the continuation of neutrality between the two sides. However Jordan seemed to be biased towards the preservation of unity, this was obvious through the hints of the media and the political references in describing the conflict. In this phase, Late Zeid Bin

Shaker was entrusted to draw the points of view of Sana'a and Aden closer to each other.

Jordan also sent a high-ranking military group within the context of the joint committee with the Sultanate of Oman, which contributed in calming down the

⁽¹⁾ Tleilan, Osama , 2000 "Jordanian foreign policy and Arab conflicts: A study of the influence of regional factors on the Jordanian foreign policy behavior towards Arab conflicts.", , Mafraq-Jordan, February.

⁽²⁾ Addustour newspaper, 1996 Addustour's letter from Berlin, copied from the Tsaynong Times news paper, Amman, issue 9524, on the 24th of February , page 26.

situation and the reconstruction of some sites. But, Jordan at the time felt that the Yemenis themselves should handle themselves the rest of the responsibilities related to the conflict.⁽¹⁾

Upon returning to the conduct of Jordanian diplomacy and foreign policy and the elements affecting it one can see that the change in the regional environment of the Jordanian foreign policy and Arab policies was accompanied by a partial change in the system of regional elements affecting the conduct of the Jordanian foreign policy towards the region and its conflicts, despite the fact the Jordan's goals remained fixed to a certain extent.

On one hand, the restrictions on the Jordanian foreign policy decreased with the suspension of the different sorts of economic aid, which were given to Jordan by the countries of the Gulf, which was also accompanied by a transitional weakness in the regional political relations between Jordan and these countries and their allies Egypt and Syria. On the other hand, the severity of the threats coming from the external regional environment of the system decreased, especially those coming from Israel after signing the peace treaty with Jordan.

If one wanted to compare the conduct of the Jordanian policy towards the Yemeni conflict of 1994 and the Yemeni conflict of 1962-1963, one can say that with the changes of the regional environment for the Jordanian foreign policy in the 1990s, especially after the restrictions on its movement decreased that was caused by the decrease of Jordan's economic dependence on other countries in the fields of economy and security and the decrease of external threats i.e. Israel, Jordan seemed

⁽¹⁾ Al Rai newspaper, Amman, issue 8674, on the 19th of May 1994, page 1.).

to be more active and more flexible in choosing the conduct that best suits its goals of eliminating conflicts between Arab countries and containing them, and as a mediator that solves Arab conflicts and contributes to their peace.

King Hussein's Funeral:

King Hussein Ibn Talal, at 63 young by today's standards, passed away of cancer on February 7th, 1999. Among the powerful men who came to bid him goodbye were all the American presidents who are alive - Bill Clinton plus Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter and George Bush. The Israelis arrived in force. Muammar Qadhafi and Saddam Hussein - advisedly stayed back. So did Iran's Mohammed Khatami. The PLO leader Yasser Arafat was predictably there, wiping tears. Even Boris Yeltsin dragged his wobbly self into Amman.

The American media described it as the "diplomatic funeral of the century". The editorial in the New York Times eulogized the "power of the peacemaking man ... In death, King Hussein was able to do one more time what he often did while living - draw together divided men." "Forceful and compassionate advocate of Arab-Israeli peace" the Washington post echoed.

This funeral astonished the whole world that cried, King Hussein, the peacemaker. In this regards Ayman Al Safadi said:

“I think that the funeral of King Hussein is a testament to that (The success of Jordanian diplomacy). After all, lets be realistic, King Hussein was the King of a country of five million people which is less than the population of a neighborhood in Cairo, and yet the whole world came to this funeral. It was a statement of how significant that man had been, and how significant, by association has been in the

eyes of all the major powers. We have seen other Arab leaders pass away; we did not see anything even close to King Hussein's funeral. And this is a testament of the success of the late King in nurturing relations that ultimately helped serve the interests of Jordan whether economically or politically, and that is something that can not be denied.”⁽¹⁾

⁽¹⁾ (Interview with the researcher, Amman, August 11,2005)

Section four

Jordanian diplomacy (1999-2004):

Prince Abdullah, the oldest son of King Hussein, was named Crown Prince in January 1999, about two weeks before King Hussein passed away of cancer. A few hours after his father's death on February 7th, 1999, he was sworn in as King Abdullah II. King Abdullah was named crown prince shortly after his birth in 1962, but the title was transferred to King Hussein's brother Prince Hassan three years later. Just before his death on the 24th of January 1999, King Hussein demoted Prince Hassan from the position and named his son then prince Abdullah heir to the throne. King Abdullah II bin Al Hussein is the 43rd generation direct descendant of the Prophet Muhammad (Peace Be upon Him).

One of the region's youngest leaders, born in Amman on January 30th, 1962, King Abdullah II is the oldest son of King Hussein and Princess Muna Al Hussein. He began his primary education at the Islamic Educational College in Amman, and later attended St. Edmund's School in Surrey, England. For his secondary education, he attended Eagle brook School and Deerfield Academy in the United States of America.

King Abdullah II joined the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst in the United Kingdom in 1980, and was commissioned as Second Lieutenant in 1981. In 1982, King Abdullah II attended Oxford University where he completed a one-year

Special Studies course in Middle Eastern Affairs. Upon returning home, King Abdullah II joined the Jordanian Armed Forces and served as Platoon Commander and Company Second-in-Command in the 40th Armored Brigade. In 1985, he attended the Armored Officers Advanced Course at Fort Knox, Kentucky, USA. A year later, he became Commander of a Tank Company in the 91st Armored Brigade of the Jordanian Armed Forces holding the rank of Captain. He also served with the Royal Jordanian Air force Anti-Tank Wing where he received his wings as well as his qualifications as a Cobra Attack Pilot.

In 1987, King Abdullah II attended the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University in Washington, D.C. as a Mid-Career Fellow. He completed an Advanced Study and Research program in International Affairs, part of the 'Master of Science in Foreign Service' program.

King Abdullah II, thereafter, resumed his military career where he held various positions, among them Commander of the Royal Jordanian Special Forces and Special Operations Commander. ⁽¹⁾ In addition to his career as an army officer, King Abdullah II served Jordan many times in the official capacity of Regent in the absence of the late King Hussein, and regularly traveled on official missions.

In Jordan, it is important to distinguish between political system and government. The political system, comprising the King, the Royal family, tribal elders, and principal advisers, draws the parameters of the government's business, and generally gives it an influential steer. One can assume, under normal circumstances

⁽¹⁾ Satloff, Robert, (1999) "From Hussein to Abdullah: Jordan in transition", The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, U.S.A.

that the political system only changes when the King dies. The government, on the other hand, consisting of prime minister and cabinet, usually appointed by the King, is more often than not changed every 18 months or so. This distinction between political system and government is essential when considering the diplomacy of the state. When one talks about the state in the Jordanian context, one is usually referring to the King and his court. The King is responsible for virtually all of Jordan's foreign policy. Therefore, the following sections assumes that when speaking of Jordanian foreign policy, King Abdullah's hand, though not explicitly mentioned, was always in place, guiding it.⁽¹⁾

Since his ascension to the throne, King Abdullah II has continued his late father's commitment to creating a strong and positive moderating role for Jordan within the Arab region and the world, and has worked towards the establishment of a just and lasting comprehensive solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Although he has announced that he will continue his father's policies to further institutionalize democratic and political pluralism in Jordan. King Abdullah has, according to the Washington institute for Near East Policy, already displayed "ingenuity and cunning" in steering the country toward a more regionally- successful and prosperous path. He is considered moderate and cautious like his father. King Abdullah has the important advantage of widespread support within Jordan, in three key segments of the population: First, the army. Second, the Bedouin tribes. Third, the Palestinians in Jordan. It was widely assumed that that these three elements would guarantee King Abdullah domestic stability. This is, of course, contingent or

⁽¹⁾ Haddad, Amjad, (2003) "The Political System in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan", Dar Wael for printing and publishing, First Edition, Jordan, p.323.

retaining the goodwill of these segments, as well as of the wider population, including Islamists. This seems to be the case so far. There have been pro-Palestinian demonstrations particularly since the outbreak of the second Intifada in September 2000, and non-governmental ties to Israel have been reduced. But there have not been any major challenges to his political system.

On the domestic front, King Abdullah is certainly aware of the economic challenge and the need to conciliate Palestinians. On the other front, he has promoted several officials of Palestinian origin. King Abdullah has also reduced the honorifics and ceremonies associated with Jordanian royalty in an attempt to increase its popularity.

Yet, in terms of actions, he has so far done a lot on the foreign policy front. King Abdullah has followed his father's strategy in a number of areas; sometimes moving beyond the point King Hussein had reached before his death. King Hussein had brought his country closer to Israel through a peace treaty and engaging in numerous joint economic enterprises. Israel sees Jordan as an eastern buffer against more radical states; while Jordan views Israel as a hedge against Arab aggression toward it. King Hussein was always careful to note this, despite fears at times of a direct Israeli offensive.

King Hussein spent much of his efforts putting Jordan back in the good graces of the West, especially the United States, after being denounced for his stance in the 1991 Gulf War and suffering the economic consequences. It is these two areas that King Abdullah II has most closely followed his father's direction.

But, in addition to his father's legacy, King Abdullah also inherited Jordan's problems and security concerns. The two main areas the King had to attend to immediately are domestic socio-economic conditions and maintaining the delicate balance between various currents of regional and international politics.

Despite the continuities in Jordanian foreign and security policy, there have been evident changes as well. Most of these changes spring from previous trends, but include stronger relations with other states. Late King Hussein might have been hesitant about. The most notable example can be found in King Abdullah's regional initiatives, especially efforts at reconciliation with some of Jordan's neighbors with whom King Hussein had strained relations, particularly Syria and Kuwait.

Another feature of King Abdullah's diplomacy has been his greater emphasis on Turkey, though this follows a trend begun by his father Late King Hussein. As Turkey continues to flex its political, military, and economic muscle in the Middle East, including its alignment with Israel, Jordan seems to find Turkey a powerful, Western-Oriented ally. Although King Abdullah has not been too keen on overtly aligning Jordan with Turkey, given Turkey's antagonistic and even hostile relations with many Arab States, the option remains.

King Abdullah expressed the continuation of Jordanian support for the peace process and expressed his commitment to backing the Middle East peace process.

With his father's policies as the base for his policies King Abdullah redefined his policy to focus more on Jordan, and have less involvement in regional politics than it had before. Ayman Al Safadi former director of King Abdullah's press office

said: Jordan's policies now focus on the achievement of a more stable Jordan, a more economically prosperous Jordan, a stronger Jordan that is more capable of playing a supporting role for the Palestinians and others. The policies now focus more on domestic issues. What is our major problem? Is it the Arab-Israeli conflict or is it poverty? I think that a lot of people would argue that at this point the bigger issue for Jordan is poverty not Israel. Jordan better focus its national resources and energy on alleviating poverty, fighting unemployment, securing water resources, improving the level of education, and opening up opportunities for tens of thousands of new comers to the labor market without abandoning its regional responsibilities. Jordan redefined them in a way that corresponds with its actual ability to play a role."⁽¹⁾

This redefinition was also notable when asked by Jane's Defense Weekly what he thought would be the greatest challenges to global security in the next five or ten years, King Abdullah did not mention the Arab-Israeli conflict, in contrast to most other Arab leaders, but rather pointed to poverty, hunger, and environmental damage. This standpoint of broad vision has characterized King Abdullah since he came to the throne and put an emphasis on types of issues that his father Late King Hussein discussed more rarely.

Just like I said earlier, the main goal of the Jordanian diplomacy is the achievement of the country's national interests that are mostly affected by the country's economic situation.

⁽¹⁾ Al Safadi, Ayman former director of King Abdullah's press office In an interview with the researcher, August 11,2005, Amman-Jordan.

Thus, King Abdullah's diplomacy and international relations has been focusing on exerting extensive effort to insure sustainable levels of economic growth and social development aimed at improving the standard of living of all Jordanians. The King has also been working towards modernizing Jordan's information technology and educational systems.

King Abdullah's numerous diplomatic efforts and international contacts in this regards have been evidently fruitful. Jordan was admitted to the World Trade Organization, and ratified agreements for the establishment of a Free Trade Area with the United States of America, the European Union, the European Free Trade Association countries, and sixteen Arab countries. King Abdullah II has also been involved in the drive for national administrative reform, as well as governmental transparency and accountability. He has been working on the advancement of civil liberties making Jordan one of the most progressive countries in the Middle East. Also, he has been involved in enacting the necessary legislations that guarantee women a full role in the Kingdom's socio-economic and political life.

The challenges of the new reign:

Many different studies including a study by Robert Satloff of the Washington Institute of Near East studies highlight the following issues as being the challenges that top King Abdullah's agenda since the beginning of his reign:⁽¹⁾

1) Reforming the economy:

⁽¹⁾ Sattloff, Robert, 1999, **From Hussein to Abdullah: Jordan in transition**, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington, p.3-12.

Improving the economy has been King Abdullah's number one priority since the very first day of his reign. Jordan's economy was not strong when King Hussein was still alive, and with his death Jordan lost its number one export- the King himself, via his ability to win substantial assistance from Gulf leaders and his persona in the West Bank as the Arab moderate for decades.

Jordan is in the unique and enviable position of having a preferential trade with Europe and duty –free access to the United States via Jordan-Israel Qualifying industrial Zone, which is soon to expand to new sites, but a relatively partly slice of Jordanian exports heads to either of those markets”.

Sadly, Jordan had failed to take advantage of the one raw material it has in abundance- a young, healthy, highly educated work force. Health and educational standards, the envy of the developing world, are the greatest legacy of King Hussein's reign. And thus, King Abdullah realized that Jordan could capitalize on its best natural resource- tens of thousands of young Jordanians- to create new industries in computer software and related technologies.

2) Fighting Corruption:

The keys to implementing reforms are political as much as economic. A small country like Jordan needs strong safeguards of transparency and accountability to protect against the allure of corruption. King Abdullah's designation letters to all the successive governments since the beginning of his reign focused on the need to terminate corruption. King Abdullah's first policy statements highlighted the need for clean government. The King describes corruption as follows: “Corruption is one of the plagues of our age; it is not specific to a certain culture or country; rather, it is

a phenomenon found in developing and developed countries alike, in the public and private sectors and in all classes of society. But its negative effects are greatest in those countries that strive to improve economic and social development and conquer poverty and unemployment. Corruption wastes capabilities, breeds frustration and undermines citizens' confidence in their institutions, robbing them of legitimate opportunities.” He added: “[Societies dedicated to their own advancement] are required to fight corruption”.

Jordan has been a pioneer country in fighting corruption at the international level through the great efforts exerted by the Directorate for Fighting Corruption and the Audit Bureau. Transparency International ranked Jordan number thirty- seven among 145 countries in the fight against this phenomenon; it is a rank close to those of developed countries. But while we aspire to make Jordan first among countries that seek to rid themselves of this phenomenon, we realize that our efforts to do so have been tainted to a certain extent. We endured several periods of disorder and failure over the past few years. This requires us to find and implement a new mechanism that ensures more transparency, justice and integrity in the fight against corruption ⁽¹⁾.

A firm policy from the palace on this hot-button issue would have lasting benefits; demanding real ministerial responsibility and “zero tolerance”.

3) Unifying the family:

⁽¹⁾ (The Letter of His Majesty King Abdullah II to Prime Minister H.E. Dr. Adnan Badran on Anti-Corruption Fight, June 26,2005.

“King Abdullah surely gleaned from his father the cardinal rule of Hashemite politics: Politicians may come and go –and with a change in government on average every eleven months, they all come and go- but the family is constant” Given the numerous challenges that King Abdullah had been facing, he found a way to bolster the unity of the Hashemite family that can not afford the alternative. In his study “From Hussein to Abdullah: Jordan in transition” Robert Satloff described this as “smart politics”.⁽¹⁾

4) Affirming the strategic Choice for peace:

At the beginning of King Abdullah’s reign he confirmed that he would continue his father’s approach in regards of the peace process. Even before he became King, King Abdullah has had his own network of contacts in Israel, built through military connections and his many American friends, to compliment those he inherited. Yet, his immediate priorities were elsewhere- affirming his own position, invigorating the economy, taking advantage of the “era of good feelings” to renew ties with estranged Arab states.

5) Neighborhood watch:

King Abdullah has so far sought to maximize the goodwill that flowed at his father’s funeral and to say “yes” to all comers: yes Jordan supports all Palestinian claims against Israel: yes, Jordan supports Egypt’s lead in inter-Arab politics; yes, Jordan supports Syria’s desire for a new chapter in relations; yes, Jordan supports

⁽¹⁾ Sattloff, Robert, 1999, **From Hussein to Abdullah: Jordan in transition**, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington, p.5.

the Iraqi people's thirst for change but insists that change emanate from within; yes, Jordan supports the claims of Kuwait against Saddam Hussein; yes, Jordan supports "Arab consensus," even if none exists.

King Abdullah II calculated his sources carefully, he has been reaping what he can from the repaired ties with estranged Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, and deepened his investment in the United States, Israel, and the younger princes of the small Arab Gulf States, whose security Jordanian troops have for years helped to maintain. In addition, strengthening ties with Turkey- including the search for new markets and economic cooperation to match strong security relations- is an important objective that needs not come at the expense of patching differences with Arab states.

"Over the long run, these countries can help to provide new assets to balance the loss of regional prestige that died with Hussein"⁽¹⁾

Relations with the U.S.A.:

The United States looms large in the Jordanian national psyche. King Abdullah spent many of his years in the United States-at secondary school in Massachusetts, university in Washington D.C., and military courses in Kentucky- therefore has a deep familiarity with the American culture.

Historically, Jordan has looked to an outside patron to compensate for its lack of strength, size, wealth, and there is no doubt that the current and perhaps only candidate is the United States.

⁽¹⁾ Sattloff, Robert, 1999, **From Hussein to Abdullah: Jordan in transition**, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington, p.7.

That was a summary of the challenges King Abdullah has been facing. Starting here the researcher will go into more details of related issues and how King Abdullah II has dealt with each of them:

Jordanian-Arab regional relations:

Despite the continuities in Jordanian foreign and security policy, there have been evident changes as well. Most of these changes spring from previous trends, but include stronger relations with other states. Late King Hussein might have been hesitant about. The most notable example can be found in King Abdullah's regional initiatives, especially efforts at reconciliation with some of Jordan's neighbors with whom King Hussein had strained relations, particularly Syria and Kuwait. After Syrian President Hafez Al Assad passed away in June 2000, his son and successor Bashar and King Abdullah exchanged state visits. Jordan had been very careful not to give Syria any reason to be angry. King Abdullah has also been careful to repair relations with the Arab world that were damaged during the 1990-1991 Kuwait crisis (A closer examination of King Hussein's policies show that although he did not break ties with Iraq or join to anti-Iraq coalition, he did not support the invasion itself or Baghdad's annexation of Kuwait, and in fact called for an Iraqi withdrawal. Thus Jordanian policy was more balanced than is usually assumed⁽¹⁾ Diplomatic relations with the Gulf monarchies were restored soon after Prince Abdullah became King. The Arabs had the biggest and most important presence on the Jordanian scene after the passing away of King Hussein when they showed a great

⁽¹⁾ (Curtis, Ryan, "Alliances and Jordanian Foreign Policy."). ("Washington Institute for Near East policy, November 8, 2000.) Between Baghdad and Washington: Jordan's balancing Act" Policy Watch No.501

deal of support to the new reign. These stands and statements reflected clear signals on the Arab's readiness to open a new page of cooperation with the new reign particularly the Gulf countries that had misunderstood Jordan's position in regards of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

These states, including Saudi Arabia, began transferring money to Jordan again, which helped stabilize the Jordanian Dinar. In the first few months after ascending to the throne, King Abdullah received a number of high-level delegations from across the Arab and Muslim world, including Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Lebanon, and visited these countries frequently as well. In 2000, Jordan took steps to improve relations with Iraq. Jordan's Prime Minister Mr. Abdul-Ra'ouf Al-Rawabdeh became the first Arab prime minister to fly to Iraq since 1991. King Abdullah knows how to deal with the Arab nationalist line. He called the Arabs "Our Nation" and declared that they had to stand by the Syrians to achieve liberations of their lands, stand by the Palestinians and supports their martyrs, and even help Lebanon achieve" complete liberation of their occupied lands"⁽¹⁾ despite U.N. certification that Israel has withdrawn from all of Lebanese territory. As for Iraq, the King called for an end to the embargo, describing Iraq as being "at the forefront of the (Arab) nation in defending its causes and rights."⁽²⁾

In his repeated visits to the ministry of Foreign Affairs and meetings with the diplomats and officials, King Abdullah II repeatedly urged the staff of diplomats and officials to

⁽¹⁾ King Abdullah's address to the opening session of the Arab League conference in March 2001

⁽²⁾ Sasley, Brent , **Changes and Continuities in Jordanian Foreign Policy**, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, page 45).

promote Jordan-Arab cooperation to surmount common challenges with direct impact on the Arab nation at the political, economic and development levels.

King Abdullah has always underlined the need for consultation and coordination with Arab states in all fields of interest to the Arab nation and in areas that serve common Arab causes ⁽¹⁾

The Second Gulf conflict:

Out of his concern for Arab causes and interest, and even before the start of the second Gulf war, King Abdullah stressed that Jordan could no longer accept the international sanctions on Iraq ⁽²⁾

On all levels, he called for the alleviation of the sanctions imposed on Iraq mainly for humanitarian reasons. Then the second Gulf conflict started to emerge.

The U.S. accused Iraq of owning and developing weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), and said that Iraq had failed to account for its Weapons of Mass Destruction or to fully cooperate with the UN inspections, and the appreciation of the urgency to counter a possible use of these varied greatly among members of the United Nations. And thus, it was ready to start a war on it with the “coalition of the willing”. The U.S. wanted a regime change in Iraq in order to “spread democracy and reform” as U.S. officials put it.

Given the animosity between Washington and Baghdad, there had not been much space for Jordan to maneuver. Because of this Jordan did not want to alienate the only superpower, although King Abdullah II refused to condemn Saddam Hussein or Iraq’s

⁽¹⁾ Jordan Times Tuesday, January 16, 2001

⁽²⁾ King Abdullah’s speech to the October 2000 Arab Summit.

policies. “Perhaps here is a contrast with his father, who might have shifted from one to the other or tried to distance himself from both; Abdullah sought to maintain good relations with both.”⁽¹⁾

The Jordanian political system had been under severe pressure and far from being in a position to pursue an independent foreign policy. Jordan’s strategic and financial alliance with the U.S., Jordan’s economic dependence on Iraqi oil at low prices and a plethora of socio-economic ties with Palestine are all factors constraining the political decisions of the political system. Neither the King nor the government could afford to lose the support of its chief supporter, the U.S. but at the same time, they could not afford to be too pro-U.S. or openly anti-Iraqi, either, as this would have added fuel to the fire of oppositional discontent in the country.

Political analyst, Ebert-Stiftung –Friedrich said that quick and effective clinical war would have probably augmented the standing of the Jordanian political system while a brutal, drawn-out conflict could seriously damage it over the long run. They predicted that the attack on Iraq will not only create a new regional political order in the Middle East, but will also have a host of unpredictable consequences for Jordan.

It was predicted that the US-led war against Iraq would bring about a string of unknown consequences for Jordan and the region. There was fear among both Arab and European circles that the U.S. administration’s desire to bring about political system change in Iraq

⁽¹⁾ Sasley, Brent , **Changes and Continuities in Jordanian Foreign Policy**, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, page 48).

has dangerously obscured its broader vision, which might include an analysis of the possible implications for the region. These implications have somehow been subsumed under President Bush's ideological goal to remove Saddam Hussein from power. Jordan welcomed UN Resolution 1441 of November 8, 2002 and its acceptance by the Iraqi government since it may have saved Iraq and the rest of the region the pains of war. Nevertheless it seemed that the war was a certainty. Despite its reasoned arguments against the war, it seemed that the Jordanian government, and its population, had resigned themselves to war at the beginning of 2003.

This resignation is a clear indicator that Jordanian and Arab diplomacy had failed to persuade the U.S. administration to follow any other course of action. The issue of sanctions, whether coercive or cooperative, is generally thought to be nothing more than a smoke screen, where the U.S. can seek to legitimize its ambitions through the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Of course, there were those within the Bush administration who argued against the UNSC option; and almost two months of debate over resolution 1441 have exasperated some of Bush's key cabinet members, which include Vice-President Cheney, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, and deputy-defense secretary Wolfowitz. Nonetheless, the diplomatic and linguistic wrangling at the UNSC had neither persuaded the Jordanian government nor its population that war would be avoided. This sentiment had become commonplace; and although the war held the danger of destabilizing Jordan, which is a view shaping international discussions; there was little evidence to suggest that the country would fall apart.

King Abdullah called for settling the Iraqi issue through dialogue with the U.N. instead of threatening to use force, stressing the need to put an end to the sufferings of Iraq and honoring its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

King Abdullah carried on several official visits to Arab and Western countries to try to find a peaceful to the Iraqi issue and avert the war. For example, on the fourth of February 2003 King Abdullah held talks with Saudi leaders in Riyadh on means to prevent a US-led war on Iraq. The King and then Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia voiced their hope that international diplomacy would continue looking for ways to spare the region from the consequences of a war. They discussed “the effects of a war against Iraq on Jordan, notably concerning its impact on supplies of oil to Jordan.”⁽¹⁾ King Abdullah visited Saudi Arabia twice in the month that preceded the war on Iraq as the United States intensified its threats to attack Iraq to strip it of the weapons of mass destruction it claimed Baghdad was hiding. In the same period of time King Abdullah met with President Hosni Mubarak and several other leaders in his attempts to avert the war on Iraq and stressed the need for Iraq to fully cooperate with international inspectors and that the crisis be solved under the umbrella of the U.N.

Jordanian diplomacy continued and Jordanian Foreign Minister at the time Marwan Muasher urged for carrying on efforts to avoid military aggression against Iraq. He stated: “efforts should continue to avert war on Iraq in spite of all expectations that war will undoubtedly break out”.⁽²⁾

Former minister of foreign affairs Abdul Ilah Al Khatib also confirmed the fact that the Jordanian diplomacy did not spare an effort in trying to reach a peaceful solution for the

⁽¹⁾ The Jordan Times daily , February 5th, 2003, Amman-Jordan.

⁽²⁾ www.arabicnews.com daily

Iraqi issue and preventing the U.S. from taking any military actions against Iraq. He said: “His Majesty King Abdullah, Jordanian Foreign Minister, and all Jordanian diplomats tried to explain to the international community the dangerous consequences of taking a military action against Iraq. Jordanian diplomats explained that a political system change, should it come, in Iraq would have several implications for the region— some shared some specific to individual countries.”⁽¹⁾

He explained how the Jordanian diplomats highlighted the fact that one of the most important realities is the Palestinian situation and its impact on how people view the Iraq debate. Jordanian diplomats explained how in 2001 and 2002 the region had undergone obvious radicalization as a result of the Intifada, and how the radical groups that have gained currency in that period of time welcome the continuation of the cycle of violence and counter violence, whatever its origin. Hence, the people of Jordan and the rest of the region do not accept public statements by officials supporting military action against Iraq.

“Because of Jordan’s proximity to both Iraq and Palestine, Jordanians felt the impact of both situations. That did not mean there was great support for Saddam Hussein or his political system among the Jordanian public. Even those who supported Saddam strongly in 1990 became more receptive to criticism against him and his policies of the last two decades.” Khatib said.

He added that it is also true that the predominant perception in the region is that there has been a double standard. People—the press in particular—referred on a daily basis to what was being published in Israeli and American media reports about calls coming from

⁽¹⁾ Al Khatib, Abdul Ilah “**The Regional Implications of Political system Change in Iraq as a Result of External Military Action.**” Featuring, former minister of foreign affairs, Jordan-Weinberg Founders Conference 2002

Israel to encourage the campaign against Iraq. “Indeed, many such reports about U.S.-Israeli cooperation against Iraq were translated and published in the Arab press the next day. So, the debate in Israel and in the United States has been followed and has been affecting regional views.” He confirmed.

“In Jordan”, explained Former minister of foreign affairs Abdul Ilah Khatib in a lecture in the Weinberg Founders Conference 2002 “we have to be concerned about “the day after”—not just the day after regime change in Iraq, but the day after the start of military action.”. He said that the government had begun to prepare its people before the war on Iraq started and that there was a feeling among Jordanians that their country has done all it can to avert war and that Iraq was responsible for fully implementing all Security Council resolutions and allowing the inspectors to return. The thing that was acceptable to the Jordanian people and much more preferred than the war option.

Jordanian diplomats explained to the international community what the potential economic impact of war. “Jordan had been receiving all of its oil supplies from Iraq a value of \$1 billion. There is a grant component to this amount as well as a concessional price, and Jordan paid Iraq through exports; in fact, Jordan’s exports to Iraq amounted to 20 percent of its overall exports” Khatib informed. Jordan knew that the transportation sector would be severely hit, since one-third of it is devoted to business with Iraq. Former minister of foreign affairs Abdul Ilah Khatib explained: “Jordan’s foreign reserves will also be severely affected. Moreover, the foreign exchange price of Jordan’s currency will be put under increased pressure. There might be capital flight as well, at least at the beginning. In general, I expect the fiscal deficit to increase by 5 percent and the growth

rate to fall sharply as soon as military action is launched. So, there is a major economic component to potential military action.”⁽¹⁾

Jordan was also worried about an influx of refugees from Iraq. Jordan had announced intention to provide, humanitarian services on Iraqi territory, rather than allowing refugees to flood into Jordan. “We did not experience an influx of Iraqi refugees in 1991, but we did have an influx of more than 1 million third-country nationals cross through Jordan. That influx was handled smoothly, but we will not allow Iraqi refugees to cross the border in large numbers. Our previous experience in the region teaches us that refugees do not go home easily.” Al Khatib said.

There was also serious concern among the Jordanian and wider Arab public that they're the war on increase would increase harsh Israeli measures against the Palestinians. More generally, all countries in the region will be under serious pressure. That pressure will become stronger the longer the military action lasts. Jordan stressed that the principle of changing a political system through external military force will negatively affect the Arab order and will also put pressure on countries that enjoy good relations with the United States. “The opposition groups—and here we are not talking about democratic opposition groups; we are talking about groups that oppose the existence of political systems—will take advantage of the situation. Judging from the experience of the last two years and from the previous Gulf War, they will definitely benefit.” Al Khatib stressed.

⁽¹⁾) Al Khatib, Abdul Ilah “**The Regional Implications of Political system Change in Iraq as a Result of External Military Action.**” Featuring, former minister of foreign affairs, Jordan-Weinberg Founders Conference 2002

The territorial integrity of Iraq was another important element in people's thinking, as well as a source of great concern. Few in the region believed that military action would lead to the democratization of Iraq. "There is no guarantee that overthrowing the Iraqi regime will open the way for positive change. Change may be chaotic. It may get out of control. It will definitely lead to the growth of terrorism, perhaps even affecting U.S.-Jordanian efforts to combat terrorism." Khatib warned. The Arab press also raised serious questions about whether it is in Israel's interest to have a democratic Iraq.

Khatib continued: "Personally, I think that the post-Gulf War sanctions have allowed Saddam's regime to sustain and concentrate its power. The goal of preventing Saddam from acquiring key components for Iraq's weapons of mass destruction program is less important in light of the fact that the regime has been allowed to persevere. We said this at the beginning of the implementation of sanctions, and we are now saying that war will have a long-term negative impact in the region."

Jordan emphasized that it values its relations with the United States very highly and that it is keen to maintain and develop these relations and will continue to act as a close ally of the United States in the war against terror. As a friend, though, Jordan insisted that there are other options apart from war. Effective inspections, with a role for certain Arab countries to affect the Iraqi position, would definitely be a better option that could lead to an openness that would allow the Iraqi people to determine their own future.

King Abdullah had repeatedly warned that the war on Iraq would impose great hardship on the countries of the Middle East, but then acknowledged that it might be too late to secure a diplomatic understanding between Iraq and the United States.

The 2003 invasion of Iraq Also known as the Second Gulf War was launched by the United States and the United Kingdom on March 20, 2003, with support from some other governments, making up what was described as the "coalition of the willing". The invasion's legitimacy has been disputed: the main officially stated reason was that Iraq had failed to account for its Weapons of Mass Destruction or to fully cooperate with the UN inspections, and the appreciation of the urgency to counter a possible use of these varied greatly among members of the United Nations. After approximately three weeks of fighting, Iraq was occupied by coalition forces and the rule of Saddam Hussein and his Ba'ath Party came to an end. Only a few shells containing chemical agents and no operational WMD programs were found; however, the US-led Iraq Survey Group found evidence of non-compliance with the UN inspections and the intent to restart the programs after sanctions were lifted. Subsequently, the period known as post-invasion Iraq began.

“When it came to Iraq I think it was clear that there is nothing we can do to stop the war from happening. America pretty much made up its mind and there was no stopping it.” explained Ayman Al Safadi, former director of King Abdullah’s press office⁽¹⁾.

Jordan’s stand towards the occupation of Iraq shows its deep understanding of the Iraqi issue and its commitment to its political and external goals, therefore Jordan did not send any forces to Iraq and called on all Arab countries in the Iraq’s Neighboring countries summit not to send any forces or participate in the war against Iraq. Jordan’s stand came as follows:

⁽¹⁾ Al Safadi, Ayman, Researcher’s interview with, former director of King Abdullah’s press office on August 11, 2005)

1. Jordan demanded that the international community and the United Nations have a central role in Iraq.
2. Jordan called for elections to be held as soon as possible so the Iraqi people can make their own decisions and have self-determination.
3. Jordan called for the full withdrawal of the occupying forces from Iraq.
4. It also demanded Training of the staff of Iraqi establishments, institutions, and army.
5. Iraqi leadership should be chosen from the inside of Iraq and that Jordan accepts what ever is accepted and chosen by the Iraqi people, respects its democratic choice and works towards Iraq's achievement and practice of self determination.
6. Jordan is fully committed to providing continuous humanitarian aid to Iraq.

Jordanian diplomacy expressed the need for Arab states to take a proactive position to help Iraqis during their crisis because it believed that without a proactive Arab role in helping Iraqis, the occupation is going to last longer. "As for our dear brethren state, Iraq, our relations will continue to be that amongst brethren states. We will continue to side with our Iraqi brethren, vouch for the integrity of Iraqi lands, and for the Iraqi people's right to elect their own leadership and their future." King Abdullah said⁽¹⁾

Jordan also believed that the meeting of Iraq's neighboring countries which took place in Iraq went "extremely positively" in sending that signal to the Iraqis, as well as the Arab foreign ministers in Cairo which also sent a positive signal, confirming that Arabs do want to play a constructive role whether it is in the political process, in the

⁽¹⁾ King Abdullah's Letter of Redesignation of H.E. Mr. Ali Abu al-Ragheb on 20th of July 2003)

reconstruction phase or in the economic fields. Jordan believes that when talking about preserving the unity of the country the political process in Iraq has to be coupled with rebuilding the Iraqi security capability. Jordan believes that one cannot talk about the unity of Iraq being preserved indefinitely by foreign forces. And if Iraqis are to assume control of their security situation over the whole country, then it is imperative that everybody helps in rebuilding the security capability. This was why Jordan took the decision of training Iraqi police force and members of the military. Jordan has trained more than 35,000 members of the police force over a period of two years, in addition to more than 5,000 members from the military.⁽¹⁾ But that is not enough, Jordan did not want Iraq to reach the stage where a political process is developed but is not coupled with a security capability. Jordanian diplomacy expressed Jordan's concern about the unity of Iraq on the international scene. Jordan stressed that no one has the right to interfere in the kind of the political system that Iraqis want to choose for themselves. Jordan considered this not only an Iraqi internal affair but also a regional one because the dismemberment of the country is going have very deep repercussions over the whole region and would throw the whole region in Arab instability. Jordanian Foreign minister at that time Dr. Marwan Muasher added:” We are all in the process that is driven by the Iraqis that would preserve that unity that would not take any action that might lead to threatening this unity. And that can only be achieved if Iraqis can agree, not only on the rule of the majority, but on the rights of the minority. Rule of the majority without rights of the minority might lead to a situation of a civil war in the country. And therefore, this golden

⁽¹⁾ Muasher, Marwan, (“Challenges Facing the Arab World” by at Woodrow Wilson International Center-USA March 15, 2004).

rule must be preserved at all times if we are to talk about an Iraq that continues to be united and continues to be stable in the region.”⁽¹⁾

When asked whether there was going to be Hashemite role or interference in Baghdad, King Abdullah said: “I have been very opposed to the idea of the Hashemite family getting involved in Iraq. Sheikh Ali, the Hashemite prince, keeps pounding on our door to come and visit us, but I refuse and have said so to everyone, including Prince Hassan. Whenever the subject came up, I have disagreed with members of my cabinet about getting involved in Iraq. I don’t think that there is a role for the Hashemites. If there is a role for the Hashemites, that comes many years down the line if the Iraqis want it. But it’s a non-starter for me. It’s the same argument that I use when I’m talking about the moral high ground of the Iranians and others who wish certain involvement in Iraq when I say that I don’t believe that Amman should get involved in Baghdad.”⁽²⁾

Former Jordanian Foreign Minister Marwan Muasher explained that Jordan is not a participant in this war. Jordan tried to find a diplomatic way out that would achieve the same objectives without going to war but it was not, obviously, able to do that. “And since that the war has started, our principal objective is to make sure that it ends at the soonest possible time with the minimum of casualties. The longer the war takes, the more frustrated people in this region are.” Muasher explained.⁽³⁾

The Jordanian Government has repeatedly explained that US troops and equipment based in its remote Iraqi border region are there only to operate Patriot air defense

⁽¹⁾ Muasher, Marwan, (“Challenges Facing the Arab World” by at Woodrow Wilson International Center-USA March 15, 2004).

⁽²⁾ King Abdullah’s interview with of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy on January 11, 2005.

⁽³⁾ Former Jordanian minister of foreign affairs Marwan Muasher’s interview on CNN Larry King Live on Thursday March 27th, 2003.

missiles sited to protect Jordan itself. In that regards the Jordanian government explained that there was a number of U.S. troops that were in the country to install and train our troops on the use of the Patriot battery missile systems and on other logistical affairs, but they are purely in Jordan for defensive purposes. The Jordanian Government has confirmed that the U.S. troops in Jordan are not participating in the war against Iraq.

This clarified Jordan's position and intentions. However, at the beginning of 2005, there was a general misunderstanding when King Abdullah II said that a Shiite-led Iraq might develop a special relationship with Iran, Syria, Lebanon, and Lebanese Hezbollah to create a "crescent ... that will be very destabilizing for the Gulf countries and for the whole region." When asked about this issue King Abdullah II explained that the Hashemites are from 'Ahl Al Bayt [family of the Prophet] and do not have a problem with Shiites. He said: "We are as close to them as we are to the Sunnis. But, there are many people in Iraq—including Shiites—who have their own concerns about Iran."⁽¹⁾

"We keep saying that the core problem in the Middle East is the Israeli-Palestinian one, but for the first time, my fear is that if things do not quickly settle in Iraq into an inclusive process that brings stability and security, then the Israeli-Palestinian issue may no longer be the core problem." He added that in that situation, the core problem is going to be based around Iraq, and it's going to be a terrible conflict within Islam—a Shiite-Sunni conflict—which would be devastating for this part of the world. The King continued: "the so-called issue of "the crescent" was taken out of context and blown out of proportion. My concern is political, not religious, revolving around Iran, Iran's political involvement inside Iraq, its relation with Syria and Hezbollah, and the

⁽¹⁾ King Abdullah in an interview with of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy on January 11, 2005

strengthening of this political-strategic alliance.” He stressed that if this happens, it would create a scenario where there are these four [Iran, Iran-influenced Iraq, Syria, and Hezbollah] who have a strategic objective that could create a major conflict. “I don’t have any problem with Shiites. I have a real problem with certain Iranian factions’ political influence inside Iraq. Our argument to the United States is that a capable, independent, secure Iraq is the best way of containing Iran. There’s one reason why 1980 happened—the war between Iraq and Iran. The Iranians realize that the way to have success against the West is by them succeeding in Iraq. So Iraq is the battleground, the West against Iran.”

King Abdullah called for having a long-term plan in place. To insure the stability and security of Iraq, the King suggested putting an Iraqi armored company inside of a Jordanian battalion or an Iraqi battalion inside a Jordanian brigade and has them go through Jordanian one-year training cycle. “We’ll give them the equipment, and we’ll train them inside of our brigades and our divisions, and then at the end of a training cycle they can go back to Iraq as a united, well-trained force.” King Abdullah confirmed.

Arab-Israeli Conflict:

Jordan has managed to employ its peace treaty with Israel to serve the Palestinians. The Hebron Protocol, the release of Ahmed Yassin, and the Wye River Agreement would not have been secured were it not for Jordan's intervention.

Furthermore, Jordan managed to neutralize the Israeli factor in its relations with the United States and played a key role in the formulation of the roadmap. Explicit in statements coming from senior officials in Jordan and from King Abdullah himself is that the establishment of an independent and viable Palestinian state is in the best interest of

Jordan. The Hashemite Kingdom has lobbied vigorously in the United States to resume the peace process. Furthermore, Jordanian diplomacy served the Palestinians regarding the Israeli separation wall when Amman managed to cast the whole Israeli project as posing a threat to Jordanian national security.⁽¹⁾

The outbreak of the second Intifada took place in September 2000, around 19 months from King Abdullah's accession to the throne. It did not push the King to follow the trend of other Arab states, and point the finger at Israel as the sole cause of the violence and obstacle to its resolution. King Abdullah along with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak to a lesser extent has worked to tone down the rhetoric of Arab summit meetings, including the 2001 Arab League meeting in Jordan. This has not been easy, and it has put Jordan in a somewhat difficult position. The continuing violence has evoked widespread and strong criticism of Israel and support for the Palestinians across the Jordanian political spectrum. This has also created a region wide movement to freeze links and to re-impose the economic boycott on Israel. Although Jordan has managed to tone down some of this rhetoric it nonetheless faces heavy pressure to fall in line with the regional trend.

King Abdullah has been very balanced when discussing the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and the violence. He has many times referred to his "friends in Israel". When asked about his definition of terrorism, King Abdullah said: " Anybody who takes the lives of innocent people- if somebody puts a backpack of explosives and goes to a pizza restaurant and blows himself up and kills innocent people, that is a terrorist" He also argues that no peace or stability in the region is possible until the Palestinians

⁽¹⁾ Hamarneh, Mustafa , (A Jordanian perspective by is director of the Center for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan.)

achieve statehood, continues to proclaim Jordan's support for the Palestinians, and asserts that Jordan stands "by their side with all our capabilities." At the same time he has refused to blame Israel as solely responsible for the violence, and does not clarify Israel as the enemy. He warns that continuation of the Arab-Israeli conflict "poses a serious threat to the development of the region."⁽¹⁾

King Abdullah expressed the continuation of Jordanian support for the peace process and expressed his commitment to backing the Middle East peace process. King Abdullah made great efforts to keep the border with Israel quiet and so cracked down on Hamas' offices in Jordan- a direct break with his father's live- and-let-live approach to the organization. He refused to accede to the demands of Hamas in Jordan and expelled several of its top leaders. This was unpopular, especially among professional associations controlled by Islamists. Although such moves have not resulted in any direct challenges to his political system King Abdullah opened a door to a tougher relationship with these organizations.⁽²⁾

Jordan believes in a comprehensive solution that would solve all aspects of the Arab-Israeli conflict, which is believed to be the main reason for conflict in the region, so the Palestinian people could get back their legitimate rights on their land and any final agreement that could satisfy Jordan should include a complete Israeli withdrawal from all occupied Arab land. The King has made this point very clear. King Abdullah II stressed Jordan's stand in supporting the Palestinian people in all international forums and circles so as to restore back their lands and establish their independent state with Jerusalem as a

⁽¹⁾ King Abdullah's speech at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C, May 19, and 1999).

⁽²⁾ (King Abdullah's Interview with Jordan Television, August 4, 2001.)

capital, King Abdullah said: “Our efforts have focused during this period, on contacting influential countries in this world, in the forefront of which are the USA, Russia, the European Union and China, to use all our relations with them, to stop this attack, and to urge Israel to fulfill its agreements with our Palestinian brethren, and to return to the negotiations and the Peace Process. We have re-affirmed to all these states that the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories is the main cause of conflict in the region, and that peace cannot prevail until the occupied Arab lands are returned to the Palestinians on the bases of U.N. resolutions 242, 338 and 1397, the Arab initiative and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state on Palestinian soil, that a specific time frame should be set up for the establishment of this state, and that the Palestinian Authority is the only legitimate leadership of the Palestinian people, and that the Palestinian people only can choose their leadership and take their national decisions.”⁽¹⁾

In most, if not all of his speeches, King Abdullah keeps reminding the international community that the world will not achieve peace until the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is solved. In the same speech of August 2002, the King continued to say: “we have stressed to these countries that the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories is the main reason for the conflict in the region and that peace can only be achieved through the return of the occupied Arab territories to their owners on the ground of international legitimacy resolutions and the establishment of the independent Palestinian state on the Palestinian soil.” He stressed that a set time should be set for the foundation of the Palestinian state.⁽²⁾

⁽¹⁾ same speech addressed in August 15, 2002 to Jordanians

⁽²⁾ King Abdullah’s speech at the National Press Club, Washington D.C, April 11, 2001.)

In this regards King Abdullah II added: “talking about the ‘Jordanian option’ is categorically rejected. Jordanian diplomacy headed by King Abdullah keep stressing that Jordan will not be in any way an alternative for the Palestinian leadership, and Jordan will not be a side in settling the Palestinian cause, or talking on behalf of the Palestinian people.

King Abdullah stressed the importance of having the international community's active support for regional justice and peace that must include peace and security for Israelis and Palestinians, and the creation of an independent Palestine. Since his accession to the throne King Abdullah continued to warn that the failure of the international community to help make that commitment a reality would only nurture more division. “Let the world's leaders demonstrate, once and for all, that they are serious about Palestinian freedom.” The King said.

Jordanian diplomacy has been devoted to finding a solution for the Palestinian-Israeli issue. Jordanian diplomacy headed by King Abdullah II has been pushing for the implementation of the Road map. Jordanian diplomacy realized that there is serious work ahead to make sure the road map is implemented in a timely and sincere manner to give people hope they can live in peace and security.

Jordanian diplomats reiterated Jordan’s hopes the road map can help bring about initial action -- such as the lifting of Israeli curfews, the cessation of Israeli demolitions of Palestinian homes, the stopping of some Israeli settlement in Palestinian territories, and the stabilization of the security situation in the Middle East, an apparent allusion to Israel's concern about terror attacks.

Jordan also expressed its hope that the process leads to a Palestinian state with Palestinians and Israelis living in peace.

Jordanian Former minister of Foreign Affairs said:” We support the new Palestinian government and we intend to work with it in order to make sure the proper conditions are created on the ground to help relaunch the peace process.”

Jordan also had a leading role in fighting the separation barrier built by Israel in the West Bank. With Israel under continuing assault from suicide bombers, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon has pressed ahead with his plans for the barrier. Sharon argues that if the Palestinians won’t control the suicide bombers, then Israel must take unilateral steps to protect itself — including the barrier.

But to Israel’s consternation, Jordan has taken a leading role in opposing the barrier. Jordan took this case to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The Jordanian foreign minister at the time, Marwan Muasher, told the Jordanian parliament on Jan. 21 2004: “Construction of the wall would kill every opportunity for a viable Palestinian state.” He said it would pose a “direct threat to Jordanian national security because it might revive the transfer option [of Palestinians to Jordan] despite all Israeli assertions to the contrary.”

Sharon has blamed the Jordan for “leading” the campaign against the wall and said it had “much to lose in (a) worsening of its relations with Israel” if it continued with its anti-wall campaign. Jordan countered that it wouldn’t be intimidated by Sharon’s threats.

Muasher explained that Jordan fears that the barrier, by undermining a viable Palestinian state, may revive the “Jordanian option.” That argument, which was often

made by right-wing Israeli politicians in the early 1980s, held that there was no need to create a Palestinian state because one already existed in Jordan, where a majority of the population is Palestinian.

“We are afraid that the day might come when Israeli leaders might argue ‘Jordan is Palestine,’ ” Muasher said. “Why are we worried? The wall will effectively divide the West Bank into three parts. It will make life impossible for Palestinians: dividing them from their work, their schools, and their lands. If that happens, what options do Palestinians have? They will leave, voluntarily or by force, for Jordan.”

The Israel-Jordan has taken its case to the International Court of Justice in The Hague. The Jordanians argue that the wall is illegal under international law because it is being built on territory that Israel occupied after the 1967 war. Israel has its legal counter-arguments, and the court’s ruling won’t be binding. But the legal skirmish is a sign of how this once-close relationship has begun to spin out of control.

The Jordanians could escalate the quarrel further by contending that the wall, by pushing Palestinians into Jordan, constitutes a breach of the 1994 peace treaty with Israel. Muasher won’t go that far, but he does affirm: “We have a peace treaty with Israel. It states that transfer of population is forbidden.”

The Arab Peace Initiative:

One of the numerous Jordanian initiatives to solve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict was the Arab Peace initiative. In March 2002 the Arab leaders at the Beirut Summit adopted an initiative that offers a unique opportunity and a fresh basis for movement in the peace process. It extended for the first time in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict a

comprehensive offer for full peace and normal relations between Israel and all the Arab states in return for Israel's withdrawal from territories occupied after June 4th 1967, as well as an agreed solution to the refugee problem and the establishment of a Palestinian state. Jordan had been a critical and vocal player in bringing forward this resolution in the Arab Summit and in advancing it in all future steps in the peace process.

Jordan's position, in particular, in support of the road map emanates from the road map adopting the Arab Initiative as one of the bases for a solution and thereby defining the outlines of the end game, adopting a three-year framework. This is the first international document that adopts a specific timeframe for the end of the occupation and adopts a monitoring mechanism to ensure that all the parties are meeting their commitments on time.

This is why Jordan has accepted the road map and this is why it believes these elements should not be tampered with in the course of the implementation of this road map. Jordan expressed its readiness to work with the United States in order to make this a reality and looked forward to very close cooperation with the United States, with the Palestinians, and with all parties in order to once and for all find a permanent solution to this conflict.⁽

In an interview with the executive director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy On the 11th of January 2005. King Abdullah explained how King Hussein got into the peace process and he was successful in building a relationship with the late Yitzhak Rabin. He said: "It was because he put himself in their shoes". And asked what the Israelis desired and recognized that they wanted to be part of this region. King Abdullah confirmed that that's the price Arabs should be willing to pay and that the Israelis should

have free movement and free access and a sense of fully being part of this region. “The sacrifice they need to make for this is a clear future for the Palestinians.” The king stressed. King Abdullah added that it was the Arabs job to convince the Israelis to do so. He explained that this was started in Jordan, which then became the Jordanian-Egyptian “two-basket approach” in 2001 that was later translated into Crown Prince Abdullah’s position that came out as the Arab Summit Declaration of Beirut in 2002. “I think that needs to be readdressed, and we’ve already started.”⁽¹⁾

There was the peace conference in London in March of 2005. And there was the Arab summit two weeks after that. “We have to reach out to the Israelis—and not just about this. We need to see what guarantees we can give Israel about what the Arabs need to do. We need to come to the Arab League summit in Algiers with a “Beirut-plus-plus,” a realistic statement to the Israelis that this is what we can do, and what more can we do.” King Abdullah confirmed.

In regards of Israel’s disengagement from Gaza and the northern West Bank King Abdullah stressed the importance of achieving a viable, independent Palestinian state and not only an independent state.

“On the question of having a viable state, we don’t have more than two to three years, maximum. And if we don’t have a future for the Palestinians, where does that leave us? If you don’t have a viable Palestinian state, then I could conceive of an Israeli-Palestinian problem becoming an Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian problem. As I said to the

⁽¹⁾ Satloff, Robert, (executive director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy) interview with King Abdullah II, January 11, 2005, Amman, Jordan.

(U.S.) president, in a private discussion, “Please, if there’s one word that I would like you to focus on, that’s the word viable.”

In regards to the urgency of this achievement King Abdullah went back in time to remember his father’s words and ambitions:” My father used to say that he wants peace for his children and our children’s children. He was talking about us. Do I now have to start saying I want peace for my children and our children’s children? The Middle East cannot wait that long.”

King Abdullah continued: “The problem with the Palestinians is they spend most of their time blaming the Arab street and the Arab leaders. And that’s what I was saying— Stop blaming us, because we’re ready to help you, but you’ve got to help yourself first. If you look at Al-Jazeera, it’s always saying, “Where are the Arab leaders; where’s the Arab street, and they’re letting us down.” No. You’re letting yourselves down. We want to help you, but every time I sat down with Arafat and asked, where’s your plan, where’s your strategy, there was nothing there.”

Relations with European Union:

The EU-Jordanian Association Agreement:

Jordanian diplomacy during King Hussein’s reign worked really hard on establishing strong Jordanian relations with European countries and it continued to do so during King Abdullah’s reign. On November 24th 1997 The Jordan Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement, was signed replacing the 1977 Cooperation Agreement. This agreement was ratified by the Jordanian Parliament in September 1999 and came into force on May 1st, 2002.

The agreement aims to create a free trade area by 2010 and to establish a comprehensive

framework for political, economic, financial, social and cultural cooperation. Furthermore, it facilitates the transfer of technology and encourages more direct European investments into Jordan, as industrial products manufactured in Jordan and exported to the European Union (EU) will be exempted from customs, taxes, and fees. Numerous industrial and agricultural products will also enjoy privileged access to the EU markets by means of a range of custom tax and quota exemptions.

On June 10th, 2002 the first EU-Jordan Association Council meeting took place in Luxembourg. Two days later in Strasbourg, King Abdullah met the European Commission President Romano Prodi following a speech to the European Parliament.

The Free Trade Area aims to link fifteen EU member states and twelve Mediterranean partners together. Taking an EU enlargement into consideration, the zone will be one of the world's most important trade entities as it is expected to include around forty states and six hundred to eight hundred million consumers.

The conference of the fifteen EU member states and the Mediterranean foreign ministers in Barcelona on November 27th, 1995 marked the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, also known as the Barcelona Process.

Relations with the U.S.A.:

King Hussein spent much of his efforts putting Jordan back in the good graces of the West, especially the United States, after being pilloried for his stance in the 1991 Gulf War and suffering the economic consequences. It is these two areas that King Abdullah has most closely followed his father's direction.

King Abdullah, like his father King Hussein, has been pushing for a more active American role in the peace process and in the region more generally. In April 2001, for example, he traveled to Washington to ask President George W. Bush to play a bigger role in stabilizing the region. King Abdullah said:” The active involvement of the United States of America in bringing the parties together and in helping reach the solution is vital and complements our regional efforts to bring about such an outcome.”⁽¹⁾ King Abdullah believes that this larger American role would contribute to regional peace and stability, something that is essential for Jordan both to develop its economy and for security reasons, since an unstable regional atmosphere makes it more likely that Jordan would be the target of ambitious and more powerful neighbors.

At the very least, instability would place Jordan in the position of having to choose between sides- and this is where King Abdullah does not wish to see himself.

As part of this effort to draw the United States closer into the region, King Abdullah has been keen on enhancing Jordan’s own relationship with America. In September 2001, a free trade agreement between Jordan and the United States was signed into law by President George W. Bush; Jordan being only the fourth country to have, along with Canada, Mexico, and Israel, such an agreement.

One of the first world leaders to visit the United States after the September 11 attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center was King Abdullah who arrived on September 28. King Abdullah then declared in a joint statement with President George W. Bush: “I wish our meeting was under better circumstances, but obviously, we're here to give our full, unequivocal support to you and to the people of America. And we will stand by you

⁽¹⁾ (Speech at the National Press Club, Washington D.C., April 11, 2001.)

in these very difficult times. And we're proud of our friendship; we're proud of the relations we've had with your country over many, many years, as far back as his late Majesty King Hussein. And it's in difficult times like this that true friends must stand with each other, and we'll be by your side and we'll be there to support you. And I'm here to see what we can do to help.” When other Arab leaders had been less enthusiastic in their support for American efforts to fight terrorism, King Abdullah has made it clear in almost each interview he has given that he fully supports the U.S. efforts to eradicate terrorism. King Abdullah called Osama Bin Laden, who had previously tried to carry out attacks in Jordan, an “enemy of Jordan” and said that he would do “whatever is required to join international coalition to combat terrorism”

The King expressed Jordan’s “absolute condemnation of the terrorist aggression” and assured the United States that Jordan’s” leaders and people stand with you against the perpetrators of these terrorist atrocities ⁽¹⁾

Former Jordanian Prime Minister Dr. Fayez Tarawneh explained: “King Abdullah did not waste the moment and made a wonderful presentation on the roots and origin of terrorism, indicating that regional disputes and the sense of injustice create hatred and terrorist acts. The Arab and Islamic world feel that the U.S.A. is totally biased to Israel against the just cause of the Palestinians. He urged the President for a more balanced American position vis-à-vis the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations”

“Jordan emphasized that it values its relations with the United States very highly and that it is keen to maintain and develop these relations and will continue to act as a

⁽¹⁾ King Abdullah’s letter to U.S. President George Bush, September 12, 2001

close ally of the United States in the war against terror.” said Abdul Ilah Khatib, former minister of foreign affairs. ⁽¹⁾

There are domestic reasons for King Abdullah’s desire to maintain close relations with the United States. On the economic front, in April 2000, Jordan became a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Integration into the world economic order, King Abdullah believes, is essential for Jordan’s economic development and growth. He has been trying to shift Jordan’s economy away from dependence on the Middle East towards the West. The US-Jordan free trade agreement is part of this strategy. This agreement and other U.S. assistance to Jordan did not come out of thin air.

The United States, convinced of Jordan's vitality, has provided economic and military aid since the early 1950s. For example, the U.S. concluded a major arms deal between the two countries in 1965. The U.S. continued to provide essential aid to Jordan until the aid program was disrupted during the Gulf War. Total U.S. aid to Jordan since the Gulf War through 2004 has been approximately \$5.1 billion in both economic and military aid.

⁽¹⁾ Former Prime Minister Dr. Fayez Al Tarawneh in an interview with the researcher, July 28, 2005, Amman-Jordan

The following table shows levels of U.S. aid to Jordan since 1992: ⁽¹⁾

Year	Economic Aid (in millions)	Military Aid (in millions)
1992	30	20
1993	5	9
1994	9	9
1995	7.2	7.3
1996	702	30
1997	112.2	100
1998	150	75
1999	200*	120*
2000	200**	225**
2001	150	75
2002	150	75
	248	198
2003	700***	406***
	248	
2004	100****	204

• *In 1999, Jordan received additional \$50.000 million in economic assistance and \$50.000 million in military assistance as part of the Wye Agreement Fund

⁽¹⁾ (WWW.MFA.ORG)

- **In 2000 Jordan received additional \$50.000 million in economic assistance and \$150.000 million in military assistance satisfying the \$300.000 million allocated for Jordan as part of the Wye Agreement fund
- ***As part of the FY 2003 supplemental
- ****As part of the FY 2004 supplemental, FY 2004

The Greater Arab Initiative:

Many efforts have been made by Arabs and also by the International community, including the United States of America, to reform the Arab World. This reform in the region has been defined through what has come to be known as the “Greater Middle East Initiative”. In this regards Jordanian diplomacy said that Jordan did not differ over the content of this reform from what has been talked about in the U.S. or in Europe, but stressed the importance of Arab ownership of this program. Former Jordanian foreign minister Marwan Muasher confirmed” We cannot be talking about a program that would be imposed or perceived to be imposed in any way by the outside. If we do not do that, we hurt genuine efforts of reformers in the region who are trying, and have been trying for some time, to transform this region because they would be fought by the status quo forces in our societies who do not want to change and who can easily paint these reformers as U.S. agents.”⁽¹⁾ Thus Jordanian diplomacy asked for the International Community’s assistance in Arab’s own efforts at reform, rather than to suggest a one-for-all blueprint for democracy and ask the region to implement it without taking into

⁽¹⁾ Muasher, Marwan, (2004) (**Challenges Facing the Arab World**” at Woodrow Wilson International Center- USA March 15.).

account the specific conditions of each country. Jordan made it clear to the world that there has been genuine efforts, both in Jordan and in the region, to commit to a set of principles that all should agree on, having to do with women's rights, having to do with freedom of expression, good governance, judicial reform, educational reform, and all other areas that have been talked about. In this regards Jordan also stressed to the international community that "movement on reform in isolation of movement in the Arab-Israeli conflicts will lead to the wrong results. And as a result, there should be a move on the two together. No reform movement will have any public buy-in if it does not address the central core issue that all Arabs have on their mind, which is the Arab-Israeli conflict, and any attempt to deal with the region, as if the conflict does not exist, is not going to be a successful one.

Jordanian diplomacy made sure that any regional reform should not be perceived as a movement against a religion, against Islam. "If it is against terrorism then we are all with it and, the region has taken and needs to take very strong measures against any terrorist organization, regardless of its religion. But to paint this as or to even be perceived as a movement against a religion by talking about a greater Middle East that is not really related in many ways, other than the fact that they share sometimes the same religion, is going to dilute the issue and is going to be counterproductive when it comes to public buy-in of this program." Muasher added.

Reform in Jordan:

Some might say: “What does reform have to do with Jordanian diplomacy?” However; as mentioned earlier Reform lies within the country’s national interests which is the main goal of diplomacy. Without a successful diplomacy a country cannot achieve serious reform. Because it needs the cooperation and assistance of other countries which cannot be achieved without active diplomacy and communication. Reform now lies on top of Jordan’s priorities for protecting and realizing its national interests.

“Throughout our countries, people are creating positive change. Here in Jordan we have been working tirelessly for reform, development and peace. For our region, there is, clearly, further to go” King Abdullah announced in Davos 2004.

“The Jordanian diplomacy, lead by King Abdullah II was extremely successful is convincing the world, especially the West and the world financial institutions that Jordan is totally committed to political, economic and social reform, with democracy, human rights (especially women’s rights), the rule of law and private sector economy will be deepened in the Jordanian society.” Confirmed Dr.Fayez Al Tarawneh, former Jordanian Prime Minister.⁽¹⁾

For many years, Jordan has deservedly enjoyed a reputation as a standard-bearer of moderation and reform among Arab states. Education is highly prized, illiteracy rates are low, and political prisoners are few and rarely incarcerated for long. The late King Hussein reconstituted the parliament in the mid-1980s. Jordan has held relatively free elections ever since. Women have long held the right to vote and have exercised it in

⁽¹⁾ Former Prime Minister Dr. Fayez Al Tarawneh in an interview with the researcher, July 28, 2005, Amman-Jordan.

large numbers. In a region where reformers, democrats, and social mavericks routinely suffer imprisonment, torture, disappearance, or death, the long arm of the Jordanian state is normally limited to a stern warning, a lost job, or a confiscated passport.

In recent years, the kingdom has focused most of its national efforts on economic reform, including efforts to streamline business start-ups, encourage foreign investment, and reduce bureaucracy. The Qualifying Industrial Zones established in cooperation with Israel have been showcase initiatives, producing thousands of jobs and nearly \$1 billion worth of exports to the United States. The combined effect of these policies—complemented by a sizable infusion of cash from Iraqi expatriates, Syrian land speculators, Palestinians seeking a violence-free sanctuary for their capital, U.S. economic aid, and the derivative benefits of U.S. companies setting up shop in Jordan to service the rebuilding of Iraq—provided Jordan with an impressive 7 percent growth rate in 2004.

Former Prime Minister Fayez Tarawneh said that Jordan always reminds the world that its Geo-political position, between Iraq and Palestine, put certain constraints on its accelerated speed in implementing the required reforms, especially the political one.” Some would understand but others would accuse Jordan of lack of seriousness. The King and his diplomatic team are in continuous dialogue with those others to explain the objective circumstance we are facing.” He added.

On April 20,2005, former Jordanian minister of finance Dr. Bassem Awadallah confirmed to the Washington Institute’s Special Policy Forum Jordan’s commitment to reform and modernization as not being a reaction to pressure from others,

but rather an understanding that Jordan, like all Arab countries, requires reform in order to accommodate the rising requirements of its young populace

He explained that Jordan's population is growing at a rate of 2.4 percent annually, with 23 percent of Jordanians entering the labor force over the next ten years. "To accommodate these growing numbers and the requisite requirement for work, Jordan's economy must grow at a rate of 8 percent annually with 100,000 jobs created each year. Without such economic progress, Jordan risks alienating many young people."

Attracting Investment, Creating Jobs

Jordan had to pursue an economic reform policy that will attract private capital and stimulate job creation. Jordan's economy has improved over the years; growth last year was a relatively impressive 7.5 percent.

Two years ago the unemployment rate was 15 percent, but according to a survey taken in 2004, unemployment was reduced to 12.5 percent.⁽¹⁾

Private investors, however, still view investment in Jordan as risky because of Jordan's debt level and the perceived instability of the region.

The country's domestic and external debt is nearly equal to its gross domestic product (GDP).

⁽¹⁾ Former Jordanian minister of finance Dr. Bassem Awadallah session at the Washington Institute's Special Policy Forum ,April 20,2005, U.S.A

If Jordan is able to reduce its debt, the country's investor ratings will improve. (Although external debt is still high, it has decreased from 180 percent of GDP in 1989.)

Yet, no matter what reforms Jordan makes, the perceived risks associated with regional instability will continue to act as a deterrent to potential investors, a reality that highlights the importance of making progress on the peace process.

Educational Reform

Educational reform in Jordan has been very successful over the past five years. In 1999,

King Abdullah created the Educational Reform for the Knowledge Economy Project, which has triggered a stunning transformation in the kingdom's education sector. Positive changes include making kindergarten the norm for all Jordanian children, abolishing double shifts in most schools, and wiring all schools with broadband internet. Major advancements have also been made in the content of learning and in curriculum reform, with a focus on e-learning as well as efforts to standardize and digitize the math, science, history, and Arabic curricula.

Reform of the education sector has involved a public-private partnership, with many local and international companies supporting Jordan's efforts. Although primary education is important, Jordan must also focus on vocational training to ensure that Jordanians are trained in relevant skills that will enable them to find jobs after graduation.

Administrative Reform and Decentralization

Administrative reform in Jordan is a complex undertaking. Because historically, the public sector has been the country's primary employer, it has proven difficult to convince Jordanians that the private sector should provide jobs for the majority of the population.

In an effort to reduce bureaucratic inefficiency, the government has created the Ministry for Government Performance, which holds other ministries accountable to their mandates.

In addition, King Abdullah has taken on the tough challenge of military pension reform and succeeded in implementing a policy that is fairer, more equitable, and more cost efficient.

Jordan's King Abdullah recently announced a major initiative for decentralizing political and fiscal authority in the kingdom by establishing a number of regional assemblies and empowering them with many of the responsibilities currently enjoyed by the parliament and central government. This effort should be viewed as one of the means by which the monarch hopes to keep pace with the democratizing trend in the Middle East, headlined by the success of recent elections on Jordan's east (Iraq) and west (West Bank/Gaza).

In this context, King Abdullah delivered a brief nationwide address on January 26 2005 announcing what was touted as major political and administrative reform. Specifically, he outlined a new approach to political participation in public life: "As political development is the gateway to the full participation of all segments of grassroots

and civil society institutions in the various aspects of the development process, I assert here that political development should start at the grassroots level, then move up to decision making centers, and not vice versa.” Operationally, King Abdullah said, the Kingdom’s current administrative divisions will be “reconsidered.” The existing governorates—twelve in number, from Irbid in the north to Aqaba in the south—will be combined into a small number (three or four) of “development areas or regions.” Each region will have a directly elected local assembly that, along with directly elected municipal councils, will “set priorities and draw up plans and programs related to their respective regions.” He specifically noted that these new assemblies would enjoy the power of the purse that is, making decisions over “public facilities, investment priorities, expenditures on capital and services projects, and in overseeing the performance of official bodies in all areas.” In explaining the rationale for this whole exercise, the King noted that “these tasks should no longer be exclusive to central decision makers because the people of each region are more aware of their interests and needs.”

In practical terms, King Abdullah's plan is effectively a strategy to circumvent two sets of institutions: parliament and the central government ministries. Depending on how it is implemented, the king’s proposal to transfer primary responsibility for many areas of planning, spending, and service delivery—possibly even in such politically explosive fields as education, health, and public works—from Amman to the regions could translate into a huge shift of influence over jobs and money from politicians and bureaucrats in the capital to local officials in the provinces.

“More importantly, from my short-term point of view, with political reform is this idea of complete government decentralization, and created three regions in Jordan, North,

Central and South. And allowing those regions to be able to talk about their own futures, and be part of the building block of a new democratic process in Jordan.”⁽¹⁾

Political Reform

The National Agenda, created by King Abdullah II, institutionalizes Jordan’s political reform process and enshrines his vision of modernization, development, and reform. To lead this initiative, the government created a steering committee and eight additional committees composed of experts tasked with assessing the issues of political inclusion, fiscal reform, economic reform, judicial reform, educational reform, investment and privatization, gender issues, and social concerns.

Each committee will produce a report on its findings by September 2005. Then, the onus will be on the government to create a budget reflecting the priorities articulated in these reports.

Reform must be expressed in a budget that provides the appropriate resources to implement specific reform initiatives. Jordan can achieve all the accountability and transparency in the world, but unless it has a budget that allocates the funding needed to implement reform, the average Jordanian will neither see nor feel change. At the moment, the major variable in the Jordanian budget is the price and subsidy of oil. Without special assistance from Jordan’s friends and allies, this could prove to be a major brake on the reform process.

⁽¹⁾ King Abdullah said. Abdullah spoke with ABC News' Peter Jennings on **March 15, 2005**

Similarly, limitations on the extent to which the government can carry out political reform will persist in the absence of a solution to the Palestinian question that addresses the issues of land, people, and refugees.

Political Development

King Abdullah II accentuated on different occasions that one of the main pillars for sustainable socio-economic development is the effective participation of the civil society in the decision making process.

King Abdullah II has made it clear that progress toward democracy, pluralism, economic prosperity and freedom of expression, speech and thought in Jordan is an irreversible process.

King Abdullah II consistently emphasized that developing the political life in Jordan necessitates the existence of national parties that must adopt a national agenda based on their commitment to the nation's causes whereby Jordan's interests are given top priorities, and above all other considerations. King Abdullah II affirmed the need for all political parties in Jordan to unite into two or three main groups, which would ensure that each party has an identity of its own, with clear programmes, and objectives.

In line with King Abdullah's directives, the government enacted the new election law, which aimed to secure wider participation, and guarantee better representation for all districts in Jordan, while ensuring that the election process will be transparent and free. In order to enhance the role of women in civil society, women's quota has been introduced

in parliamentary elections. King Abdullah II also instructed the government to lower the voting age from 19 years to 18 years in order to engage the youth in charting the future.

In December 2001, the Higher Media Council media was established with the aim of restructuring the foundations of the media sector on democratic grounds while ensuring more private sector participation involvement in the process. The Council's responsibilities encompass formulating media policy, overseeing the regulation of the media sector and assisting in the creation of a responsible and accountable media environment. In December 2002, King Abdullah II ordered the reformation of the Higher Media Council with the aim of making it a regulatory non-executive reference body.

In January 2003, an independent Centre for Human Rights was established. The Centre would oversee the promotion and protection of civil and human rights in Jordan.

The Economy:

In 1999, King Abdullah II made it a priority to integrate Jordan into the new global economy. As a result, major economic and legislative reforms have been made to bring the Jordanian foreign trade political system into conformity with World Trade Organization (WTO) requirements. In addition Jordan made commitments on a wide range of services with quite liberal access for foreign suppliers and investors.

The Jordanian Parliament ratified the Law on Jordan's WTO membership on February 24th 2000 following the WTO's December 17th 1999 approval of the accession

package.

On April 11, 2000 Jordan became the 136th WTO member following major economic and legislative reforms made possible by the special attention given to the matter by King Abdullah II.

The economic "peace dividend"-improved trade with the West Bank and increased investment from Western Europe, while sanctions against Iraq had blocked Jordanian exports.

In an attempt to address these issues, King Abdullah II has made economic development his major priority. His government has initiated intellectual property and tax laws, decreased import duties, and privatized state-run freight railway and telecom systems. In 2000, King Abdullah brought Jordan into the World Trade Organization and obtained a free trade agreement with the United States. In May 2001, he launched the Aqaba Special Economic Zone, a duty-free area for residential communities, tourism, and light and heavy industries, schools, hospitals, and business parks. The same day as the launch, the government unveiled a \$500 million joint Egyptian-Jordanian tourism project. Future plans include building an advanced information technology industry, overhauling education to provide for computer and English-language training, and privatizing the energy and phosphates sectors.

Despite the occupation of Iraq to its east, ongoing violence to its west and the resulting destruction of the country's tourism industry, Jordan appears to be enjoying a peace dividend that sets it apart. As neighboring economies have plunged in recent years, an economic upturn has occurred in Jordan because of its new relationship with the

United States and its working trade relationship with Israel. And this economic growth has political consequences.

In the last five years, Jordan's exports to the U.S. have skyrocketed. In 1997, the total was \$5 million; in 2002, the figure was in the \$400-million range. No small feat for a country whose gross national product is just \$8 billion.

The job market also has expanded considerably, with 30,000 new jobs created in the last year alone. The nation's economic growth for the year is estimated at 4.9%. Foreign reserves stand at a record \$3.9 billion.

This success derives in large part from the Qualifying Industrial Zone, established in 1996 in the wake of the Jordan-Israel peace treaty. Under the deal, if Jordan and Israel work together to produce at least 35% of the value of any good, it enters the U.S. duty-free. Also, in December 2001, Jordan became the first Arab country to sign a free-trade agreement with the U.S.

There was a relative decrease of Jordanian economic dependence on Iraq. In the year 2002, Jordanian exports to the U.S. for the first time topped the traditional \$350-million oil subsidy that Amman says it receives from Baghdad. And Washington has stepped up aid to Jordan. As a result, King Abdullah's new rallying cry is "Jordan first," a slogan that encompasses the nation's need to insulate itself from the storms of east and west and focus on economic performance.

None of this should be seen as suggesting an outpouring of societal love for the U.S. And the government has not reduced its concern for Jordan's Palestinian and Iraqi brethren. Rather, there are indications that Jordan wishes to be a strong and independent country, not just a blind supporter of pan-Arabism.

David Makovsky an economic analyst at the Los Angeles Times says: “The story of Jordan is not a panacea to transform the Middle East. Yet if a political dividend can occur at a time of regional deterioration, there is greater promise during normal times.”⁽¹⁾

At the end of July 2003, a strategic pan-Arab gas pipeline between Jordan and Egypt went on stream, as King Abdullah II and President Hosni Mubarak officially opened the channel. The 270-kilometers pipeline was the first phase of an inter-regional economic venture, estimated at more than \$1 billion, that will later stretch to Syria, Lebanon in 2005 and beyond to Cyprus and Turkey by 2006. A 16-kilometer marine link between Taba and Aqaba, completed in just 18 months, marked the first phase of the project through which 1 billion cubic meters of Egyptian natural gas will be supplied each year.

Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources at the time Mohammad Batayneh said Egypt's gas supply is expected to save the Kingdom \$50 million each year, whilst also providing a low-cost and less harmful source of energy.

- The Qualifying Industrial Zones established in cooperation with Israel have been showcase initiatives, producing thousands of jobs and nearly \$1 billion worth of exports to the United States. The combined effect of these policies— complemented by a sizable infusion of cash from Iraqi expatriates, Syrian land speculators, Palestinians seeking a violence-free sanctuary for their capital, U.S.

⁽¹⁾ Makovsky, David (Peace Pays Off for Jordan, , Los Angeles Times, January 31, 2003)

economic aid, and the derivative benefits of U.S. companies setting up shop in Jordan to service operations in Iraq—provided Jordan with an impressive 7 percent growth rate in 2004.

—Aqaba was designated as a Special Economic Zone on February 15th, 2001 under the provisions of the Aqaba Special Economic Zone Law. In 2000, this law established the Aqaba Special Economic Zone Authority (ASEZA) as the legal heir of both the Aqaba Regional Authority and the Aqaba Municipality within ASEZ.

Aqaba, encompassing Jordan's entire coastline, is situated at the crossroads of four countries and three continents. It also boasts a deep-water seaport, an international airport, and a network of modern highways connecting it to the surrounding region. Aqaba is envisaged to become the leading Red Sea destination for tourists, an enticing shopping center, a leading transportation and trading hub, as well as a leading regional development center for information and communication technology, among other things.

ASEZA is set to qualify the zone to attract investors and create a healthy investment environment to stimulate industry, trade, tourism and services. Its other responsibilities include simplifying procedures, promoting the private sector's role, and creating jobs for Jordanians.

ASEZ, which covers an area of approximately 375 square kilometers and extends to the land borders of Israel and Saudi Arabia and the territorial waters of Egypt, offers investors attractive business incentives; tax exemption and duty-free import.

These include, but are not limited to exemption from custom duties and sales tax/VAT on all imports to the ASEZ (except for cars). Investors are exempt from the social services tax, and annual land and building taxes on utilized property. Exemption from sales tax on the final consumption of all goods and services, except for a 7% services and retail tax. A 5% flat tax on net business income, except for banking, insurance, and land transport services, which are subject to prevailing Jordanian income tax..

Products manufactured in Jordan enjoy duty and quota free access to the U.S. through the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and the Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZ) and the EU through the Euro-Jordanian.

ASEZ is anticipated to bring immense economic benefits to Jordan. Investments inflows are expected to amount to six billion U.S. dollars over the next twenty years, and the number of jobs created as a result will amount to more than seventy thousand. Moreover, the Jordanian government hopes Aqaba's success will have a spillover effect on the entire economic future of the country.

ASEZ is the product of Jordan's wide-scale aggressive policy to position the country within the global economy. The zone is also emerging as a major duty-free economic development node for tourism, recreational and professional services, multi-modal transportation, and value-added industries in the Middle East.

Free Trade Agreement with the U.S.A:

On October 24th 2000, King Abdullah II and U.S. President, at the time, Bill Clinton witnessed the signing of an historic Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the United States. "...We are members of the World Trade Organization. We have a strong Association Agreement with Europe, and, we were the first Arab country to sign a free-trade agreement with the U.S" King Abdullah said.

On September 28th, 2001 during King Abdullah's visit to Washington, U.S. President George W. Bush signed into law the U.S.-Jordan FTA. The agreement came into force on December 17th, 2001.

The FTA demonstrated a strong vote of confidence in Jordan's leadership and economic future. As President Bush stated "This agreement is a strong and tangible symbol of our support for Jordan, for its economic reforms, and for the King's leadership". King Abdullah II has been instrumental in paving the ground for reaching the Agreement. The agreement would help Jordan's economy to shift from a state of dependence on foreign aid to one of self-reliance and to prosper through increasing customs-free exports, attracting foreign investments and facilitating the transfer of technology.

The agreement demonstrates the appreciation of the US administration for King Abdullah II's efforts to reform the economy and develop the investment climate in Jordan. International institutions have also praised these efforts geared to

implement economic reform programs and boost the private sector's role in economic liberalization. It is also a U.S. tribute to the role Jordan has played over the past several years to promote stability and peace in the region.

The agreement is historic because it is only the fourth free trade agreement the United States has negotiated, after those with Israel, Canada and Mexico (NAFTA), and the first ever with an Arab state. It is also the first U.S. free trade agreement to include both labor and environment obligations in the text body.

The FTA eliminates duties and commercial barriers to bilateral trade in goods and services originating in the United States and Jordan. It is the first trade agreement to include substantive provisions addressing electronic commerce, a step that should help advance a global free trade agenda in a sector critical to American high technology and multimedia companies. Jordan becomes the first country to legally bind itself to no customs duties on electronic transmission (WTO members currently only have political commitments in this area). These provisions aim at encouraging investment in new technologies and stimulating the innovative uses of networks to deliver products and services.

The FTA has already played a major role in fostering closer bilateral business ties between Jordanian and American firms. It will provide benefits to consumers and businesses in Jordan and the U.S. by increasing choices and lowering the prices of goods and services. By the end of 2002, Jordan's exports to the United States amounted to US\$ 363 Million compared to US\$ 13 Million in 1999.

-The Jordan-EU Association Agreement came into force on May 1st, 2002 after it was signed on November 24th, 1997, and ratified by the Jordanian Parliament in September 1999. The agreement which aims to create a free trade area between EU and Jordan by the year 2010, as well as to establish a comprehensive framework for political, trade, economic and financial cooperation. The agreement was concluded within the framework of the Barcelona Process 1995 goal of which is to create a larger area of peace and economic prosperity in the Mediterranean Basin.

The Free Trade Area aims to link fifteen EU member states and twelve Mediterranean partners together. Taking an EU enlargement into consideration, the zone will be one of the world's most important trade entities as it is expected to include around forty states and six hundred to eight hundred million consumers.

The Agreement allows entry of Jordanian industrial exports into EU-member countries free of customs duties and other charges having equivalent effect from the date of the entry into force of the Agreement. Also, EU industrial exports shall be allowed entry into Jordan free of customs duties and any other charges having an equivalent effect over a transitional period lasting 12 years starting from the date of entry into force of the Agreement, except for a list of specific products.

In accordance with the agreement, financial and technical support would be extended to Jordan to improve the capacity of industries that have the potential to export and compete in the EU markets. The EU has pledged to set up a Special Fund to assist Jordanian industries overcome the negative effects that may result

from the implementation of the Agreement and to improve their export capacity and their competitiveness.

The agreement promises to play an important role in Jordan's economic development. The accord will encourage more direct European investments into the Kingdom, boost the Jordanian exports to the EU markets and enhance the competitiveness of the local market.

-On June 21, 2001, Jordan and the Economic free trade agreements (EFTA) states (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland) signed a free trade agreement, which aims to create favorable conditions for the development and diversification of trade and to promote commercial and economic cooperation in areas of common interest on basis of equality, mutual benefit, non-discrimination and international law.

The agreement, which entered into force on 1/1/2002 provisionally with Switzerland, covers economic cooperation and technical assistance in a number of fields ranging from intellectual property and customs matters to technical regulations. It stipulates that special attention should be given to those sectors in Jordan that face difficulty as a result of structural adjustment process, which aims to liberalize the economy.

The free trade area between Jordan and the EFTA states will be fully operational through progressive liberalization extending over a period of 12 years. The agreement covers trade in industrial, agricultural and fish and marine products. As of the date of entry into force of the agreement, the EFTA states will abolish all customs duties and other charges on imports of industrial products originating in

Jordan. Jordan will progressively abolish customs duties on the same products originating in the EFTA states according to 2 schemes extending over 4 to 12 years, while leaving tariffs on a limited number of categories of products to be negotiated after four years of entry into force of the agreement.

-Jordan, along with sixteen other Arab countries, is a member of the Arab Free Trade Agreement. According to the agreement, all Arab products moving among Arab member states will be afforded the status of national goods in accordance with the principle of gradual liberalization, which took effect on January 1, 1998. By way of annual reductions of 10% of customs duties, fees and taxes, goods are scheduled to be moving duty-free among the States through the establishment of the Arab Free Trade Zone by 2008. As a result, Jordan is expected to attract new Arab-based investments, and to enjoy unhindered access to the markets of the Arab world.

Such agreements will help Jordan's economy to prosper through increasing customs-free exports, attracting foreign investments and facilitating the transfer of technology.

-Trade Ministers of Jordan, Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco signed the Agadir Declaration:

An agreement on January 11, 2003 to establish a joint free trade area in order to foster economic integration and boost their exports to the European Union. The agreement would enable the member countries to better exploit their partnership

with the EU primarily through applying the cumulative system for the origin of a product.

The creation of a sub-regional free trade zone, which would facilitate production processes in a cost-effective environment after accumulating relatively cheap input from member states. The agreement would also enhance the flow of intermediary goods.

The Agadir Declaration, which was signed in 2001 by Jordan, Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco, is the most advanced sub-regional integration process.

Jordan first:

Under the directives of King Abdullah II the 'Jordan First' national declaration was launched on the 20th October 2002 in order to strengthen the foundations of a pragmatic, democratic state. It is a working plan that seeks to deepen the sense of national identity among citizens where everyone acts as partners in building and developing the Kingdom. It is also an approach that banks on past achievements and seeks to open new doors for policies and programs in development, education, culture, and communication and information. It emphasizes the pre-eminence of Jordan's interests above all other considerations and seeks to spread a culture of respect and tolerance and integrate and fortify the concepts of parliamentary democracy, supremacy of the law, public freedom, accountability, transparency, and equal opportunities. This declaration targets a generation of young Jordanians, who pride themselves in their Homeland and their Monarch's throne and who beam

with their democracy and effective, responsible participation in shaping their parliamentary institutions to be both accountable for, and loyal to Jordan. ⁽¹⁾

⁽¹⁾ www.mfa.gov.jo

Section Five

Results and Recommendations

Analysis of Questionnaire results:

The Questionnaire used in this thesis consisted of two parts. The first part contains ten hypothesis in regards of the Jordanian diplomacy and main achievements in the period between 1990 and 1999. The second part contains ten hypothesis in regards of the Jordanian diplomacy and main achievements in the period between 1999 and 2004.

The questionnaire was distributed to a 150 students and professors of political science in public and private universities in Jordan randomly. For each question, the person filling out the questionnaire must put a tick next to his own opinion. The options are: I strongly agree, I agree, or I disagree.

Out of the 150 questionnaires distributed a 120 of them were filled out and returned. After they were answered and collected, the results were entered into an Spss statistical program, which gave us the results as follows:

Part one of the Questionnaire (covering the period between 1990 and 1999- the last nine years of King Hussein's reign) consists of the following hypothesis:

1. Jordanian Diplomacy is considered to be a source of power for the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

Q1

Valid	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	CumulativePercent
Strongly Agree	78	65.0	65.0	65.0
Agree	40	33.3	33.3	98.3
Disagree	02	01.7	01.7	100.0
Total	120	100.0	100.0	

According to the analysis of the results gathered on this hypothesis, 65.0% of the sample strongly agreed with this hypothesis. 33.3% agreed, and 1.7% disagreed. These results show that Jordanian diplomacy is viewed by the majority very positively as a source of power and an asset to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, through which the Kingdom has been able to survive and develop.

2. Jordanian diplomacy had a big role in reaching and signing of the Wadi Araba treaty in which Jordan gained back all its rights.

Q2

Valid	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	CumulativePercent
Strongly Agree	61	50.8	50.8	50.8
Agree	49	40.8	40.8	91.7
Disagree	10	08.4	08.4	100.0
Total	120	100.0	100.0	

50.8% of the sample strongly agreed, 40.8% agreed, and 8.4% disagreed. This result shows that the vast majority recognize the important role of Jordanian diplomacy in the peace process as a whole and in reaching the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty of Wadi Araba in particular. 91.6% of the study population realized that without smart Jordanian diplomacy Jordan could not have signed the Wadi Araba peace treaty. Even if it did, without successful diplomacy Jordan would not have been able to gain back its rights in terms of land, water, specified boundaries, etc.

3. Jordanian diplomacy headed by Late King Hussein was strong enough to build strategic relations with the world super powers particularly the United States.

Q3

Valid	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	CumulativePercent
Strongly Agree	74	61.7	61.7	61.7
Agree	39	32.5	32.5	94.2
Disagree	07	05.8	05.8	100.0
Total	120	100.0	100.0	

This hypothesis talked about the essence of Jordanian diplomacy in which King Hussein had a very important role. 61.7% of the sample strongly agreed, that although King Hussein was a leader of a small country, he had managed to establish strategic relations with the superpowers of the world. 32.5% of the sample agreed on this hypothesis, and only 5.8% disagreed.

4. Internal Jordanian diplomacy was characterized by courage and wisdom and the respect of higher national interests of the Jordanian people.

Q4

Valid	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	CumulativePercent
Strongly Agree	43	35.8	35.8	35.8
Agree	64	53.3	53.3	89.2
Disagree	13	10.8	10.8	100.0
Total	120	100.0	100.0	

Internal affairs do strongly influence foreign affairs. And thus Jordanian leaderships had used internal diplomacy in dealing with internal communities and internal affairs in order to achieve the higher national interest of Jordan. The results of this hypothesis proved that people do respect and recognize the wisdom and courage of Jordanian internal diplomacy. 35.8% strongly agreed on this hypothesis, 53.3% agreed, and 10.8% disagreed.

- Jordanian diplomacy was empowered by King Hussein's clear vision of the national interests.

Q5

Valid	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	CumulativePercent
Strongly Agree	56	46.7	46.7	46.7

Agree	52	43.3	43.3	90.0
Disagree	12	10.0	10.0	100.0
Total	120	100.0	100.0	

46.7% of the sample strongly agreed that late King Hussein had empowered Jordanian diplomacy to achieve higher national interests and did all his best to put it on the right tracks in the different circumstances that had prevailed in the region, 43.3% agreed, and 10.0% disagreed.

6. Jordanian diplomacy had a major role in solving Arab- Arab conflicts.

Q6

Valid	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	CumulativePercent
Strongly Agree	48	40.0	40.0	40.0

Agree	53	44.2	44.2	84.2
Disagree	19	15.8	15.8	100.0
Total	120	100.0	100.0	

Many people recognized Jordan's role in solving inter-Arab conflicts or at least in trying to solve Arab-Arab disputes. 40% strongly agreed that Jordan had done its best to solve Arab conflicts peacefully and usually succeeded just like it succeeded in solving the Yemen conflict in the 1990s, 44.2% agreed, and 15.8% disagreed perhaps because the attempts of Jordanian diplomacy to solve the 1990s Gulf Crisis had been aborted.

7. No other country in the region had a diplomacy similar to the calm mediating Diplomacy of Jordan in the Gulf crisis of 1990.

Q7

Valid	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	CumulativePercent
Strongly Agree	56	46.7	46.7	46.7
Agree	49	40.8	40.8	87.5
Disagree	15	12.5	12.5	100.0
Total	120	100.0	100.0	

46.7% strongly agreed, 40.8% agreed, 12.5% disagreed on this hypothesis. Jordanian diplomacy had been very calm and patient before, during and after the Gulf crisis of 1990. Jordanian diplomacy headed by late King Hussein had not spared an effort to try to solve the conflict peacefully. Even with all the signs that a war was inevitable, Jordan did not quit and King Hussein pursued his diplomacy even after the war started in order to put an end to it.

8. Jordanian diplomacy focused on the principles of rejecting foreign intervention in the internal affairs of others, the illegitimacy of occupation and war.

Q8

Valid	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	CumulativePercent
Strongly Agree	55	45.8	45.8	45.8
Agree	49	40.8	40.8	86.7
Disagree	16	13.3	13.3	100.0
Total	120	100.0	100.0	

The Jordanian diplomacy is built on the above-mentioned principles that is why 45.8% of the sample strongly agreed. 40.8% agreed, and only 13.3% disagreed. Jordanian diplomacy had always refused to interfere in the affairs of others unless it was asked to. An example of this would be its rejection of foreign intervention during the Kuwaiti-Iraqi dispute. Jordanian diplomacy headed by King Hussein had strived to contain the crisis within Arab context, and also rejected Iraq's annexation of Kuwait.

9. Jordanian diplomacy was characterized by seriousness in the Wye river meeting between the Palestinians and the Israelis which resulted in signing the agreement.

Q9

Valid	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	CumulativePercent
Strongly Agree	54	45.0	45.0	45.0
Agree	56	46.7	46.7	91.7
Disagree	10	08.3	08.3	100.0
Total	120	100.0	100.0	

45.0% strongly agreed with this, 46.7% agreed, and 8.3% disagreed. Anyone who had seen or even heard of the Wye river meeting would definitely realize the serious and genuine Jordanian pursue of peace. Late King Hussein left his hospital bed while he was being treated for cancer in order to sponsor and attend this meeting that would achieve peace.

10. The Jordanian diplomacy headed by King Hussein had faced numerous challenges in very difficult circumstances.

Q 10

Valid	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	CumulativePercent
Strongly Agree	73	60.8	60.8	60.8
Agree	40	33.3	33.3	94.2
Disagree	07	5.8	5.8	100.0
Total	120	100.0	100.0	

60.8% strongly agreed, 33.3% agreed, and 5.8% disagreed, the vast majority of the sample has realized the numerous challenges that had faced Jordanian diplomacy. Jordan as a small country with limited resources and numerous sources of threat was subjected to many different challenges, mostly economic and political. However, with the wisdom of King Hussein Jordan had managed to overcome and survive these challenges.

Part two of the Questionnaire (covering the period between 1999 and 2004- the first five years of King Abdullah's reign) consists of the following hypothesis:

1. Jordanian diplomacy headed by King Abdullah II was able to present Jordan as a model for political, economic, and social reform.

Q 1

Valid	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	CumulativePercent
Strongly Agree	62	51.7	51.7	51.7
Agree	53	44.2	44.2	95.8
Disagree	05	04.2	04.2	100.0
Total	120	100.0	100.0	

51.7% of the sample strongly agreed with this hypothesis. 44.2% agreed, and 4.2% disagreed. A very small minority could disagree that the Jordanian diplomacy headed by King Abdullah II was able to present Jordan as a model for political, economic, and social reform. Ever since King Abdullah acceded to the throne he has been making tremendous efforts to present Jordan as a model for political, economic, and social reform. He has been an ambassador for Jordan throughout the whole world to make this presentation and achieve real substantial reform.

2. The presence of good diplomats that enabled Jordan to enter the World Trade Organization gave Jordan a great significance in the region.

Q 2

Valid	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	CumulativePercent
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Strongly Agree	55	45.8	45.8	45.8
Agree	57	47.5	47.5	93.3
Disagree	08	06.7	06.7	100.0
Total	120	100.0	100.0	

45.8% of the sample strongly agreed, 47.5% agreed, and 6.7% disagreed. People realize that having good diplomats headed by King Abdullah II have enabled Jordan to enter the World Trade Organization. This of course has given Jordan great significance in the region because it is not easy for any country to be part of such a big organization. Jordan's diplomacy has portrayed Jordan as a credible country with a great future and this credibility built the worldwide acceptance and respect for Jordan whose influence and reputation have become far greater than its size and limited resources.

3. Jordanian diplomacy was able to convince the world's largest financial institutions to reschedule Jordanian debts.

Q 3

Valid	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	CumulativePercent
Strongly Agree	60	50.0	50.0	50.0

Agree	52	43.3	43.3	93.3
Disagree	08	06.7	06.7	100.0
Total	120	100.0	100.0	

4. 50% of the sample strongly agreed with this important hypothesis. 43.3% of the sample agreed, and 6.7% disagreed. Jordanian diplomacy and good relations was able to convince the world's largest financial institutions to reschedule Jordanian debts. This came also as a result of the credibility of Jordan world wide.

5. Jordan signing several free trade agreements and establishing qualified industrial zones are signs of having active Jordanian diplomacy.

Q 4

Valid	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	CumulativePercent
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Strongly Agree	64	53.3	53.3	53.3
Agree	47	39.2	39.2	92.5
Disagree	09	07.5	07.5	100.0
Total	120	100.0	100.0	

53.3% strongly agreed on this hypothesis, 39.2% agreed, and only 7.5% disagreed.

Jordanian diplomacy headed by King Abdullah II who has been marketing Jordan all over the world has enabled Jordan to sign several free trade agreements and to establish qualified industrial zones that even larger and richer countries were not able to do. Jordan was also chosen to be the place where the World Economic Forum is held. These are only some of the signs and results of Jordanian diplomacy activities.

6. Jordanian diplomacy had a big role in the road map solution for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

Q 5

Valid	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	CumulativePercent
Strongly Agree	47	39.2	39.2	39.2
Agree	53	44.2	44.2	83.3
Disagree	20	16.7	16.7	100.0
Total	120	100.0	100.0	

7.39.2% of the sample strongly agreed with this hypothesis, 44.2% agreed, and 16.7% disagreed. Therefore, a total 84% of the sample does appreciate the fact that Jordanian diplomacy had played a big role in the road map solution for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Not only that, but also people do realize the significance of the Palestinian issue for Jordan, and Jordan's continuous efforts to find a just and comprehensive solution for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

8. Jordan's world wide credibility enabled Jordan to be supported in its case on the separation barrier at the International Court of Justice (ICJ).

Q 8

Valid	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	CumulativePercent
Strongly Agree	44	36.7	36.7	36.7

Agree	64	53.3	53.3	90.0
Disagree	12	10.0	10.0	100.0
Total	120	100.0	100.0	

36.7% strongly agreed, 53.3% agreed, and 10% disagreed. This also came as a result of people's realization of Jordan's concern for the Palestinian issue and the humanitarian issues in general. The majority of the sample appreciate King Abdullah's continuous efforts to achieve peace in the Middle East.

9. Extraordinary circumstances have prevailed on the West and the East of Jordan; however Jordan had been able to preserve its national interests.

Q9

Valid	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	CumulativePercent
Strongly Agree	49	40.8	40.8	40.8
Agree	51	42.5	42.5	83.3

Disagree	20	16.7	16.7	100.0
Total	120	100.0	100.0	

This hypothesis has been the core of this research. The research's aim was to find out whether Jordan had been able to preserve its national interests, and how it did it in the light of the extraordinary circumstances that have prevailed on its West and East.

40.8% strongly agreed that Jordan had been successful in preserving its national interests, 42.5% agreed, 16.7% disagreed.

10. Jordanian diplomacy has been able to market Jordan world wide and attract many foreign investors.

Q 10

Valid	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	CumulativePercent
Strongly Agree	53	44.2	44.2	44.2

Agree	58	48.3	48.3	92.5
Disagree	09	07.5	07.5	100.0
Total	120	100.0	100.0	

44.2% of the sample strongly agreed. 48.3% agreed, and only 7.5% disagreed.

This result was very much expected. Any one who follows closely King Abdullah's activities would realize that Jordanian diplomacy headed by him has been able to market Jordan world wide and attract many foreign investors and many huge projects.

09. Choosing Jordan as a location for the Davos conference came as a result of the successful Jordanian diplomacy.

Q9

Valid	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	CumulativePercent
Strongly Agree	53	44.2	44.2	44.2
Agree	60	50.0	50.0	94.2

Disagree	07	05.8	05.8	100.0
Total	120	100.0	100.0	

44.2% strongly agreed, 50% agreed, and 5.8% disagreed. A huge percent agreed because it is not easy at all for a country with limited resources such as Jordan to be chosen to hold such important conferences in which the world leaders participate.

10. Jordanian diplomacy's reputation of honesty, justice, and commitment facilitated the army's participation in the U.N. peacekeeping troops.

Q 10

Valid	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	CumulativePercent
Strongly Agree	53	44.2	44.2	44.2

Agree	55	45.8	45.8	90.0
Disagree	12	10.0	10.0	100.0
Total	120	100.0	100.0	

44.2% strongly agreed, 45.8% agreed, and 10% disagreed. This means that the majority of people agree that Jordanian diplomacy's reputation of honesty, justice, and commitment is recognized world wide. And that this reputation is has enabled a small country like Jordan to participate in big international missions.

Conclusion of the thesis:

Defining the performance of Jordan's diplomacy depends on the major issues that affects it and to what extent it has succeeded in serving its interests. Through the research on issues affecting or concerning Jordanian diplomacy, we can see that the following issues had been the most important:

1- The Arab-Israeli peace talks and the implications of the peace settlement for Jordan.

2- Inter-Arab relations and regional disputes

3- Relations with the West particularly with the U.S. and the European Union.

4- Reform and economic development.

As a result of the research, Questionnaire, and interviews with former Prime minister Dr. Fayez Tarawneh, Former foreign minister Abdul Ilah A Khatib, Head of the international and regional affairs department in the Lower House of Parliament Dr. Mohammad Abu Hdeib, Retired General Dr. Saleh Al Ma'aytah, the researcher has reached the following results that prove or disprove the thesis hypothesis:

1- A country's diplomacy plays a major role in preserving its survival and stability, and achievement of its national interests.

Only a country's successful diplomacy can play a major role in preserving its survival and stability, and achievement of its national interests. And in the case of Jordan it definitely does. Jordan is a small country with limited resources. It is also trapped between stronger and more aggressive neighbors. Not only that but it also lies in the middle of two war zones. On its west there is the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and on its West there is the situation in Iraq. However, its diplomacy proved to be smart and active to have been able to insure the survival and stability of Jordan in the midst of the prevailing circumstances.

2- Even small countries with limited resources can play the role of the regional stabilizer.

This hypothesis was proven to be true. Jordanian diplomacy has been built on a number of pivotal principles in executing its foreign policy. The first is its support for the Palestinian issue in all international arenas and considering it Arab's number one pivotal issue. Therefore, Jordanian diplomacy never stopped supporting this issue and defending the rights of the Palestinians to return or be compensated. Jordan continued this policy during the Arab-Israeli negotiations after the Arabs announced that peace is the strategic choice with Israel, and can not be given up. Jordan has provided military and economic support for the Palestinians during the years of war with Israel in the years that preceded the Madrid conference in the early 1990s. During those years the East and the West Banks of Jordan even united to preserve what was left of Palestine. When the Palestinians announced their decision to negotiate with Israel, Jordan provided the political and legitimate umbrella for them through the establishment of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation in the Madrid conference. Jordan continued to support the Palestinian issue in the period that followed the Madrid conference through giving proposals and initiatives for finding a solution for the Palestinian issue based on international legitimacy, Security Council resolutions, and the land for peace principle.

- Jordanian diplomacy is also based on the principle of respect for national sovereignty of other states, and not interfering in their internal affairs. It is also built on solving conflicts in peaceful means. When Iraq invaded Kuwait, Jordan headed by Late King Hussein Bin

Talal rushed to mediate to solve the conflict peacefully. It called on Iraq under the political system of Saddam Hussein to respect the national sovereignty of Kuwait and go back to the pre-occupation position to delete its traces. However, after the western countries headed by the United States gathered their military forces to attack Iraq, and in agreement with the desire of Jordanian people who saw the Gulf conflict as an attempt to interfere in Arab-Arab affairs and dominate the economic capabilities of the region; Jordanian diplomacy and policy had to stand by the Iraqi people in their confrontation with the multi-polar military forces. Jordan had to face the consequences of that position which were represented by imposing American sanctions on the port of Aqaba, and considering Jordan as an anti coalition according to the categorization of the Gulf countries particularly Kuwait. Jordan was also denied the assistance it used to receive before the conflict began.

There are many sources of disputes between Arab countries, the most significant of which is the borders issue. Almost every Arab country has border disputes with its Arab neighbors particularly the countries of the Gulf.

Another source of conflict is the nature of economic relations between Arab countries and the relations of these Arab countries with the super powers and the nature of political systems present there. Jordan has always attempted, both in King Hussein's reign and King Abdullah II's, to solve these conflicts in peaceful means and good offices, and in accordance with the principles of fairness, justice, and international laws and customs.

-When it comes to relations with Israel, Jordan managed to maintain some sort of stability, prevent chaos, and to ultimately negotiate a peace treaty. That, by any standard,

did serve as much as possible given the balance of power and regional and international politics, the interest of Jordan.

Jordan is in the middle between Israel, the Palestinian territories and the rest of the Arab world, by virtue of its geographic location let alone any other roles that were played in the past it was extremely important that Jordan maintains its stability in order to protect regional stability, so it is very important and this has been recognized both regionally and internationally by the United States and else where. If there was chaos in Jordan this means that 562 kilometers of border with Israel would have been open with no body there and the same applies for the borders with Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Iraq, so Jordan is an important country in the region and it has played the role of the stabilizer.

3- The personality and the charisma of a country's leader play a big in defending and communicating its policies.

This hypothesis was also proven to be true. Jordan's diplomacy headed by Late King Hussein and now King Abdullah II has played a major role in the survival and stability of the Jordanian monarchy and stability of Jordan.

World leaders and Political analysts have spoken astonishingly about King Hussein's survival in spite of all the country's limitations. One example would be Uriel Dann of The Washington institute of near East policy who had written a whole policy paper on King Hussein's strategy of survival. He says: "The story of how he (King Hussein) managed to stay in power speaks volumes, not only about his own skill, but also about the intricacies of Middle Eastern history and the differences that individual leaders can make in shaping events. Again and Again one contemplates how did he do it?"

- 4- The wisdom of a small country's leader along with his own long and direct contacts with other leaders can make him and his country far more important than his country's small size and weak status would have otherwise indicated.

In the case of Jordan, The research showed that this is possible. - One can see that Jordan did succeed in projecting itself as a country that is a voice of moderation, openness, and reason. That was manifested in the economic aid, the political support Jordan has been getting. The funeral of King Hussein is a testament to that. After all, King Hussein was the King of a country of five million people, and yet the whole world came to this funeral. It was a statement of how significant that man had been, and how significant, by association has been in the eyes of all the major powers. Other Arab leaders passed away; and none got anything even close to King Hussein's funeral. And this is a testament of the success of the late King in nurturing relations that ultimately helped serve the interests of Jordan whether economically or politically, and that is something that cannot be denied.

- 5- Small countries are able to achieve internal development and reform.

This proved to be true in the case of Jordan. The main goal of Jordanian diplomacy is to secure and protect Jordan's national interests and advance its goals under the circumstances that prevail in every stage. It is based on the full adherence of International law, U.N. Charter, International Conventions and Human rights acts

The Jordanian diplomacy, lead by King Abdullah II was extremely successful is convincing the world, especially the West and the world financial institutions that Jordan is totally committed to political, economic and social reform, with democracy, human rights (especially women's rights), the rule of law and private sector economy will be deepened in the Jordanian society.

For many years, Jordan has deservedly enjoyed a reputation as a standard-bearer of moderation and reform among Arab states. Education is highly prized, illiteracy rates are low, and political prisoners are few and rarely incarcerated for long. The late King Hussein reconstituted the parliament in the mid-1980s. Jordan has held relatively free elections ever since. Women have long held the right to vote and have exercised it in large numbers. In a region where reformers, democrats, and social mavericks routinely suffer imprisonment, torture, disappearance, or death, the long arm of the Jordanian state is normally limited to a stern warning, a lost job, or a confiscated passport.

In recent years, the kingdom has focused most of its national efforts on economic reform, including efforts to streamline business start-ups, encourage foreign investment, and reduce bureaucracy.

Strengths and weaknesses in Jordanian diplomacy:

The main points of weaknesses in Jordanian diplomacy either in the period from 1990 until 1999 or in the period from 1999 until 2004 are those emerging from the restrictions

or limitations that restrict Jordanian foreign policy. The main ones would be the scarcity of the Jordanian economic resources and the reliance of the Jordanian budget to a big extent on foreign assistance, grants, and international loans. The thing that decreases and weakens the chances of influence of the Jordanian foreign policy and thus the limitation of its action with a larger freedom. It is not a secret that the capability of the government- any government- to draw and execute its policies is directly proportional with its capabilities and economic resources available and vice versa. When these capabilities are limited it weakens the foreign decision maker or limits his ambitions.

In addition, another main point of weakness in the Jordanian diplomacy is its geopolitical belonging. Jordan lies in a political area that suffers from a weakness in political stability that came as a result of the Israeli occupation and its aggressive practices against the Palestinian people and some other Arab countries, in addition to the U.S. occupation of Iraq. This had reflected negatively on the Jordanian economy (weak tourism, less direct and indirect foreign investments, etc.)

The points of strength in the Jordanian diplomacy are mainly represented by the invariable consistencies on which Jordanian foreign policy has been built since the very beginning of the founding of the Jordanian state until the present time. The main invariables are the respect of the international resolutions and agreements, not interfering in the internal affairs of other states, respecting their national sovereignty on their land and people, in addition to the respect of the self determination right of the states which are under occupation.

On top of all this the charisma of Late King Hussein and now King Abdullah II as active parts of the formulation the Jordanian foreign policy; their openness on the Arab,

regional, and international affairs and their deep understanding and far sight in many of the international issues.

Recommendations:

It is hard for me to put down recommendations for a diplomacy that had been lead by a diplomatic genius that enabled Jordan to survive through the numerous challenges it had to face because of its geographic centrality and limited resources such as his late Majesty King Hussein bin Talal. And it is even harder to recommend anything for the diplomacy of King Abdullah II, who has done so much in so little time and was himself the number one diplomat that continued his father's path and presented Jordan to the whole world in the most wonderful way.

If the thesis was about the diplomacy of ambassadors, envoys, foreign ministers, or any diplomatic persons or establishment, things would have done much easier.

However, out of my research I would recommend that the Jordanian diplomacy sticks to its principles and invariables, work for the achievement of Arab and regional interests, but not on the expense of the Jordanian national interests. And that is what I admire the most about the new trend of Jordanian diplomacy which focuses more on Jordan first, to achieve a stronger more stable Jordan that will continue to survive and prosper in the face of any challenges it might face and then be able to continue to help others more effeciently.

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APPENDICES

Dr. Mohammad Abu Hdeib is a deputy the lower House of Parliament and Head of the Lower House's committee for regional and International affairs.

The researcher met with Dr. Abu Hdeib in his office in July of 2005, but did not get the answers immediately. Dr. Abu Hdeib was kind enough to discuss these questions with the committee of regional and international affairs in the Lower House of Parliament, so the researcher can get a joint point of view of the whole committee.

-Researcher : “What was the role of Jordanian diplomacy in the Arab-Israeli peace process before and after the Madrid conference?”

-Dr. Abu Hdeib: “Jordanian Diplomacy has been based on a number of pivotal principles in executing its foreign policy. The first and the most important is its support for the Palestinian issue in all international arenas and considering this issue Arab's number one pivotal issue. Therefore, Jordanian diplomacy never stopped supporting this issue and defending the rights of the Palestinians to return or be compensated. Jordan continued this policy during the Arab-Israeli negotiations after the Arabs announced that peace is the strategic choice with Israel, and can not be given up. Jordan has provided military and economic support for the Palestinians during the years of war with Israel in the years that preceded the Madrid conference in the early 1990s. During those years the East and the West Banks of Jordan even united to preserve what was left of Palestine. When the Palestinians announced their decision to negotiate with Israel, Jordan provided

the political and legitimate umbrella for them through the establishment of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation in the Madrid conference. Jordan continued to support the Palestinian issue in the period that followed the Madrid conference through giving proposal and initiatives for finding a solution for the Palestinian issue based on international legitimacy, Security Council resolution, and the land for peace principle.”

- **Researcher:** “What was the role of Jordanian diplomacy during the Gulf conflict of 1990? And what was its role in minimizing the damages for Jordan?”

- What was the role of Jordanian diplomacy during the recent war on Iraq in 2003? And what was its role in minimizing the damages for Jordan?”

-**Dr. Abu Hdeib:** “As every body knows, Jordanian diplomacy is based on the principle of respect for national sovereignty for other countries, and not interfering in their internal affairs. It is also built on solving conflicts in peaceful means. When Iraq invaded Kuwait, Jordan headed by His Late Majesty King Hussein Bin Talal rushed to mediate to solve the conflict peacefully. It called on Iraq under the regime of Saddam Hussein to respect the national sovereignty of Kuwait and go back to the pre-occupation position to delete its traces. However, after the western countries headed by the United States gathered their military forces to attack Iraq, and in agreement with the desire of Jordanian people who saw the second Gulf conflict as an attempt to interfere in Arab-Arab affairs and dominate the economic capabilities of the region; Jordanian diplomacy and policy had to stand by the Iraqi people in their confrontation with the multi-polar military forces. Jordan had to

face the consequences of that position which were represented by imposing American sanctions on the port of Aqaba, and considering Jordan as an anti coalition according to the categorization of the Gulf countries particularly Kuwait. Jordan was also denied the assistance it used to receive before the conflict began.”

- **Researcher:** “Could you please tell me about the points of strength and the points of weakness in Jordanian diplomacy during the period from **1999-2004**?”

-**Dr. Abu Hdeib:** “When you read through the history of Arab- Arab relations you can see how it was influenced by political and legal conflicts that even reached sometimes to military means to solve these disputes.

There are many sources of disputes between Arab countries, the most significant of which is the borders issue. Almost every Arab country has border disputes with its Arab neighbors particularly the countries of the Gulf.

Another source of conflicts is the nature of economic relations between Arab countries and the relations of these Arab countries with the super powers and the nature of political systems present there. Jordan has always attempted, both in his Late Majesty King Hussein’s reign and His Majesty King Abdullah II’s, to solve these conflicts in peaceful means and good offices, and in accordance with the principles of fairness, justice, and international customs.”

- **Researcher:** “What role does the Parliament play in making foreign policy decisions?”

-**Dr. Abu Hdeib:** “The lower House of Parliament plays an important role in making and executing Jordanian foreign policy through a number of ways. First of all and most

importantly, through the committee of Arab and International affairs. This committee is one of the Lower Houses fourteen permanent committees which discuss all Arab, regional, and international issues. It also discusses the international agreements that Jordan is part of, and decides a stand in its regards. The committee also meets international delegations visiting the Parliament and explains to them Jordan's stands towards the different joint issues that are related to Jordan or to the visiting delegation. The committee also tries to propose solutions for issues of dispute.

In addition to the periodical consultation meetings that the committee holds with the centers of political decision making when it comes to Jordanian foreign policy (For example the committees meetings with the Foreign minister) through which relations of influence take place between the two sides.

The Parliament also has an important role in the Jordanian Foreign policy through its political statements through which it declares its position towards a certain issue or a series of emerging events. These statements come as a result of serious intensive discussion in the Parliament. Finally, I have to point out the role of the Jordanian Parliamentary delegations that participate in regional and international conferences and official visits that have important significance in foreign policy.”

- **Researcher:** “What is the role of political parties and opposition in making foreign policy decisions?”

-Dr. Abu Hdeib: “Jordanian political parties have a minimal and limited role in foreign policy. This is not because there is no channels of communication or freedom of expression or because they are marginalized but because of the weakness of these political parties and their inactivity in the society and Jordanian politics and the absence of the basics of the General political action.

That does not mean that there is no influence for the Jordanian political parties. Because there is a number of political parties’ representatives like the Islamic Action Front who have a role in this regards through various channels of expression; either through their deputies in the Parliament or through other means.”

- Researcher: “What are the points of strength and what are the points of weaknesses in Jordanian diplomacy in the period from 1990 until 1999? And what are they in the period from 1999 until 2004?”

-Dr. Abu Hdeib: “The main points of weaknesses in Jordanian diplomacy either in the period from 1990 until 1999 or in the period from 1999 until 2004 are those emerging from the restrictions or limitations that restrict Jordanian foreign policy. The main ones would be the scarcity of the Jordanian economic resources and the reliance of the Jordanian budget to a big extent on for assistance, grants, and international loans. The thing that decreases and weakens the chances of influence of the Jordanian foreign policy and thus the limitation of its action with a larger freedom. It is not a secret that the capability of the government-any government- to draw and execute its policies is directly proportional with its capabilities and economic resources available and vice versa. When these capabilities are limited it weakens the foreign decision maker or limits his ambitions.

In addition, another main point of weakness in the Jordanian diplomacy is its geo-political belonging. Jordan lies in a political area that suffers from a weakness in political stability that came as a result of the Israeli occupation and its aggressive practices against the Palestinian people and some other Arab countries. In addition to the U.S. occupation of Iraq. The thing that reflected negatively on the Jordanian economy (weak tourism, less direct and indirect foreign investments, etc.)

The points of strength in the Jordanian diplomacy, are in my opinion, mainly represented by the invariables consistencies on which Jordanian foreign policy has been built since the very beginning of the founding of the Jordanian state until the present time. The main invariables are the respect of the international resolutions and agreements, not interfering in the internal affairs of other states, respecting their national sovereignty on their land and people, in addition to the respect of the self determination right of the states which are under occupation.

On top of all this the charisma of his Late Majesty King Hussein and now King Abdullah II as active parts of the formulation the Jordanian foreign policy; the openness of their Majesties on the Arab, regional, and international affairs and their deep understanding and far sight in many of the international issues.”

Abdul Ilah Al Khatib:

The researcher interviewed former minister of foreign affairs Abdul Ilah Al Khatib on Sunday August 21st, 2005 in Amman. The interview went as follows:

- **Researcher:** “Can you please explain to me what the role of the Jordanian diplomacy was and how well it played it during the Arab-Israeli negotiations, before and after the Madrid conference?”

Mr. Khatib: “The role of Jordanian diplomacy is like any other diplomacy for securing or protecting the national interests advancing the goals of the state and it depends on the certain circumstances that prevail at any stage.

If we talk about the Jordanian diplomacy regarding the Arab-Israeli peace process, Jordan has been advocating a peaceful political solution for the Arab-Israeli conflict because we from the very beginning recognized that the balance of power, the international situation did not allow for any other means to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Arabs had other ideas had other views and other positions, and some of them were even under huge illusions that military action could solve the Arab-Israeli conflict. Jordan persisted and insisted from the very beginning of the Arab-Israeli conflict that a peaceful political solution was the only attainable, the only possible solution for the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Jordanian diplomacy evolved around that concept, so it varies it really depends on the circumstances under which we operated whether under Arab unity or appearance of unity or division or disagreements.

From the very beginning from the adoption of resolution 242 in 1967 Jordan insisted and tried to promote the idea that the only solution was a political one based on resolution 242. Arabs resisted that for fifteen years actually between 1967 and 1982 Arabs have reprimanded Jordan in many many ways for advocating that position and in 1982 when the Arab summit convened in Morocco Arabs decided that they would accept resolution 242 as the base for negotiations and the political solution for the Arab-Israeli conflict.

From that date on there has been an evolution of the Arab position. More Arabs were convinced that resolution 242 should be the base. Palestinians tried to qualify and tried to enter the political game by doing what the Americans and the rest of the western powers demanded them to do as far as denouncing terrorism, accepting the right of the state Israel to exist- accepting the political solution. That took between 1982 and 1992 but unfortunately the Arabs went to the peace negotiations under very unbalanced situations after the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait and under very deep divisions in the Arab ranks. So we preferred that the Arabs had gone to the negotiations under better conditions. This was the Jordanian view.

-Researcher : “Could you please tell me about the points of strength and the points of weakness in Jordanian diplomacy during the period from **1990-2004**?”

Al Khatib: “I think that there were different aspects of Jordanian diplomacy. It focused on finding a solution for the Arab-Israeli conflict, it also focused on introducing the notion of complementarity and cooperation between Arab states to build a regional order. It also focused on enhancing Jordan’s credibility in the eyes of the rest of the world so they would be more forthcoming in helping Jordan economically and I think that there have been remarkable successes on all fields. I think Jordan has gained tremendous credibility as far as the Arab-Israeli conflict was concerned. Jordan is considered by the vast majority of the world that it pushed the sound of reason and wisdom in the region. The perception of a moderate Jordan has helped a great deal for important players to involve themselves in the peace process. Jordan did everything it could to build a regional order, but the Arab world has not been ready to build a regional order. I do not think that we can compare in any positive sense between the Arab’s attempts to build a

regional order to the European attempt to build a regional order that had resulted in the creation of the European Union (EU). While the Arabs have not created any umbrella for regional cooperation and regional joint action and as far as Jordan's efforts to convince the international donors that Jordan can efficiently use the sources available to advance social and economic development I think that Jordan has achieved a great deal. If you look at what we have in terms of infrastructure, services, and development in any sector and compare between our own resources our resources would not justify what we have. Therefore I think that the balance has been coming from the international donors.. that is a great success for Jordanian diplomacy. I do not think that we can differentiate between Jordanian diplomacy and the leading role of the King whether late King Hussein or King Abdullah today. So, there is a very steady pattern of performance as far as the role of the leadership is concerned in building that credibility and today in maintaining that credibility. You can look at the list of donations or assistance that has been available to Jordan since 1955 until today. For the last forty years, in absolute terms today's assistance or donations are far greater than when they started, but still it is a huge percentage of our budget or even our GDP (Gross Domestic Product) and this was because Jordan created a notion of credibility and it sustained it through out the years. We need to draw a line between investment and assistance. Assistance has been given to Jordan as grants from many countries for many years Investments when you invest in a certain country you look for the fundamentals of the economy, you look for the prevailing situation, and you look for the applicable laws in order to encourage investments to allow you to transfer the profit. Investment is something that does not have to do only with your diplomatic activity; it has to do with the fundamentals of the

economy and with the prevailing laws. Grants are more related to the country's diplomatic activity and how you are viewed by others. Grants in a way of assistance to Jordan whether from the U.S., Japan, Canada, the EU, or from Arab states and investments because when you invest in a certain country your aim is to make profit and be allowed to transfer that profit wherever you want. So there are different levels of activities.

GULF CONFLICT:

-Researcher: “What was the role of Jordanian diplomacy during the second Gulf conflict? And what was its role in minimizing the damages for Jordan?”

Mr. Khatib: “During the Gulf Crisis 1990-1991, from the very first day Jordan tried to find an Arab solution to the conflict. Jordan was against the involvement or deployment of foreign troops in the region because our experience taught us in many different ways that when foreign troops are deployed in the region they create more problems than they solve. This was the view of late King Hussein from the very first day from August 2nd on, he was against the deployment of the American and the allied troops in the region and he attempted to find an Arab solution, to convince the Iraqis to withdraw from Kuwait and to convince other Arabs to jointly try to approach Iraq to convince Iraq to withdraw. The developments were not in the direction of finding an Arab solution, five days after the invasion of Kuwait the American troops were deployed in Saudi Arabia and the Arab summit convened in Cairo and decided to invite Arab troops and the attempt to find an Arab solution were aborted very early in the conflict. Between August and December 1990 Jordan continued to try to convince both sides the Americans and the Iraqis that we

need to do whatever we could to avoid confrontation. Jordan played a very active role in freeing the thousands of people who were taken hostages who were taken hostages by the Iraqi regime. Jordan acted as a bridge between Iraq and the rest of the world in evacuating hundreds of thousands if not millions of foreigners who lived in Iraq and Kuwait. So there was a huge humanitarian undertaking by Jordan.

During the build up for the war, I mean the building of the coalition, Jordan avoided participating in the coalition and continued to advocate the fact that the war will bring a disaster to the region and that the deployment of foreign troops is not in the interest of the people of the region. Jordan was unique in playing that role, because the vast majority of Arab governments participated in the coalition to oust the Iraqi.... So there was a distinct Jordanian position towards this conflict.

SMART OR NOT:

-Researcher: “ Do you think that the Jordanian diplomacy is smart or not?”

Mr. Khatib: “I think in retrospect it was a smart position when we look at the attempt of late King Hussein to find an Arab solution, I think fifteen years after that, fifteen years after the deployment of foreign troops in the region we could today say that the source of the unrest that prevails today in the region started then. Jordan could say thanks God we advocated the avoiding the deployment of the US led troops because we see up until today in Iraq and elsewhere in the region the results and the negative implications of the foreign troops deployment in the region.

We were punished economically for many years, our budget has been suffering ever since because Arabs severed their assistance to Jordan and Jordan was punished in many many

different ways. But I believe that the chaos that prevails in the region today started by the deployment of US-led troops in the region.

Diplomacy is trying your best to protect your national interests and there are different ways of protecting your national interests under changing situations, and if we wanted to compare what we did in 1990 to what we did in 2003. In 1990 Jordan tried to maintain its territorial integrity, and tried to warn from the dangers of deploying foreign troops in the region and of the division within the Arab ranks. In 2003, Jordan tried its best to avoid war and there were many approaches by His Majesty King Abdullah II towards U.S President Bush to try to convince him that there are other means to introduce the compliance of Iraq with the U.N. resolutions other than war and the Americans would not change their position and they were not convinced and they were determined to go forward and invade Iraq. When you reach that conclusion that the American position would not change then you need to look at ways and means to protect your national interests and I think that we did that very efficiently. We maintained tranquility internally, we managed our relations with the neighboring countries, we managed our borders with Iraq, we made contingencies regarding the possible influx of refugees from Iraq, we had contingencies regarding the supplies of oil, we did what a responsible leadership would do to serve its interests.

In 1990 we served our national interests and in 2003 we served our national interests, but these were two different situations, totally different from each other.

There are many similarities and of course there are differences in style and approach but there is a pattern of maintaining the national interest. But I don't know how we can measure points of strength and points of weaknesses.

SUCSESSES AND FAILURES:

Researcher: “ What are the successes and what are the failures of the Jordanian diplomacy?”

Mr. Khatib: “I think our success was basically in 1990 we maintained the national unity of the people of the country. We avoided divisions, there was national harmony. King Hussein managed to lead his people, there were no internal conflicts on who stood with whom and this is a great achievement for a country like ours. This is for the internal situation in Jordan In that period we managed to overcome the difficulties that began by taking our position. You know that the Americans and the West and some Arab countries were really very angry of that position. So if you look at the pattern of conduct of Jordanian diplomacy starting in 1992 onwards you will see that Jordan managed to rebuild its relations with the west and with the Arab world. After the war the Americans started to prepare for the Middle East peace conference and they could not ignore Jordan from their preparations at the beginning, the U.S. Secretary of State would not even visit Jordan when he visited other Arab countries, I remember we went to see him in Geneva in the first meeting. But then they (the U.S) started talking to Jordan, and I think that the King was able to light the vehicle of the peace process in order to rebuild Jordan's relations with the United States and the West and we were successful. So that was a great achievement. And of course during the preparations for the Madrid peace conference,

there was an attempt to revive Arab coordination regarding the peace process. There were regular meetings between the five Arab parties involved in the peace process; Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, the Palestinians, and the Egyptians, and even the Saudis. That was also used as a vehicle to rebuild Arab relations, And there was a success. And of course, we managed to sign the peace treaty under difficult circumstances but I think that was a great political achievement of diplomacy.

WEAKNESSES:

Researcher: “ What are the weaknesses of the Jordanian diplomacy?”

Mr. Khatib: “There are always weaknesses for a small poor country squeezed between powerful regional neighbors. There are all kinds of weaknesses; we lack the resources to move efficiently to influence public opinion here and there and we have a beauracracy that was not living up to the aims and abilities of the leadership. We have many many different situations when there was no match between the aims of the leadership and the ability of the institutions of foreign policy to conduct foreign policy in a way that is capable of producing very successful results.

“we continued to rebuild our relations with the Europeans ,Americans, and the rest of the Arab world. I would say that King Abdullah has continued to follow the same path after he took over. Of course, the U.S. war on Iraq in 2003 came under different circumstances. The divisions within the Arab ranks were less obvious, there was not a serious division between those who oppose the American action and those who support the American action. People saw that the Americans were determined to invade Iraq and to change the regime no matter what the Arabs did, so they all managed to protect their

own interests and be as flexible as possible with the new campaign and I think Jordan did the same. The situation was different from 1990 and the Iraqi regime gave the Americans all pretexts to justify a possible invasion and that Jordan or any other country could do nothing to change the situation because the image and the perception of the Iraqi regime were not helpful at all.”

FAILURES:

“There are always failures as I said. There is the failure to forge joint action by the Arabs; there is the failure to convince the Palestinians that closer coordination is better for both Jordan and the Palestinians. There are all kinds of failures within the Arab ranks. But Jordan under the prevailing situation and the prevailing conditions has aimed at securing its national interests and protecting its national rights. You can not change the positions of the rest of the Arabs but you can follow a line that would allow you to protect and preserve your national interests because there are so many variables that are not under your control when you talk to joint Arab action to convince the Arabs that we need to act jointly. So you go in the direction of protecting your own interests.”

Economy:

Researcher: “ What is the role of the Jordanian diplomacy in attracting investments and assistance?”

Mr. Khatib: “Jordan has been successful in attracting huge amounts of funds from the west, the rest of the world, from the Arab countries to support Jordan’s attempt towards development socially and economically and that was a great success for Jordanian

diplomacy. I think that the image that King Hussein has managed to build in the world for Jordan has been the main reason for attracting these donations and assistance to Jordan. I think that our own resources would not allow us to build what we have already built in Jordan, all the infrastructure , all the services that are available to the Jordanian citizens I think are not funded by our own resources. And the huge amounts that are being attracted by Jordan from various donors. All these have allowed us to build the infrastructure and to achieve this level of development that is not consistent with our national resources, it far exceeds what we have and I think that that was a result of the activity of the King and the perception that Jordan has been viewed in the world.

The challenges:

Researcher:” What are the challenges that face the Jordanian diplomacy?”

I think that the challenges that Jordan had been facing have been always tough, they were tough during King Hussein’s reign and they are tough during King Abdullah’s. Look at the region’s situation today. Look at what is happening in Palestine; in Iraq and the weakness in the Arab order itself that does not allow joint action to face up to the challenges in the region. I think that the quality of challenges has not changed, but the challenges themselves have been evolving.

“Between 1967 and 1994 I would say we faced many challenges, we faced the terror challenges, we faced challenges due to the confrontation between Jordan and Israel, we faced problems and difficulties with several Arab countries, the divisions between those

who supported the peaceful solution and those who opposed it, there were all kinds of challenges”.

Today, we face a disaster in Iraq, and this is a source of worry for us here because we are neighboring to Iraq and we see the continued instability of Iraq as affecting our own stability. So we really are concerned. This is a major source of concern.

Similarly, if the Palestinians do not manage well their own affairs after the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza. This is another cause of worry for Jordan, and this is a future issue for Jordan. So the quality of challenges has not changed, the challenges kept changing, but they have been always very serious to Jordan”.

INTERNAL CHALLENGES:

Researcher: “ What are the internal challenges of the Jordanian diplomacy?”

Mr. Khatib: “I think we are talking about different circumstances, in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s many Jordanian parties or political groups constituted extensions for other regional powers. There were attempts to interfere in our own internal affairs by Egypt, by Iraq, by Syria, and by different forces in the Arab world. I think that the vast majority of Jordanians today would not accept the interference by other Arab governments in Jordanian internal affairs. So this is changing now. But this has changed without Jordanian parties being able to develop as national institutions, still the structure of political parties in Jordan is very weak and there are attempts now to encourage the creation of Jordanian political groups, and political parties with Jordanian aims and orientation, not as extensions for instance to the Nasserites in Egypt or Baathis in Iraq or

Syria, just home grown political parties. This will take a long time. King Abdullah is pushing the agenda for political development in that direction, but I do not think that this is a thing that could happen over night or in a year or two. It will take a long time. For political parties to evolve, for the political life to develop. In a country like Jordan it will take a long time.”

OPPOSITION:

-Researcher : What role does the opposition have in making foreign policy decisions?”

Khatib: “They do not have much of an influence on Foreign policy, but they can effect your ability to conduct foreign policy, but I do not think that a society that is bound by laws and regulations accepts such an activity that goes beyond the law because the law stipulates that Jordan is establishing diplomatic relations with Israel as a result of the peace treaty. This is a ratified law by Parliament, but people can be free to express their views on these issues. But I do not think that we need to allow people to force others not to do what the law allowed them to do. There is a huge difference between expressing your view on something and preventing some one from doing something that is legal. There is no huge drive to normalize quote unquote relations with Israel but I think that since we regained our territory and signed a peace treaty with Israel and that peace treaty was ratified by the Parliament, conducting relations between Jordan and Israel is perfectly legal. And we should not allow others to take the law in their hands and prevent people from doing something that is legal. There is a great deal of inconsistency, the people who call for severing the ties and the relations between Jordan and Israel continue to call for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the occupied territories and the

continuation of the peace process. So how could they talk about the peace process and call on Jordan to end its relations with Israel that came under the context of the peace process.

-Researcher : “To what extent is the government involved in foreign policy making?”

Mr. Khatib: ”In today’s world the heads of states are deeply involved in executing foreign policy, before they were involved in formulating foreign policy. In today’s world where communication is so easily available and the heads of states can pick up the phone and talk to each other, or U assume they e-mail each other, establishing links is so easily done today. I think that the heads of states, not only in the case of Jordan, but also in the case of a big number of countries, the King is very much involved in formulating and conducting foreign policy. Well, I think that the foreign ministry is the institution that is assigned the task of executing foreign policy, and the degree of performance varies between times. Because the foreign ministry is the government’s arm to execute foreign policy. It varies on the type of government, the type of prime minister, and foreign minister. I mean this is the variation that you can see. But, in theory, the foreign ministry is the institution to conduct foreign policy.

Assistance from Arab countries:

-Researcher :’ What sort of assistance is Jordan getting from Arab countries?”

Mr. Khatib: ““Recently we were getting part of our oil needs from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates. Previously we were getting cash transfers by those countries and others. But now there are no cash transfers. I think you need to verify whether there are cash transfers to replace part of the donation by Saudi Arabia of oil. By April 2005, they stopped but we continue to hope that we will manage to get concessional rates or a different kind of assistance by the Saudis or others.

CONCESSIONAL PRICES OF IRAQ:

“Because Iraq was under the embargo, Iraq needed Jordan as an outlet to the whole world. If you compare what we used to pay to the Iraqis in exchange for their oil and what they used to get when they smuggled their oil, they were better off selling their oil to us rather than smuggling it through the sea, Through the sea they were getting between five and seven dollars a barrel. And when they sold it for barter to Jordan they were getting on average around twelve dollars a barrel. So they knew what they were doing”.

-Researcher: ““What are the weaknesses in Jordanian diplomacy”

Mr. Khatib: “Of course, if you look at all the factors that make a state a state you know, we have deficits. We are a small country, we do not have natural resources, we have internal divisions because of the question of Palestine, we have more powerful neighbors, I think we have done much much better than all others in many different ways. That was because we had always an enlightened, open, energetic leadership that knows what is going on in the world that has been able and efficient in reading the world situation, not

to live under illusions that we can do this through military means which we do not have. The illusion that many Arabs have lived under for many many years.

Wisdom?

-Researcher: ““Do you consider Jordanian diplomacy to be wise?”

Mr. Khatib :”If you go back to the early days of the state, that is why I am saying it is a pattern that started with late King Abdullah I who was a very wise man, he saw things that many Arabs took fifty years in appreciating, for me this is leadership to see in advance, to see beyond the illusions of the day, and this was always the case for the leadership in Jordan. And I think today, yes, King Abdullah has only been only six years in office, and you can compare him with the rest of the whole Arab world. Who can talk to the world today more effectively than he can? In the whole Arab world Egypt, Syria, or Iraq? No body. This is the Jordanian way of approaching things, this is the Hashemite way. This is the difference between us and the rest of the region. Jordanian diplomacy played a central role.

Stability, the level of economic development, the level of national cohesion or national integration, education, everything.

-Researcher: “How can I prove this?”

Mr. Khatib: “I’ll give you an example which I always like to note. Between 1967 and 1982 Arabs had been accusing us of being too soft in accepting the political notion of solving the Arab-Israeli conflict. And they were criticizing us because we were promoting 242, now all the Arab world thinks that 242 is a biblical text. They really

believe that. It took them fifteen years of fighting Jordan, of punishing Jordan because we accepted 242. If you remember the U.N. resolution 181 of 1949. Jordan called for accepting that resolution and the whole Arab world was furious against Jordan. Today it is a wish for the vast majority of Arabs that this resolution was being applied. This is the far sight ness of Jordan and we are shy to brag about what we have and what we have done.”

Jordanian diplomacy for Palestinians:

Researcher: “ What is the Jordanian diplomacy doing for the Palestinian issue?”

Mr. Khatib:“We have always focused on our national interests, and it is part of our national interest to create a Palestinian state, and we continue to do what ever we can , but it does not depend on us . This is something that we can not really control. It really depends on the ability of the United States to pressure Israel, it depends on the internal situation in Israel, it depends on the ability of the Palestinians to put their act together and unify their action, and manage their own affairs in Gaza efficiently.”

Conclusion:

Mr. Khatib: “The foreign policy of Jordan is a moderate one, regionally and internationally. And Jordan has not taken very tough positions either way on any issue because we think that diplomacy is to find common ground with others. This is the essence of diplomacy. And I think that the failure that can be shared by many is the failure to build an Arab order that is capable of organizing joint action between Arab countries.

Jordan has done what ever it can in every stage, Jordan has shown flexibility. And if you look at Jordan’s relations with the rest of the Arab World today, I think the best way to

measure is may be the economic exchanges that go on to Jordan and the rest of the Arab world. The average interregional trade between the Arab countries does not exceed 10 percent of their foreign trade. I think that in the case of Jordan you are talking about one third of our trade that goes to the Arab world and one third of our imports come from the Arab world. So this goes far beyond the average that prevails between the Arab countries.

“I think we achieved plenty of success and we continue to achieve our goals and successes. I mean look at our neighbors, all our neighbors are stronger than Jordan and in many many ways belligerent against Jordan. Look at the Israelis, the Palestinians, the Saudis, the Syrians, and the situation in Iraq today I think for Jordan to be an island of tranquility of reason and wisdom of openness towards the whole world it is a story of great success, definitely.”

Dr. Fayez Al Tarawneh:

On the 28th of July 2005, the researcher Amal Al Ma'aytah interviewed Dr. Fayez Al-Tarawneh- Former Prime Minister of Jordan -Head of the Jordanian delegation to the Washington negotiations- and former Jordanian ambassador in Washington D.C.

Researcher: “Can you please explain to me what the role of the Jordanian diplomacy was and how well it played it during the Arab-Israeli negotiations, before and after the Madrid conference?”

Dr. Tarawneh: “Since the legal and administrative disengagement with the West Bank, Jordan declared that no body can negotiate on behalf of the Palestinians and they should have their own track as an independent sovereign body. Jordan pushed toward that end enabled the Palestinians to face the Israelis as full-fledged counterparts, and not as part of a joint delegation. Jordan provided the umbrella for the Palestinians to participate in the Madrid peace conference and insisted to split in two independent tracks. The declared Jordanian position is clear: Any negotiation should satisfy the aspiration of the Palestinian people of independence and formulating their own state with east Jerusalem as its capital.. This is the essence of the Arab initiative and our interpretation of the road map. Jordan has been employing its treaty of peace with Israel toward this endeavor. In the process, Jordan’s firm position with the Israelis and the Palestinians is categorical rejection of the Jordanian option in the West Bank and Jordan is Palestine slogan.

Researcher: “ What role did the Jordanian diplomacy play in the gulf conflicts of 1990 and 2003? What are the points of weaknesses and points of strength in Jordanian diplomacy? “

Dr. Tarawneh: “I will try to combine these questions together and some answers can be found in the questions below.

Every policy has weaknesses and strengths, depending on the circumstances and events. The Jordanian diplomacy is based on the full adherence of International Law, Charter of the UN, International Conventions and Human rights Acts. Jordan is also a member of the Arab League and Islamic Conference. In addition, Jordan has a Peace Treaty with Israel. So many times in regional and international affairs, a contradiction in positioning oneself can occur as it happened during the second Gulf war: either adherence to UNSCRs and the decision of the Arab League in joining the military action against Iraq, or, neutralize the position to absorb the internal uproar. Jordan opted for the second and had to bear the political and economic consequences. Yet, leadership is not about taking positions in conflicting moments, but it is about knowing the repercussions and search for alternative venues to come back.. i.e. if all doors are closed in your face look for possible windows to open. His Majesty Late King Hussein found the peace process as the window of opportunity to re-enter the world community again. It worked.

The Jordanian diplomacy, lead by King Abdullah II was extremely successful is convincing the world, especially the West and the world financial institutions (IBRD IMF) that Jordan is totally committed to political, economic and social reform, with democracy, human rights (especially women’s rights), the rule of law and private sector economy will be deepened in the Jordanian society.

Jordan always reminds the world that its Geo-political position, between Iraq and Palestine, put certain constraints on its accelerated speed in implementing the required reforms, especially the political one. Some would understand but others would accuse Jordan of lack of seriousness. The King and his diplomatic team are in continuous dialogue with those others to explain the objective circumstance we are facing.

Immediately after 11 September, His Majesty King Abdullah II visited Washington and met the President of the U.S.A. The Americans were in complete shock and very emotional. The King stood firmly with the American people and declared Jordan's involvement in the war against terror. But he did not waste the moment and made a wonderful presentation on the roots and origin of terrorism, indicating that regional disputes and the sense of injustice create hatred and terrorist acts. The Arab and Islamic world feel that the U.S.A. is totally biased to Israel against the just cause of the Palestinians. He urged the President for a more balanced American position vis-à-vis the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. This new position will reduce the tension and make the Americans more close to the Arab and Muslim communities. As a result of this long presentation, the President declared a new American position. He called for the resumption of the P-I negotiations that should result in the establishment of a viable independent Palestinian state in three years with a road map, adopted by the Quartet (represented by USA, Russia, EU, and the UN). Unfortunately, the invasion of Iraq put the whole initiative on hold.

Researcher: “What has been the Role of Jordanian Diplomacy in improving the economy of Jordan?”

Dr. Tarawneh: “Again, led by the King and his diplomatic and economic teams, the Jordanian diplomacy was instrumental in maximizing the financial and economic grants to Jordan, mainly from the USA, Saudi Arabia and the EU. In addition, convincing the world’s financial institutions about Jordan’s economic reform, the country was enabled to reschedule its foreign debt and to relief its foreign exchange reserves.

Researcher: “What were the main strategies and main concerns of the Jordanian diplomacy during the period from 1990-1999?”

Dr. Tarawneh: “The beginning of the 1990 decade was critical to Jordan as a result of the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. The main concern of the Jordanian Diplomacy and politics was how to salvage the deterioration in the Arab-Arab relations and the split of the Arab position vis-à-vis the international coalition. Jordan advocated the Arab-Arab solution instead of the war against Iraq. The Jordanian position resulted in a dangerous blockade against Jordan and unprecedented bad political relationships with Jordan’s classical friends in the West and the Gulf countries.

The strategy was how to lift the blockade and resume the relations with the West and GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) countries. The Middle East Peace process, based on Madrid Conference was the venue to resume the dialogue with the west and to coordinate with the Arab World, especially Egypt, Syria and the GCC countries.

After the signing of the Jordanian-Israeli Treaty of peace in 1994, the Jordanian diplomatic and political concern was maintaining the balance between the new era in the Jordanian-Israeli Relationship and the anti-peace camp in the Arab world and internally. The strategy was to employ the peace treaty to help the Palestinians in their negotiations efforts to establish their independent states.

Researcher: “What were the main strategies and main concerns of the Jordanian diplomacy during the period from 1999-2004?”

Dr. Tarawneh: “The Palestinian cause remained the main concern, in addition to the war against terrorism as a result of 11 September and its impact on Arab-American relationship and the image of Islam and the repercussions of the American occupation of Iraq.

The strategies were joining the war on terror, convincing the Arab world to resume the Arab summit conferences, training the Iraqi Armed Forces and security apparatus in order to shorten the period of occupation and to lead the interfaith dialogue as a vehicle to save the image and face of Islam (Amman Message).

Researcher: “What are the internal and external factors affecting Jordanian foreign policy?”

Dr. Tarawneh: Jordan’s foreign policy is based on moderation, centrism and solving regional and international disputes through peaceful means. Dialogue rather than military confrontation is the name of the game. There are radical groups in Jordan, basically anti peace and anti American camps who try hard to change the Jordanian political convictions of regional and international relations. Jordan’s political regime has never used force against those who differ with its political positions. On the

contrary the dialogue is open with all factions, as long as they practice their political freedom through peaceful means. They are not deprived from their political or civic rights, including general elections. But as long as they do not represent the majority, they can not dictate the Jordanian foreign policy, though they are not persecuted because of their political convictions.

Researcher:” What role do the political parties and opposition have in making foreign policy decisions?”

Dr. Tarawneh: “The role is minimal. There are no mature political parties, except for the Islamic action front, and unfortunately, their opposition is absolute in the sense that they oppose for the sake of opposition, without looking objectively at the case at hand or its ramifications on Jordan. The opposition lack the economic and social programs alternatives to the governmental programs they oppose.

Researcher:” What role does the Parliament have in making foreign policy decisions?”

Dr. Tarawneh: “The Jordanian Parliament is overwhelmingly main stream, except for the 17 members of the Islamic Action Front and some other opposition members. The majority of the Parliament believes that his Majesty is the main architect of foreign policies and they have full confidence in His Majesty’s vision and wisdom. Nevertheless, there are continuous dialogues between the government, represented by the Foreign minister, and the two houses of Parliament, represented by their International relations Committees.

Researcher:” To what extent is the government involved with the King in making foreign policy decisions?”

Dr. Tarawneh: “Both the Prime minister and the minister of Foreign Affairs are directly involved with His Majesty in formulating foreign policy, but the King is the dominant principle of foreign policy.

Researcher:” How did the Jordanian monarchs use Internal diplomacy to solve internal issues?”

Dr. Tarawneh: “Both His Majesty Late King Hussein and His Majesty King Abdullah II adopted the policy of tolerance, absorption through dialogue and pardon rather than liquidation and imprisonment”.

Researcher:” What was the Jordanian role in solving the Palestinian issue and its role in the second and third Gulf wars?

Dr. Tarawneh: “Answering this question needs volumes. It cannot be answered in a nutshell but I will try.

“Since Madrid conference, Jordan is supporting the negotiations efforts of the Palestinians to gain their independence and to establish their independent state, with East Jerusalem as its capital. From the outset, Jordan provided the umbrella for joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to enable the Palestinians to participate in the peace process, with the understanding that this Joint delegation is only for the plenary of the conference.”

On the Gulf wars:

“After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Jordan tried to prevent the formulation of the international coalition and tried hard to convince Saddam to withdraw from Kuwait. This gesture did not work because Saddam was adamant and the military coalition was already in the formulation. Jordan on the other hand was instrumental in helping to reduce the impact of sanctions against Iraq through the sanction committee of the U.N. As for the Third Gulf war, nothing much could have been done but Jordan continued its efforts to train the Iraqis in all civil and military fields to rebuild their country and to reduce the duration of the occupation”.

Researcher:” What was the role of the Jordanian diplomacy in the survival of Jordan?”

Dr. Tarawneh:

- a- The consistency of Jordan’s international relations, i.e., not jumping from East to West or from right to left.
- b- The adoption of the moderate position and the commitment to fight terrorism.
- c- The full participation in the peace process and the effectiveness of the Jordanian role in the adoption of the Arab initiative in Beirut.
- d- The continuous encountering with the G8, mainly the USA and the UK, and addressing the public opinion directly by His Majesty the King.
- e- The internal openness which prevented any radical factions to go underground.

Saleh Al Ma'aytah:

Is a retired general of the Arab Army. He is also a strategic researcher and lecturer at the University of Mu'ta. The researcher met with him on the 28th of June, 2005 in Amman and the following conversation:

Researcher:” Why was the Jordanian diplomacy misunderstood during the Gulf conflict of 1990?”

Dr. Ma'aytah: “ It is very well known that the Jordanian diplomacy and Foreign policy is based on moderateness and not interfering with the affairs of other states. The Foreign policy is headed by the King. Thus, the goal of his late Majesty King Hussein was to preserve internal stability of the country. He felt that the popular view of the people was supporting Iraq; therefore he preserved the unity of his people and explained the Jordanian position in this conflict in “The white Book”.

Researcher:” What are the internal and external influences on Jordanian foreign policy?”

Dr. Ma'aytah: “The Geographical factor in terms of the location of Jordan, its total area, economic resources, in addition to the climate all influence foreign policy decision making either positively or negatively. When we talk about geography as an influence on a country's foreign policy we have to link it to the challenges that this country is facing. The economic factor also has a great influence on Jordan's foreign policy , in addition to the demographic factor.

3-What was the role of Jordanian diplomacy during the Arab-Israeli negotiations before and after the Madrid conference?

Dr. Ma'aytah: “Jordanian diplomacy focused on trying to unite all Arab efforts on the base that the Palestinian issue is a pivotal one and the center of struggle. It stressed that all Arab countries should support the peace process until an independent Palestinian state is achieved.”

Researcher:” In your opinion, what are the points of strength and what are the points of weaknesses in Jordanian diplomacy?”

Dr. Ma'aytah: “Jordanian diplomacy is built on moderateness and not interfering in the affairs of others. Jordan does not believe in coalitions and aims at achieving world peace and human rights. It is very well respected in all international arenas and that is the most important point.”

Researcher:” What are the issues that Jordanian diplomacy managed to solve and what are the issues that it failed to solve within the Arab-Arab context?”

Dr. Ma'aytah: “Jordanian diplomacy has succeeded in mediating between the Southern Yemen and Northern Yemen and united them; it also succeeded in solving the conflict at the Arab League. There is no animosity between Jordan and any other Arab country, but we could say that Jordanian diplomacy had failed in mediating between Iraq and Kuwait in 1990 to reach a peaceful solution to their conflict.”

Researcher:” The Jordanian government tries to balance the internal and external diplomacy in dealing with the local, regional, and international issues, what tactics did the Jordanian diplomacy use?”

Dr. Ma'aytah: “Jordanian diplomacy works through the coordination between the internal and external politics through the continuous communications with the ambassadors abroad to keep them updated and connected with the various Jordanian establishments and institutions.”

Researcher:” How did the Jordanian diplomacy deal with the economic difficulties that Jordan had been subjected to?”

Dr. Ma'aytah: “In spite of the fact that Jordan lies in between two areas inflamed with struggles that have affected Jordanian economy, Jordan had been able to overcome their economic consequences through minimizing its expenses and encouraging foreign investments.

Researcher:” What role did the Jordanian diplomacy in the second Gulf war?”

Dr. Ma'aytah: “Jordanian diplomacy since the very beginning of the Kuwaiti-Iraqi conflict called for finding a peaceful solution to the conflict within Arab context. However Jordan’s position was misunderstood by the countries of the Gulf and some western countries, therefore Jordan had to face enormous economic losses.

Researcher:” What was the role of Jordanian diplomacy in preserving the holy shrines of Jerusalem?”

Dr. Ma'aytah: “The Hashemite patronage of the holy places in Jerusalem goes back to so ,any years ago, in addition to their care of the people working their, Jordanian

diplomacy headed by the Hashemite monarchs has managed to preserve that role and carry out the renovation process of Al Aqsa Mosque .

Researcher:” What are the main features of Jordanian diplomacy?”

Dr. Ma’aytah: “The main features of Jordanian diplomacy could be summarized as follows: it is moderate and neutral; it does not interfere in the Affairs of others. It respects international agreements, human rights, democracy, and fights terrorism. That is why Jordan was able to participate in the U.N. peace keeping forces for example. Jordan never interfered in the affairs of others because it is headed by the Hashemite leadership which brings people together but would never separate them.”

AYMAN AL SAFADI:

Ayman Al Safadi is the former director of King Abdullah's press office and the current editor in chief of Al Ghad daily newspaper. The researcher met with him on the 11th of August, 2005. When he started explaining:

Mr. Safadi: "Basically defining the performance of foreign policy of any country's foreign policy depends on the major issues that affects it and to what extent it has succeeded in serving your interests. Basically for Jordan there are a number of issues that are extremely important to the Jordanian foreign policy:

1. Our relation with the Palestinians and the Arab-Israeli conflict is extremely significant extremely important for Jordan, that is one criterion which one should use in measuring Jordan's foreign policy successes or failures.
2. Regional relations with Arab countries
3. International relations mainly those with the United States because of the economic, commercial ties that exist between us and them and to a certain extent Europe as well. So you need to sort of isolate each file and look at how we performed in each of them.

The peace process, the problem is that it is not a bilateral issue even though you can speak of Jordanian-Israeli relations

A multitude of components like the progress or lack of it in the Israeli-Palestinian track and the over all regional environment whether you have progress towards peace or regression in that regards. When the peace process started they started as a comprehensive solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. When Jordan entered the negotiations it entered as part of Arab countries which have collectively decided to negotiate a peace settlement with Israel then they decided to have separate talks but the over all decision, the global decision that allowed these talks to take place was a collective decision. That was a very sensitive period for the Jordanian foreign policy because supposedly you have all these countries coordinating if you follow closely you would realize that there was not enough trust and confidence among the Arab parties themselves therefore Jordan was very scared of what Syria is doing, even though they had a Jordanian-Palestinian negotiating team under the “umbrella” it turned out that the Palestinians were negotiating separately with the Israelis and hence came Oslo, that lack of trust and lack of coordination some how pushed each country to try and serve its interest while maintaining that link with the overall... What mattered to Jordan at the time was : number one: the retrieval of those lands wherever those were for symbolic political reasons because you can not go to your people and say we signed a peace treaty retrieving our land no matter how insignificant that land is but it is still a matter of sovereignty. Number two is water which was a key issue for Jordan and still is, number three : borders to have clear demarcation of borders which was something that was not done in the past, number four is the relation with Palestinians in as far as the refugees

issues which was at the time a significant issue for Jordan now it is less important at least in the Jordanian perspective and the relations with the West bank. I think Jordan got a very good deal in the peace process considering that it is one of the weakest countries in the region because it does not have the political weight that Syria for instance has and did not have the actual weight that the Palestinians had by the fact that they are dealing on daily basis with All in all I think that Jordan did well... a peace treaty that recognized its role in Jerusalem at least for the Hashemites to have some sort of a custodian role in Jerusalem which was something important. While the major issue was to recognize a role for Jordan in determining the status of refugees because this issue is very closely related to the country because it depends on who you ask there is about 1.3 to 1.6 million legal refugees in Jordan, another significant issue was the issue of water, Jordan managed to negotiate an equitable sort of an agreement where by Jordan got an acceptable deal as far as water rights are concerned. So that on all levels was a success, however, after the signing of the peace treaty it was no longer a bilateral issue, it never was a bilateral issue but it became more effected even by regional developments of course what allowed Jordan to do that was the Oslo signing Jordan could not have signed the peace treaty if the Palestinians did not do so and of course there were a lot of indications and solid information as well that the Syrians were really advancing and had the Syrians signed a peace treaty before Jordan did we would have been at a much weaker negotiating position Jordan realized all of that and that's why it moved fast it knew that its interests are better served if it signs the peace treaty before Syria signs it because our strategic importance would be diminished. part of the importance we got was symbolic importance that yet another Arab country signed a peace treaty with Israel,

talks with Syria were not getting there that fast but they were getting there and Jordan realized that and knew that and therefore it took action.

If you want to look at the this situation now as far as the Jordanian relations with Israel is concerned, Jordan has managed to maintain some sort of a cold peace with Israelis and that is substantiated by numbers, figures in terms of influx or Israelis coming to Jordan or Jordanians going to Israel, the market trade, the economic interaction, its all very very slow in minimal... That's probably due to mainly the deterioration of the peace talks on the Palestinian side.”

Researcher:” If we wanted to compare Jordanian-Israeli relations before 1999 and after 1999, what would you say?”

Mr. Safadi: “It is more a function of what is happening west of the river rather than what is happening east of the river. Even before the intifada the fact that talks with the Palestinians were not moving forward progress towards a comprehensive peace was not being made it increased public resistance to any sort of warming up of relations with the Israelis. When the intifada started the whole peace process collapsed in fact it had collapsed when Netanyahu came to power in think in 1997 or 1996 Netanyahu did not only destroy what was achieved in terms of peace negotiations, he destroyed the public confidence that was sort of developing and the possibility of finally having Arab-Israeli peace so we were sort of pushed back to point zero in terms of public acceptance”

“After 1999 again the pressure increased when we had the intifada in the year 2000 the Israeli forces reoccupied the West bank and Gaza, violence continued, more deaths, the talks collapsed and therefore the relationship came to a complete..... , however relations

did not improve but there was a line of commitment that the relations would not deteriorate beyond. And Jordan always argued that it needed to maintain that back channel with Israelis as a pressure tool because if Jordan severed its relations with the Israelis or stopped talking to them it would not be able to play a role in supporting the Palestinians or improve the negotiation positions therefore Jordan utilized that channel that it has with Israel in terms of maintaining contacts between them to step in and improve the conditions of the Palestinians and their negotiations.

Any country whether Jordan or any body else's responsibility is to serve its own interests that is number one everything else comes second that applies to the Syrians, the Saudis, the Palestinians and applies to Jordanians so its not strange that Jordan puts its national interest above everybody else's. Now in the case of Palestinians there is no contradiction serving Palestinian interests would serve Jordanian interests and serving Jordanian interests would serve Palestinian interests. The peace treaty with Israel was approved by the Parliament lets not forget that, and there different sorts of opposition to the peace treaty , there is ideological opposition which is mainly represented by the Islamic Action Front and other Islamic parties who have ideological stands towards Israel no matter what happens they do not want to have peace with that country and that is something you respect but can not allow it to dictate Jordan's policy priorities, the other kind is what I would call pragmatic opposition in which people say they would only move as far as the other party is moving in terms of ending the conditions of the conflict which are mainly the occupation of Palestinian lands so if Israel was to move forward towards ending its occupation of Palestinian lands then the pragmatic opposition would accept the peace

with Israel. The pressure increased on Jordan to at least decrease the level of interaction with Israel after the intifada and after it became obvious that the Palestinian-Israeli talks are heading a deadlock. However, I think that the country (Jordan) has made the right decision because should Jordan have opted for severing ties with Israel we would not have helped the Palestinians, we would not have helped the peace process, we would not have helped the regional Arab interests, and we would have hurt Jordanian interest because any such decision would have because first of all it's a treaty that you have entered to you cannot just drop and walk out of because its an international economic and political obligations they were acquired right as a result of the treaty concerning water, borders, cross border traffic, and all these sorts of things Jordan could not have done that. And mainly we would have been punished by the international community lets face it the United States would have been punished Jordan severely probably even much much more that it was punished in 1990 after the second Gulf war Jordan might have gotten some emotional applaud but this is not how states are run states are run in terms of interest not in terms of emotions. Then Jordan would have not have served the Palestinians and would have hurt itself so it was not an option, so I think both his late majesty and his majesty and the governments of course, however, facts do show that the deterioration of the situation west of the river have impacted our relations with Israel in terms of political coordination, economic interaction, even human and social interaction.”

Researcher:” How important is the stability of Jordan for the region’s stability?”

Mr. Safadi: “Of course the stability of Jordan is as important as to the stability of the region as the Arab Syria or Iraq or any country , the problem is that those countries are

very close to each other, there a lot of dependence- interdependence whether economic, demographic, geographic, political. Jordan is in the middle between Israel, the Palestinian territories and the rest of the Arab world, by virtue of its geographic location let alone any other roles that were played in the past it was extremely important that Jordan maintains its stability in order to protect regional stability, so it is very important and this has been recognized both regionally and internationally by the United States and elsewhere, should you have chaos in Jordan this means that 562 kilometers of border with Israel would have been open with no body there and the same applies for the borders with Saudi Arabia, Syria , and Iraq, so Jordan is an important country in the region and it has played a role, I don't want to over define the role that Jordan played, but it did play a significant role in maintaining regional stability and in pushing for some sort of moderation and reason in regional politics, I think with Jordan's claim to fame that it has been able to provide a model of good governance within in terms of local or regional and international relations. It has been a voice of moderation, openness, reason, and hence is the importance of Jordan as a country and probably I mean that is the legacy of King Hussein which is now continued by King Abdullah II. Jordan is a small poor country which is cornered, sandwiched between the Palestinian-Israeli conflict on one side and the conflict of Iraq on the other, it is situated in rough waters, in a very bad neighborhood but somehow the late king succeeded in isolating Jordan from these negative impacts.”

Researcher:” Is it the Jordanian diplomacy that enabled Jordan to survive, and how did it do that? Or what it something else? Is it a successful diplomacy?”

Mr. Safadi: “In trying to assess major diplomacy or foreign policy success, you need to bench mark. You need to have a clear criteria for assessment to be able to make a judgement. Did we succeed in uniting our relations with **Israel**? I think we did , proof is that after 1967, despite everything, Jordan managed to maintain some sort of stability, prevent chaos, and to ultimately negotiate a peace treaty. That, by any standard, did serve as much as possible given the balance of power and regional and international politics, the interest of Jordan.

Relations with the West, Europe and the United States, Jordan did succeed in projecting itself as a country that is a voice of moderation, openness, and reason. That was manifested in the economic aid, the political support Jordan is getting. And I think that the funeral of King Hussein is a testament to that. After all, lets be realistic, King Hussein was the King of a country of five million people which is less than the population of a neighbourhood in Cairo, and yet the whole world came to this funeral. It was a statement of how significant that man had been, and how significant, by association has been in the eyes of all the major powers. We have seen other Arab leaders pass away, we did not see anything even close to King Hussein’s funeral. And this is a testament of the success of the late King in nurturing relations that ultimately helped serve the interests of Jordan whether economically or politically, and that is something that can not be denied.”

Researcher:” What are the Failures of Jodanian diplomacy?”

Mr. Safadi: “For example, our relations with the Palestinians fluctuated. It was not always Jordan’s fault. Jordanian foreign policy has always been a function of events that are happening around it, that is why it is really hard to say this has been a success and this

has been a failure as a policy decision. In terms of steps, implementation or projects yes. If you go back to the details of our negotiations with the Palestinians in the 1980s for instance. Arafat comes we agree with him , he leaves, ultimately nothing happens. Did we fail? The answer is yes we failed, why? Is it our fault or that Arafat did not commit to us.

So you look at that, and this requires a sort of microscopic means to come up with an anatomy.

But, if you look at the main damages of Foreign policy, I think that the total sum would be a plus. Look at the 1990 Gulf war from an American perspective Jordan took the wrong decision and Jordan was punished for it for years, however if you look at it from the domestic perspective, a lot of people have argued that had King Hussein decided to join the coalition we would have had a repetition of the Baghdad pact in 1956 sort of reaction. A lot of people would argue that it would have been suicidal for Jordan to have joint the coalition. We had no chance; Jordan could not afford but take that stand. We were punished for it, Jordan suffered for years but ultimately every body came around and this is another testament of the success of Jordanian diplomacy”.

Researcher:” What was the main reason behind Jordan’s position in the First Gulf conflict?”

Mr. Safadi: “A number of reasons. However, I think that one has to look at the fact that public sentiment was very clearly against a global war on Iraq. Even though people did not necessarily endorse the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, they were not for the option of launching war on Iraq. So, the King did not ignore the sentiments of his people. The

public opinion was very strongly against the war on Iraq. Number two, the King had a point that war was the wrong approach and encouraged other peaceful approaches that are less costly to the region. The King firmly believed in and worked for the peaceful approach. And I think, if I look back now, what did the Gulf war achieve? It achieved ten years of suffering, ten years of uncertainty, tens of billions of dollars of the region's wealth wasted on a war that could have been avoided. Was that a failure? Probably if you are looking at it from the perspective of an American analyst sitting in Washington and not paying enough attention to these details. You would consider this a failure.

From my, not official, personal point of view, I think we had no choice, and I think we were right.

I think what happened after the passing away of His Majesty King Hussein , Jordan redefined its policy priorities. The late Majesty was a product of circumstances that shaped his thinking, policies, and approaches. He assumed his responsibilities in the 1950s. King Hussein had to negotiate his way through a very troubled neighborhood. And therefore had to play a role in the region not only as an offensive mechanism, but also as a defensive mechanism. Just as Syrians thought that they could interfere in our affairs Jordan also had to show that it can also pose a threat to them, so they would keep their distance. So it was in a way a defensive mechanism. Jordan could not but play a regional role, it could not reduce its role and say it's a small country and these are our borders. Everything was so interdependent, Jamal Abd Al Nasser would make a speech in Cairo and people would go to the streets in Amman. So one could not ignore regional politics. King Hussein grew up under his late Grandfather King Abdullah I who was

clearly in pursuit of one Arab Kingdom that is why the revolution started. It was a matter of upbringing , there is a Hashemite legacy there whivh King Hussein grew under and was affected by. Because of the interdependence of politics and the fact that very few of the region were willing to recognize nation states. Very few were willing to recognize Jordan as a country. As a way of defending himself , King Hussein had to go out, the Saudis, the Egptians that Jordan can pose a threat, play a role in Iraq and sometimes go to Yemen as a signal to Egyptians and Saudis not out of the neccisity of being there.

So regional politics dictated that Jordan played a role beyond that and of course the Palestinian issue. Palestine was a part of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, and the Rabat summit in 1974 took that responsibility away from Jordan and gave it to the PLO.”

Researcher:” What are the points of strength and points of weaknesses in Jordanian diplomacy after 1999?”

Mr. Safadi: “After King Hussein passed away, I think we redefined these priorities. The region somehow settled into the concept of nation states. Syrians probably do not like us as much, but still Jordan is recognized as a state and they can not say that Jordan is a part of Syria. Saudi- Jordanian relations have stabilized, the two countries have gotten over conflicts of the past, and they realized that they need to work together because they do represent some similar stands on a number of issues against some other countries that do not have similar stands. So things have stabilized, the Palestinian issue is under the PLO control now, you have the PNA (Palestinian National Authority) emplaced in the West Bank that is negotiating on behalf of Palestinians and running Palestinian affairs. So, I think Jordan has redefined the means through which we can serve our national interests

by focusing more on Jordan. So Jordan could play a supporting role for the Palestinians in their negotiations but Jordan will not negotiate on behalf of them and will not try to push itself as a lead player, so it would only get involved as much as it is needed without triggering alarms among others.

That redefinition allowed us to focus more on Jordan, and have less involvement in regional politics than it had before. Jordan's policies now focus on the achievement of a more stable Jordan, a more economically prosperous Jordan, a stronger Jordan that is more capable of playing a supporting role for the Palestinians and others. The policies now focus more on domestic issues. What is our major problem: is it the Arab-Israeli conflict or is it poverty. I think that a lot of people would argue that at this point the bigger issue for Jordan is poverty not Israel. Jordan better focus its national resources and energy on alleviating poverty, fighting unemployment, securing water resources, improving the level of education, and opening up opportunities for tens of thousands of new comers to the labor market without abandoning its regional responsibilities. Jordan redefined them in a way that corresponds with its actual ability to play a role."

Researcher: "What was Jordan's position in regards to the last war on Iraq?"

Mr. Safadi: Jordan was pragmatic, and we in Jordan recognized that the best we can do is serve ourselves. The priority was we need to protect Jordan first. I was in the United States when 9/11 took place, I was still working for the office of His Majesty. We decided to deal with the event as Jordan, we have to safe Jordan and we should not approach this as Arabs abd I said : " Now we are Jordan because Jordan is peaceful, Jordan is moderate, Jordan does not advocate terrorism". If we were going to say the

word Arab we were going to be accused of many things, so its important to save your interest because the West started accusing any body who is an Arabor muslim of terrorism”.

When it came to Iraq I think it was clear that there is nothing we can do to stop the war from happening. America pretty much made up its mind and there was no stopping it. Jordan could have said well, we are against you and we are opposing you, then it would have been the only country to say that. Americans were not in a listening mood, for them it was “ you are either with us or against us”. Jordan explained to the Americans that it will not join them and will not send troops because it had to protect itself. Jordan saved itself and received one billion dollars in additional aid to the country to compensate for the loss of the Iraqi market. Jordan made some efforts and offered advice to the Americans to avert the war, but the Americans was not listening and Jordan was not ready to get into a confrontation with them.

Jordan played a bigger role in the war against terror. Jordan was not shy that it was part of it. Jordan provided intelligence support, however it did not send troops. It also provided logistic support, sent a hospital to Afghanistan but.

This is another success for Jordanian diplomacy to have survived the war on Iraq the way that it did. Jordan played its cards right, it was very pragmatic, and it made the right decision, and as result it did not pay as high of a price than was expected when the war started.

Researcher:” Can you tell me about Jordanian internal diplomacy?”

Mr. Safadi: “You have to give that to the Hashemites. Jordan is the only country in the region where no body was executed for political reasons. People who even tried to topple

King Hussein ultimately ended up serving as ministers. So I think that public diplomacy was played very masterfully, very articulately by the late King Hussein. And King Abdullah is the same, he is able to go visit any village and sit down, eat their food and drink their tea, talk their language, and communicate and relate to. The monarchy did succeed in having a link and communication with the people. The trait of personal involvement in addressing the issues of the people is a trade mark of both King Hussein and King Abdullah.

The political environment in which King Abdullah operates dictated its own tools of operation

Researcher:” What about the role of Jordanian diplomacy in improvinf the economy?”

One must say that, since King Abdullah took over he has been playing the role of a sales person, trying to market Jordan.

To summerize and evaluate the Jordan’s diplomacy:

You measure foreign policy successes or failures on the issue that are more relevant to you as a country.

Researcher:”How do you find Jordan’s diplomacy within the region and the international spectrum?”

Mr. Safadi: “Regional relations: “I think they have been pretty good, Iraq was beyond our ability to influence or reach. Jordan needs to work harder on adjusting to the new reality of Iraq. There is a new structure in Iraq that does not see Jordan favorably at all thus it has to work very hard on trying to absorb the situation there.

The Gulf countries: I think Jordan is on the right track. Syria I think the problem is with them not with us, they have to decide what is it that they want, and I think that their foreign policy is a failure not ours.

Palestinian-Israeli: Jordan made a decision to reduce all direct involvement. Some would argue that this is a wrong decision others would say it is a right one. I would say we can not disengage from the Arab-Israeli conflict because as much as the PLO would claim that there is a domestic Jordanian-Palestinian dimension to the Jordanian policy, there should also be a domestic Jordanian dimension to Palestinian policy.

Relations with the West: I think they are very good. I think that Jordan has managed to build on the legacy that King Hussein has left. In terms of Jordan being a key state not in terms of demographic or geographic factors alone but also in terms spreading of our sort of thinking in the region supporting openness and moderation. That is something that the Jordanian diplomacy has managed to build on .

You can not isolate diplomacy from internal affairs, thus we in Jordan need to further on reform in Jordan whether political or economic because that will affect Jordan's foreign policy success .

Conclusion:

There have been ups and down, naturally, but I think the balance and the total sum has been positive.

الجنس

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid انثى	47	39.2	39.2	39.2
ذكر	73	60.8	60.8	100.0
Total	120	100.0	100.0	

العمر

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid من ٣٠ الى ٤٠	68	56.7	56.7	56.7
41-50	23	19.2	19.2	75.8
51-60	21	17.5	17.5	93.3
61 فأكثر	8	6.7	6.7	100.0
Total	120	100.0	100.0	

التحصيل

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid بكالوريوس	63	52.5	52.5	52.5
ماجستير	28	23.3	23.3	75.8
دكتورة	29	24.2	24.2	100.0
Total	120	100.0	100.0	

التخصص

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid سياسة	78	65.0	65.0	65.0
اقتصاد	13	10.8	10.8	75.8
هندسة	15	12.5	12.5	88.3
علوم طبية	5	4.2	4.2	92.5
اخرى	9	7.5	7.5	100.0
Total	120	100.0	100.0	

الدخل

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	39	32.5	32.5	32.5
فما دون 300	21	17.5	17.5	50.0
300-500	19	15.8	15.8	65.8
500-700	15	12.5	12.5	78.3
700-900	26	21.7	21.7	100.0
900 فما فوق	120	100.0	100.0	
Total				

Q2

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	61	50.8	50.8	50.8
مؤيد بقوة	49	40.8	40.8	91.7
مؤيد	10	8.3	8.3	100.0
معارض	120	100.0	100.0	
Total				

Q2

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	61	50.8	50.8	50.8
مؤيد بقوة	49	40.8	40.8	91.7
مؤيد	10	8.3	8.3	100.0
معارض	120	100.0	100.0	
Total				

Q3

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	74	61.7	61.7	61.7
مؤيد بقوة	39	32.5	32.5	94.2
مؤيد	7	5.8	5.8	100.0
معارض	120	100.0	100.0	
Total				

Q4

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	43	35.8	35.8	35.8
مؤيد بقوة	64	53.3	53.3	89.2
مؤيد	13	10.8	10.8	100.0
معارض	120	100.0	100.0	
Total				

Q5

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid مؤيد بقوة	56	46.7	46.7	46.7
مؤيد	52	43.3	43.3	90.0
معارض	12	10.0	10.0	100.0
Total	120	100.0	100.0	

Q6

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid مؤيد بقوة	48	40.0	40.0	40.0
مؤيد	53	44.2	44.2	84.2
معارض	19	15.8	15.8	100.0
Total	120	100.0	100.0	

Q7

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid مؤيد بقوة	56	46.7	46.7	46.7
مؤيد	49	40.8	40.8	87.5
معارض	15	12.5	12.5	100.0
Total	120	100.0	100.0	

Q8

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid مؤيد بقوة	55	45.8	45.8	45.8
مؤيد	49	40.8	40.8	86.7
معارض	16	13.3	13.3	100.0
Total	120	100.0	100.0	

Q9

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid مؤيد بقوة	54	45.0	45.0	45.0
مؤيد	56	46.7	46.7	91.7
معارض	10	8.3	8.3	100.0
Total	120	100.0	100.0	

Q10

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid مؤيد بقوة	73	60.8	60.8	60.8
مؤيد	40	33.3	33.3	94.2
معارض	7	5.8	5.8	100.0
Total	120	100.0	100.0	

One-Sample Statistics

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
الجنس	120	.6083	.49017	.04475
العمر	120	1.7417	.97443	.08895
التحصيل	120	1.7167	.83196	.07595
التخصص	120	1.7833	1.25814	.11485
الدخل	120	2.7333	1.55425	.14188
Q1	120	1.3667	.51748	.04724
Q2	120	1.5750	.64381	.05877
Q3	120	1.4417	.60524	.05525
Q4	120	1.7500	.63841	.05828
Q5	120	1.6333	.66019	.06027
Q6	120	1.7583	.71002	.06482
Q7	120	1.6583	.69204	.06317
Q8	120	1.6750	.70009	.06391
Q9	120	1.6333	.63422	.05790
Q10	120	1.4500	.60599	.05532

One-Sample Test

	Test Value = 0					
	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
					Lower	Upper
الجنس	13.595	119	.000	.6083	.5197	.6969
العمر	19.580	119	.000	1.7417	1.5655	1.9178
التحصيل	22.603	119	.000	1.7167	1.5663	1.8670
التخصص	15.527	119	.000	1.7833	1.5559	2.0108
الدخل	19.265	119	.000	2.7333	2.4524	3.0143
Q1	28.931	119	.000	1.3667	1.2731	1.4602
Q2	26.799	119	.000	1.5750	1.4586	1.6914
Q3	26.093	119	.000	1.4417	1.3323	1.5511
Q4	30.028	119	.000	1.7500	1.6346	1.8654
Q5	27.102	119	.000	1.6333	1.5140	1.7527
Q6	27.128	119	.000	1.7583	1.6300	1.8867
Q7	26.250	119	.000	1.6583	1.5332	1.7834
Q8	26.209	119	.000	1.6750	1.5485	1.8015
Q9	28.211	119	.000	1.6333	1.5187	1.7480
Q10	26.211	119	.000	1.4500	1.3405	1.5595

الجنس

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid انثى	47	39.2	39.2	39.2
ذكر	73	60.8	60.8	100.0
Total	120	100.0	100.0	

التحصيل

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid بكالوريوس	63	52.5	52.5	52.5
ماجستير	28	23.3	23.3	75.8
دكتورة	29	24.2	24.2	100.0
Total	120	100.0	100.0	

العمر

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid من ٣٠ الى ٤٠	68	56.7	56.7	56.7
41-50	23	19.2	19.2	75.8
51-60	21	17.5	17.5	93.3
61 فأكثر	8	6.7	6.7	100.0
Total	120	100.0	100.0	

التخصص

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid سياسة	78	65.0	65.0	65.0
اقتصاد	13	10.8	10.8	75.8
هندسة	15	12.5	12.5	88.3
علوم طبية	5	4.2	4.2	92.5
اخرى	9	7.5	7.5	100.0
Total	120	100.0	100.0	

الدخل

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	39	32.5	32.5	32.5
فما دون 300	21	17.5	17.5	50.0
300-500	19	15.8	15.8	65.8
500-700	15	12.5	12.5	78.3
700-900	26	21.7	21.7	100.0
900 فما فوق	120	100.0	100.0	
Total				

Q1

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	62	51.7	51.7	51.7
مؤيد بقوة	53	44.2	44.2	95.8
مؤيد	5	4.2	4.2	100.0
معارض	120	100.0	100.0	
Total				

Q2

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	55	45.8	45.8	45.8
مؤيد بقوة	57	47.5	47.5	93.3
مؤيد	8	6.7	6.7	100.0
معارض	120	100.0	100.0	
Total				

Q3

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	60	50.0	50.0	50.0
مؤيد بقوة	52	43.3	43.3	93.3
مؤيد	8	6.7	6.7	100.0
معارض	120	100.0	100.0	
Total				

Q4

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	64	53.3	53.3	53.3
مؤيد بقوة	47	39.2	39.2	92.5
مؤيد	9	7.5	7.5	100.0
معارض	120	100.0	100.0	
Total				

Q5

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid مؤيد بقوة	47	39.2	39.2	39.2
مؤيد	53	44.2	44.2	83.3
معارض	20	16.7	16.7	100.0
Total	120	100.0	100.0	

Q6

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid مؤيد بقوة	44	36.7	36.7	36.7
مؤيد	64	53.3	53.3	90.0
معارض	12	10.0	10.0	100.0
Total	120	100.0	100.0	

Q7

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid مؤيد بقوة	49	40.8	40.8	40.8
مؤيد	51	42.5	42.5	83.3
معارض	20	16.7	16.7	100.0
Total	120	100.0	100.0	

Q8

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid مؤيد بقوة	53	44.2	44.2	44.2
مؤيد	58	48.3	48.3	92.5
معارض	9	7.5	7.5	100.0
Total	120	100.0	100.0	

Q9

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid مؤيد بقوة	53	44.2	44.2	44.2
مؤيد	60	50.0	50.0	94.2
معارض	7	5.8	5.8	100.0
Total	120	100.0	100.0	

Q10

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid مؤيد بقوة	53	44.2	44.2	44.2
مؤيد	55	45.8	45.8	90.0
معارض	12	10.0	10.0	100.0
Total	120	100.0	100.0	

One-Sample Test

	Test Value = 000					
	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
					Lower	Upper
Q1	28.841	119	.000	1.5250	1.4203	1.6297
Q2	28.781	119	.000	1.6083	1.4977	1.7190
Q3	27.765	119	.000	1.5667	1.4549	1.6784
Q4	26.649	119	.000	1.5417	1.4271	1.6562
Q5	27.175	119	.000	1.7750	1.6457	1.9043
Q6	30.064	119	.000	1.7333	1.6192	1.8475
Q7	26.687	119	.000	1.7583	1.6279	1.8888
Q8	28.820	119	.000	1.6333	1.5211	1.7456
Q9	29.681	119	.000	1.6167	1.5088	1.7245
Q10	27.751	119	.000	1.6583	1.5400	1.7767

One-Sample Test

	Test Value = 1.5					
	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
					Lower	Upper
Q1	.473	119	.637	.0250	-.0797	.1297
Q2	1.939	119	.055	.1083	-.0023	.2190
Q3	1.181	119	.240	.0667	-.0451	.1784
Q4	.720	119	.473	.0417	-.0729	.1562
Q5	4.210	119	.000	.2750	.1457	.4043
Q6	4.047	119	.000	.2333	.1192	.3475
Q7	3.921	119	.000	.2583	.1279	.3888
Q8	2.353	119	.020	.1333	.0211	.2456
Q9	2.142	119	.034	.1167	.0088	.2245
Q10	2.650	119	.009	.1583	.0400	.2767

One-Sample Statistics

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Q1	120	1.5250	.57923	.05288
Q2	120	1.6083	.61214	.05588
Q3	120	1.5667	.61812	.05643
Q4	120	1.5417	.63373	.05785
Q5	120	1.7750	.71552	.06532
Q6	120	1.7333	.63157	.05765
Q7	120	1.7583	.72176	.06589
Q8	120	1.6333	.62083	.05667
Q9	120	1.6167	.59668	.05447
Q10	120	1.6583	.65460	.05976